公平竞争环境与发展循环经济

循环经济的发展需要许多必要条件，其中，公平竞争环境是发展的前提。作者从十个方面简述了在传统经济体制下经济处在不公平竞争环境中勉强发展的状况，提出了创造公平竞争环境的基本思路和对策建议。     

论我国民营企业的核心权利及其确立的现实意义

民营企业享有生存权、产权、发展权和竞争权，四项权利构成民营企业权利体系的核心权利，承认并保护民营企业的核心权利具有极为重要的理论和实践意义。     

广东温氏集团企业“和”文化精神的制度化研究

中国传统文化及其影响下的家族制企业文化基于原始血缘伦理关系,具有“和而统”的特点。要适应现代市场竞争,就必须在普适法则的基础上包容多样性,并保持一种有张力的平衡,实现真正的“和而不同”。这需要制度制衡机制,将中国传统文化中的“和”文化精神制度化,创建竞争制衡的“和而不同”企业文化。广东温氏集团的成功就在于它实现了这种文化整合与创新,使传统家族制企业在普遍秩序中开拓出广阔的发展空间。     

高校品牌竞争优势及其法则

学校品牌竞争的目标是社会满意最大化,品牌忠诚最大化。高校的教育服务产品面临学生的就学市场、社会人才市场的选择和竞争,高等教育产品的市场竞争类型是垄断竞争市场。要确认本校的竞争优势并选择相对竞争优势,采取定位准确的品牌市场竞争法则,制订并实施学校、专业、课程营销组合策略。     

M公司外部环境和优劣势研究

M公司所处的外部宏观环境、铝型材行业竞争态势及公司自身内部条件表明,M公司存在诸多威胁和有利条件,企业内部也具有自身的优劣势.这表明M公司只有进行品牌创建,实施品牌策略,才能在激烈的市场竞争中立于不败之地.     

论企业整体竞争力的提升

企业的整体竞争力是指企业应对各种环境的能力。是比核心竞争力观念更为先进的一种理念。应从系统的、联系的、发展的观点理解整体竞争力，并从企业市场应对能力、关键信息处理能力、人力资源开发能力、财务经营能力、基本管理能力等方面入手，寻求提高企业整体竞争力的有效途径。     

标尺竞争法在公司投资决策中的应用

论文主要分析了标尺竞争法在公司投资决策中应用的问题。标尺竞争法是一种相对常见的对配电行业公司进行监督的方法,论文将其应用到配电行业公司的投资决策中,并运用标尺竞争法的“影子公司”概念构建“虚拟模型公司”。论文对“虚拟模型公司”的选择问题与选择对策进行分析,找出适合标尺竞争法在公司投资决策中应用的模式。     

Variable labour supply, specialisation-based external economies, and capital inflow

This paper examines the impact of exogenous capital inflow on prices, production, labour supply, and welfare in the presence of specialisation-based externalities. The paper utilises a simple model of an economy that produces one-final good by means of capital, labour, and a large number of varieties of an intermediate good. The intermediate good is produced by means of capital and labour. The supply of capital is exogenous but the supply of labour is endogenous. The presence of internal economies of scale in the intermediate good industry gives rise to specialisation-based external economies in the production of the final good. Perfect competition prevails in the final good industry whereas the intermediate good industry operates under Chamberlinian monopolistic competition. It is shown that exogenous capital inflow decreases labour supply and increases welfare only if the elasticity of substitution between leisure and the final good is equal to or less than unity. The paper also shows that, if trade opens up between two otherwise similar economies, a capital rich country would be a net importer of varieties of the intermediate good.     

Winner-take-all price competition

Summary. We analyze an oligopoly model of homogeneous product price competition that allows for discontinuities in demand and/or costs. Conditions under which only zero profit equilibrium outcomes obtain in such settings are provided. We then illustrate through a series of examples that the conditions provided are “tight” in the sense that their relaxation leads to positive profit outcomes. Received: April 7, 2000; revised version: September 14, 2000     

Delegation and polarization of platforms in political competition

Summary. We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters. The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates is feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates in equilibrium to a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party's ideology. In a variety of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued formally here that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized. Received: January 10, 2002; revised version: May 8, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We thank Alberto Alesina, Levent Ko?kesen, Antonio Merlo, Ronny Razin, Vijay Krishna, Alessandro Lizzeri, and seminar participants at Alicante, Columbia, Copenhagen, and NYU for helpful comments. We also thank an anonymous referee for its useful suggestions. A good fraction of this research was conducted while Ok was a visitor in the Department of Economics at University of Alicante; he thanks for the kind hospitality of this institution. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education through grant CICYT BEC2001-0535 (Faulí-Oller) and BEC2001-0980 (Ortu?o-Ortín). Correspondence to:I. Ortu?o-Ortin