Optimal sale across venues and auctions with a buy-now option

We characterize the optimal selling mechanism for a seller who faces demand demarcated by a high and a low end and who can access an (online) auction site (by paying an access cost) in addition to using his own store that can be used as a posted price selling venue. We first solve for the optimal mechanism of a direct revelation game in which there is no venue-restriction constraint. We find that the direct optimal mechanism must necessarily incorporate a certain kind of pooling. We then show that even with the venue constraint, the seller can use a two stage indirect mechanism that implements the allocation rule from the optimal direct mechanism, and uses the venues in an optimal fashion. The first stage of the indirect mechanism is a posted price at the store. If the object is not sold, we move to stage two, which involves an auction at the auction site. A feature of this auction is a buy-now option which is essential for implementing the pooling feature of the optimal direct mechanism. We also show that the buy-now option in the optimal mechanism is of a “temporary” variety, and that a “permanent” buy-now option, in contrast, cannot implement the optimal mechanism. Auctions with a temporary buy-now option are in widespread use on eBay. We thank the Associate Editor, George Deltas, for his insightful comments. We also thank seminar participants at the University of Basel and the SAET conference 2007.     

Studying the level-effect in conjoint analysis: An application of efficient experimental designs for hyper-parameter estimation

Research in marketing, and business in general, involves understanding when effect-sizes are expected to be large and when they are expected to be small. An example is the understanding of the level-effect in marketing, where the effect of product attributes on utility is positively related to the number of levels present among choice alternatives. Knowing when consumers are sensitive to the competing levels of attributes is an important aspect of merchandising, selling and promotion. In this paper, we propose a model and a method for studying the level-effect in conjoint analysis. The model combines perceptual theories in psychology to arrive at a non-linear specification of hyper-parameters in a hierarchical model. The method applies an experimental design criterion for efficient estimation of hyper-parameters. The proposed model and method are validated using a national sample of respondents.      

"十二五"时期我国价格总水平趋势分析及建议

本文首先系统总结了20世纪90年代以来我国价格运行情况及主要特点,接着在分析我国通货膨胀成因及主要类型的基础上,提出了六项通货膨胀预警指标,并对十二五时期价格总水平趋势影响因素及通胀风险进行了全面深入剖析。之后,深入阐述十二五时期我国价格波动需要密切关注的几个方面。最后,结合我国实际情况,围绕加快推进经济发展方式转变、努力保持价格总水平基本稳定提出了具体对策建议。     

When should entrepreneurs expedite or delay opportunity exploitation?

We theorize on the performance implications of the timing at which entrepreneurs stop exploring their business opportunities and start exploiting them. Using an optimal-stopping approach, we characterize the time when exploitation should begin based primarily on when an entrepreneur's ignorance has been sufficiently reduced through knowledge accumulation. This “ignorance threshold” captures a tradeoff between the time needed to increase legitimacy and the necessity to act now to minimize competition. Changes in legitimacy and competition are based on how entrepreneurs manage their knowledge (tacit versus explicit) under differing degrees of novelty for the business opportunity. These changes, in turn, impact the performance and timing of opportunity exploitation.     

基于并行混沌遗传混合算法的多用户检测

在经济全球化的大环境下,外包为何会在作为推动自由贸易发展主力的美国引起轩然大波,吸引政府、民众和媒体的广泛注意,确实是值得我们思考的问题。本文从外包概念的兴起及发展出发,讨论近年来以美国为代表的外包业务发展特点和趋势,分析离岸外包对美国就业市场的影响。     

我国得自外商直接投资的比较利益分析

我国在引进FDI中,存在着对外资各种形式的“超国民待遇”,存在着各地方政府由于竞相竞争引致的恶性博弈(不合作博弈),存在着征税体制上给外商运用“转移定价”大幅度逃税的巨大漏洞,在外资总量发展、GDP持续增长和产业结构进步的同时,我国所获的静态比较利益和动态比较利益都十分有限。因此,我国利用外资的质量和效率亟待进一步提高。     

Some problems in modelling the optimal division of a ‘cake’ between an unknown number of participants

The trade-off between the survival time of a fixed population and its consumption rates, when resources are exhaustible, has been studied by Koopmans. A link is established between this model and the traditional neoclassical literature on optimum population. The model is embedded in a larger model in which limited control over population growth rates is feasible, but in which the initial population size acts as a constraint on development. The optimal depletion rate of the exhaustible resource and optimal survival times are then explored. This facilitates a sensitivity analysis of the optimal policy and a discussion of the robustness of the results of Koopmans.     

Maximal asymptotic power and efficiency of two-sample tests based on generalized U-Statistics

In this article a systematic study is given of the asymptotic behavior of two-sample tests based on U-Statistics with arbitrary antisymmetric kernels . Besides the investigation under the hypothesis and under fixed alternatives we determine the local power as a function of as well as its maximizing value _opt. Moreover formulas for the asymptotic relative efficiency ARE(₂,₁) of the ₂-test with respect to the ₁-test are derived. It turns out that _opt also yields the most efficient test in the sense that ARE(_opt,)1 for all (admissible) kernels .     

MACROECONOMIC POLICY EVALUATION AND OPTIMAL CONTROL THEORY: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Abstract. This survey addresses the recent literature on the application of optimal control theory and game theory to macroeconomic policy evaluation and design. This literature focuses on strategic interactions between governments and private agents engaged in dynamic non-cooperative games and emphasizes such issues as precommitment, credibility and reputation as important and endemic aspects of optimal policy design. A dominant theme is the problem of dynamic inconsistency and the inferiority of an equilibrium in single-stage full-information games without commitment. This may be alleviated in repeated games involving reputation effects and threat strategies designed to coerce rivals into pursuing particular strategies and to sustain a sequential equilibrium. The type and characteristics of a sequential equilibrium also depend importantly upon the information structure conditioning players'beliefs under uncertainty. Included here are separating and pooling equilibria, involving notions of learning, signalling and information revelation. Additional dimensions exist in stochastic systems which introduce other forms of uncertainty. Optimal control and game theory have also been applied to international macroeconomic policy design, with emphasis on the potential costs and benefits of non-cooperative and cooperative behaviour between countries and problems of international policy coordination.     

THE ECONOMICS OF THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT

Abstract. The recognition that economic activity is contributing to climatic change, with attendant costs that may be of large magnitudes, has set in motion a substantial research effort. This paper seeks to review the contribution of economics to analysis of the greenhouse effect and to the policies and instruments suggested as means of mitgiating its damage.
A brief overview of the causes and consequences of global warming is given, and a number of energy-economy forecasting models are examined. As the costs of global warming depend upon the extent to which preventative and adaptive measures are undertaken, the techniques available to evaluate these costs are surveyed.
We examine extant targets for greenhouse gas emissions reduction, and explore the frameworks within which optimal policy targets can be designed. The paper also considers the narrower question of (minimized) abatement costs, and surveys the types of models used to estimate them.
The merits of alternative policy instruments are examined, paying particular attention to the role that risk and uncertainty, and the costs of monitoring and implementation of policy under conditions of imperfect information, may play in the choice of instruments. Problems of international co-operation in the development of abatement policy are examined, and we consider the compensations (across both nations and generations) that are likely to be necessary conditions for effective action.