Did the financial crisis affect the market valuation of large systemic U.S. banks?

We examine the impact of the financial crisis on the stock market valuation of large and systemic U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs). Using the Bertsatos and Sakellaris (2016) model of fundamental valuation of bank equity, we provide evidence that the financial crisis has not altered investors’ attitudes towards bank characteristics. In particular, before, during, and after the crisis, investors in large and systemic U.S. BHCs seemed to penalize leverage, albeit temporarily. Both before and after the crisis, they reward size in the short run. This pattern is appearing only briefly during the crisis. We also show that bank opacity plays no role in market valuation either in the short run or in the long run. Last but not least, we find evidence that stress testing has been informative to the market and that those BHCs that failed at the post-crisis stress tests were not subsequently valued differently by the market.     

Are Investors Rational When Valuing Loss Firms?

The authors examine whether high valuation of loss firms really exists and can be explained by behavioral factors. This valuation may originate from irrational behavior of optimistic investors who prefer lottery-like stocks, or from rational expectations of firms' profitability. Using a sample of small Canadian firms going public, the authors show that both individual investors and underwriters price loss firms higher than profit firms, everything being equal. Post-IPO 3-year underperformance does not differ statistically between loss and profit firms. Investors thus apparently behave irrationally for all firms, but their irrationality does not seem greater for loss firms.     

Industry characteristics and financial risk contagion

This article proposes a new measure of tail risk spillover: the conditional coexceedance (CCX), defined as the number of joint occurrences of extreme negative returns in an industry, conditional on an extreme negative return in the financial sector. The empirical application provides evidence of significant volatility and tail risk spillovers from the financial sector to many real sectors in the U.S. economy from 2001 to 2011. These spillovers increase in crisis periods. The CCX in a given sector is positively related to its amount of debt financing and negatively related to its valuation and investment. Therefore, real economy sectors—which require relatively high debt financing and whose value and investment activity are relatively lower—are prime candidates for stock price volatility and depreciation in the wake of a financial sector crisis. Evidence also suggests that the higher the industry’s degree of competition, the stronger the tail risk spillover from the financial sector.     

对赌条款效力探析

由于立法上的缺失,对赌条款的法律效力一直备受争议。主要体现在对赌的主体与对赌的内容两个方面。主体的分歧集中在融资公司、融资公司的股东、未持股的融资公司经营者或管理层人员的签约资格上。内容的分歧则为补偿条款。为解决对赌条款效力之争、提高司法审判实效、切实发挥对赌条款估值调整的功能,同时又节约立法成本,可采用司法解释的方式,对适格的对赌主体做出明确的规定,而对赌的内容及权益实现的程序也应提出全面的要求。     

租金房价比失效了吗——基于四大城市的经验研究

本文基于住房使用成本模型,通过构建租金和房价变动的预测模型,并使用北京、上海、广州和深圳四大城市1993年第二季度至2010年第一季度的时间序列数据,考察了租金房价比对未来租金和房价变动的预测能力。研究发现：（1）北京、上海的租金房价比与未来房价变动呈负向关系,与现值模型预测相反,而深圳的二者关系为正,广州的租金房价比对于未来房价变动不存在统计意义上的预测能力;（2）北京、广州和深圳的租金房价比可以预测未来的租金变动率,二者呈反向关系,上海的相应统计值不显著。本文的经验结论表明,租金房价比作为估值指标在中国城市住房市场上的适用性值得谨慎判断。     

The use of intellectual capital information in investment decisions: An empirical study using analyst reports

Do financial analysts convey intellectual capital information in their recommendations? This study of a sample of analyst reports on large, listed Spanish companies provides some evidence on the question. Analysts usually report information regarding a company's strategy, customers, and processes; they less often provide information about research, development, and innovation. When controlling for endogeneity, we find that certain firm characteristics appear to influence the use of intellectual capital information. Analysts use this information in the case of highly profitable companies. The results also show a significant effect of growth opportunities on intellectual capital disclosure by financial analysts.     

Analyst estimation revision clusters and corporate events, Part II

Summary In Part I of this study, we evaluated the relative usefulness of information in alternative corporate information events (CIEs) to analysts by examining the frequency with which they trigger clusters of analysts’ earnings estimate revisions. In Part II, we examine investor response to various CIEs and their revision clusters. We find that stock prices react most strongly and adjust most quickly to revision clusters that accompany CIEs that focus on financial statement information. CIEs that offer strategic information take longer for analysts and investors to assimilate, and investors appear to rely heavily on later analyst revisions following such events.     

The avenue effect,landmark externalities,and cubic transformation: Manhattan office valuation

A functional form for the valuation of office buildings is a third-order function that replicates the constrained cost function in which one of the inputs, land, is fixed. The third-order transformation improves a hedonic regression pricing model and reduces the autocorrelation. The presence of neighborhood landmarks, selected avenue address, and building size influence the office building value. The data set includes 103 midtown Manhattan office building sales transactions from 1980 to first quarter 1990.     

美国公司确定资本成本的方法分析

资本成本已成为财务理论中信息含量最为丰富的概念,如何确定资本成本是企业和投资者必须解决的问题。本文介绍美国公司确定资本成本的方法,以期对我国企业的理财提供参考。     

Conservative Accounting and Linear Information Valuation Models*

Prior research using the residual income valuation model and linear information models has generally found that estimates of firm value are negatively biased. We argue that this could result from the way in which accounting conservatism effects are reflected in such models. We build on the conservative accounting model of Feltham and Ohlson 1995 and the Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan 1999 (DHS) methodology to propose a valuation model that includes a conservatism‐correction term, based on the properties of past realizations of residual income and “other information”. “Other information” is measured using analyst‐forecast‐based predictions of residual income. We use data comparable to the DHS sample to compare the bias and inaccuracy of value estimates from our model and from models similar to those used by DHS and Myers 1999. Valuation biases are substantially less negative for our model, but valuation inaccuracy is not markedly reduced.