On Stackelberg games in a homogeneous product market

In a homogeneous product duopoly with concave demand and strictly convex costs we bring together all the standard results of quantity Stackelberg games, provide some new results with price Stackelberg games and compare the equilibrium configuration of the quantity games with the price games. In the price Stackelberg game we show there is a unique SPNE where the leader chooses a lower price than the follower, but both get equal payoffs. We prove that generally quantity Stackelberg games are less competitive than price Stackelberg games. However, we also demonstrate the possibility of a reversal of this result.     

Public choice interpretations of distributional preference

This essay examines, from the perspective of both economics and ethics, the logical foundations of income transfers in a democratic society that allocates resources, in the large, through free markets. Such transfers, enacted through the public choice process, modify the market-determined distribution of income, as a reflection of the distributional preferences of the members of a society. Both constitutional and post-constitutional explanations of redistributions are considered. A discussion of recent experimental evidence of distributional preferences leads into a critique of simple equality, built on Michael Walzer's distinction between monopoly and dominance, as a criterion of distributive justice.     

A microfoundation for increasing returns in human capital accumulation and the under-participation trap

This paper considers educational investment, wages and hours of market work in an imperfectly competitive labour market with heterogeneous workers and home production. It investigates the degree to which there might be both underemployment in the labour market and underinvestment in education. A central insight is that the ex post participation decision of workers endogeneously generates increasing marginal returns to education. Although equilibrium implies underinvestment in education, optimal policy is not to subsidise education. Instead it is to subsidise labour market participation which we argue might be efficiently targeted as state-provided childcare support.     

Tradeable permits,missing markets,and technology

This paper examines the effects of missing markets, heterogeneous pollutants, and the pollution technology of firms on the efficacy of transferable pollution permits. Under the assumption of perfect competition in all markets, we show that if firms can substitute among pollutants, then setting the optimal number of permits for only one pollutant will not, in general, lead to an efficient outcome. The degree of the inefficiency will depend on the information set available to the regulator and the substitutability among pollutants by firms. When establishing transferable pollution rights regulators should, therefore, consider the technology of firms. If firms discharge pollutants in the same fixed proportions, then the regulator need only set a market for one of the pollutants to ensure an efficient outcome. Where firms can substitute among pollutants, however, establishing a market for only one pollutant provides an incentive for firms to substitute to unregulated ones. This is an important policy issue as substitutability among pollutants within and across production processes may dampen the dynamic advantages of a tradeable permit policy.     

Price determination and dynamic adjustments: An inverse demand system approach to meat products in the United States

In this study the process of retail meat price determination is depicted in the form of an inverse demand system taking into consideration the dynamic adjustments present in monthly consumption data. The general dynamic framework identifies both long run and short run effects in a systematic manner and allows direct estimation of the long run price and scale flexibilities that are consistent with theory. The empirical application based on monthly U.S. meat products data provides reasonable and promising results.The authors are senior econometrician, Department of Risk Management, TRS, American Express Co., Phoenix, and assistant professor, Department of Applied Economics, University of Minnesota, St. Paul, respectively. The work was performed when the first author was an assistant research scientist at the Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Department of Economics, Iowa State University, Ames. Journal Paper No. J-15784 of the Iowa Agriculture and Home Economics Experiment Station, Ames, Iowa. Project No. 3109.     

Incorporating Collateral Value Uncertainty in Loss Given Default Estimates and Loan-to-value Ratios

We present a model of risky debt in which collateral value is correlated with the possibility of default. The model is then used to study the expected loss given default, primarily as a function of collateral. The results obtained could prove useful for estimating losses given default in many popular models of credit risk which assume them constant. We also examine the problem of determining sufficient collateral to secure a loan to a desired extent. In addition to bank practitioners, regulators might find our analysis useful in reviewing banks’ lending standards relative to current collateral values. In particular, the current proposals for The New (Basel) Capital Accord involve options for the use of banks’ own loss given default estimates which might benefit from the analysis in this paper.     

Competition For Order Flow, Market Quality, And Price Discovery In The Nasdaq 100 Index Tracking Stock

We investigate competition for order flow, market quality, and price discovery in the Nasdaq 100 Index Tracking Stock (QQQ). The QQQ, an AMEX‐listed, exchange‐traded fund, is the most actively traded security in the U.S. equities market. On July 31, 2001, the NYSE began trading the QQQ, marking the first time it traded securities of companies it does not list. The greatest volume of trading takes place on electronic communication networks (ECNs), following by trading on the AMEX and the NYSE. Most of the block trades are executed on the AMEX, where the bid‐ask spreads are narrower. We find that ECNs contribute the most to the price‐discovery process. The spreads on all trading platforms have decreased and market quality and price discovery have improved since QQQ shares have traded on the NYSE.     

Option pricing in the presence of natural boundaries and a quadratic diffusion term

This paper uses a probabilistic change-of-numeraire technique to compute closed-form prices of European options to exchange one asset against another when the relative price of the underlying assets follows a diffusion process with natural boundaries and a quadratic diffusion coefficient. The paper shows in particular how to interpret the option price formula in terms of exercise probabilities which are calculated under the martingale measures associated with two specific numeraire portfolios. An application to the pricing of bond options and certain interest rate derivatives illustrates the main results.     

IPOs,acquisitions, and the use of convertible securities in venture capital

This paper provides a new explanation for the use of convertible securities in venture capital. A key property of convertible preferred equity is that it allocates different cash flow rights, depending on whether exit occurs by acquisition or IPO. The paper builds a model with double moral hazard, where both the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist provide value-adding effort. The optimal contract gives the venture capitalist more cash flow rights in acquisitions than IPOs. This explains the use of convertible preferred equity, including automatic conversion at IPO. Contingent control rights are also important for achieving efficient exit decisions.     

Entry regulation as a barrier to entrepreneurship

Using a comprehensive database of European firms, we study the effect of market entry regulations on the creation of new limited-liability firms, the average size of entrants, and the growth of incumbent firms. We find that costly regulations hamper the creation of new firms, especially in industries that should naturally have high entry. These regulations also force new entrants to be larger and cause incumbent firms in naturally high-entry industries to grow more slowly. Our results hold even when we correct for the availability of financing, the degree of protection of intellectual property, and labor regulations.