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991.
We analyze the possibility of efficient trade with informationally interdependent valuations and with a dispersed ownership. A main role is played by the effects of adverse selection on incentive payments and budget constraints. Variations in the degree of interdependence directly influence the incentive payments and ultimately lead to a tightening or relaxation of the budget constraint, thus affecting the ability to achieve efficient trade. We derive precise possibility conditions for efficient trade, and we offer a framework in which the interplay of insights previously obtained by Akerlof (Quart. J. Econom. 89 (1970) 488), Myerson and Satterthwaite (J. Econom. Theory 28 (1983) 265), and Cramton et al. (Econometrica 55 (1987) 615) can be analyzed. In addition, we discuss to what extent possibility results previously obtained for private values environments can be generalized. 相似文献
992.
Abstract. It is well-known that the legal form adopted by a firm determines the type of legal responsibility borne by its owners in
case of bankruptcy. In this paper we argue that a firm under a limited liability status should be characterized by a higher
than average bankruptcy probability, which ultimately captures their risk exposure when output is affected by exogenous shocks.
To test this prediction we extend Lee's (1976) switching regressions model to a panel dataset of 1313 Spanish firms from 1990–1994,
separating them into corporate and entrepreneurial forms (with/without limited liability, respectively). We consider both
random effects and fixed effects panel data models, taking into account the potential endogeneity between risk exposure and
the legal form choice. Our results confirm the hypothesis that firms under limited liability have significant higher risk
exposure than firms under unlimited liability.
The authors gratefully acknowledge valuable suggestions from Maite Martínez-Granado, A. Jorge Padilla, Javier Suárez and two
anonymous referees. Data and financial support provided by the Fundación Empresa Pública (Madrid) and comments from participants
at seminars held at CEMFI, Simposio de Análisis Económico and Universidad de Vigo are also sincerely appreciated. Mr. Campos
particularly acknowledges research funding by the University of Las Palmas. 相似文献
993.
Agostino Manduchi 《Journal of Economic Theory》2004,116(2):347-356
A model of advertising and price distributions is investigated whereby each seller can contact different buyers, whose preferences are identical, with different probabilities. The model features a continuum of equilibria parametrized by the ratio of the buyers contacted by one seller—differing across “market segments”—and by the other sellers. In general, the sellers practice price discrimination across segments. More asymmetric equilibria correspond to higher volumes of transactions and higher expected transaction prices. This results in a lower expected utility for the buyers and higher expected profits; thus, identifying areas of influence can help the sellers to support collusion. 相似文献
994.
We apply an environmentally differentiated duopoly model to the analysis of environmental policy involving consumer subsidies based on the emission levels of the products consumers purchase. More specifically, we consider the environmental and welfare effects of subsidizing consumers who purchase environmentally friendly goods in the case of a partially covered market with a Cournot duopoly. We show that, paradoxically, the subsidy policy degrades the environment, and that the optimal policy depends on the degree of marginal social valuation of environmental damage. That is, if the marginal social valuation of environmental damage is larger than a certain value, a consumer-based environmental subsidy policy is not socially optimal. 相似文献
995.
This paper analyzes oligopolistic markets with network externalities. Exploiting a minimal complementarity structure on the model primitives that allows for pure network goods, we prove existence of non-trivial fulfilled-expectations equilibrium. We formalize the concept of industry viability, investigate its determinants, and show that it improves with more firms in the market and/or by technological progress. These results enlighten some well-known conclusions from case studies in the management strategy literature. We also characterize the effects of market structure on industry performance, which depart substantially from ordinary markets. The approach relies on lattice-theoretic methods, supplemented with basic insights from nonsmooth analysis. 相似文献
996.
Carsten Sprenger 《Journal of Comparative Economics》2011,39(2):260-277
We use a large data set of Russian manufacturing firms to describe the ownership structure in the Russian industry at the end of the mass privatization program in 1994 and its subsequent evolution. The data shows a high, but gradually decreasing ownership stakes of firm insiders (managers and workers). We estimate the effect of a wide range of firm characteristics on the decision to privatize, the initial ownership structure after privatization, and on subsequent changes of ownership stakes. We test and find support for several predictions of the model by Aghion and Blanchard (1998). For example, collusion among workers makes them more reluctant to sell shares to outsiders. Firms in financial distress show a higher incidence of insiders selecting the option of privatization leading to high insider ownership. This can be explained by their desire to insure against unemployment in the case of restructuring by outsiders. No evidence is found of a sequencing in privatization according to the performance of firms before privatization. A methodological novelty of this paper is the application of a tobit model with sample selection to the choice of ownership stakes. 相似文献
997.
Krešimir ?igi? 《Journal of Comparative Economics》2011,(4):533-556
We show that social welfare in the setup where the government lacks the full ability to commit to its trade policies may exceed the social welfare when the government possesses full commitment power if consumer surplus is part of the social welfare function. This is never the case in the standard, “third market” framework of strategic trade policy. We provide two examples in which consumer surplus matters: the “home market” and the “intra-industry trade” setup. The policy instruments under consideration are import tariffs and export subsidies and there are R&D spillovers from the domestic to the foreign firm. 相似文献
998.
Krešimir ?igi? Ilir Maçi 《Economic Modelling》2011,28(3):1042-1049
We study the potential loss in social welfare and changes in incentives to invest in R&D that result when the market leading firm is deprived of its position. We show that under plausible assumptions like free entry or repeated market interactions there is a social value of market leadership and its mechanical removal by means of competition policy is likely to be harmful for society. 相似文献
999.
Shravan Luckraz 《Economic Modelling》2011,28(6):2873-2876
In a recent paper, Tramontana (Economic Modelling, 27; 350-357, 2010) investigates the stability properties of a Cournot Duopoly game when the demand function is isoelastic. In this note, we show that for some well known applications of two-stage Cournot games (D. Aspremont and Jacquemin, American Economic Review, 78, 1122-1137, 1988) an isoelastic demand function can guarantee both the existence and the uniqueness of a Nash Equilibrium even in cases where existence is not obtained with linear demands. 相似文献
1000.
Summary This paper provides a theory of intertemporal pricing in a small market with differential information about the realizations of a stochastic process which determines demand. We study the sequential equilibria in stationary strategies of the stochastic game between a seller and buyer. The seller has zero cost of producing one unit of a non-durable good in all market periods. The buyer's value for the good is a random variable governed by a simple Markov process. At the beginning of each period the unit's value is determined by nature and is privately revealed to the buyer. The seller posts a single price offer each period, which the buyer either accepts or rejects. Only two types of price paths emerge in equilibrium: either prices are constant, or they have persistent cycles between a low and a high value. In both cases, however, prices are sticky in the sense that changes in price are less frequent than changes in the economy's fundamentals.We thank John Rust and Asher Wolinsky for helpful comments. We also gratefully acknowledge financial support from NSF grant SES 89-09242. 相似文献