盘锦市耕地后备资源评价与分析

为了合理开发利用耕地后备资源,以盘锦市为例,采取主导因素"限制性因子"评价法,通过建立后备资源评价体系,对盘锦市耕地后备资源宜耕性进行了评价,并对不宜耕的原因进行了详细分析,提出了耕地后备资源合理利用的建议。     

崇阳县耕地后备资源的质量潜力测算

准确分析评价和测算耕地后备资源的潜力是对其进行开发利用的前提。以湖北省崇阳县为研究区,参照农用地分等定级的技术方法,确定分等的因素指标和权重,计算崇阳县耕地后备资源自然质量等指数,划分自然质量等别,并借助湖北省二级区的耕地产能核算模型计算其理论产能,以此来测算耕地后备资源的质量潜力。通过计算结果可知,崇阳县耕地后备资源总潜力产量为3986.0205×104kg,在空间分布上大体呈现从西北向东南递减的趋势。     

日元国际储备地位变迁对人民币国际化的启示

20世纪70年代,日元曾迅速赶上英镑,成为世界第三大储备货币,而21世纪初日元的储备地位却被英镑悄然越过;尽管日本的GDP长期高于德国,但日元在国际储备中的比例一直低于马克。数据分析表明,日元和英镑的储备地位相对变化源于币值的变动;而日元和马克储备地位差别源于商品与劳务进口总额的差别。中国相应参数的比较暗示：人民币有可能在实现自由兑换之前成为世界第三储备货币。     

制度变迁中的中国农地产权的性质:一个历史分析视角

自我国农村社会经济转型开始至今,许多有关农村制度变迁与合约选择的文献对此进行了相关研究并深深影响了学术界、决策界对家庭承包制、农业生产合作社的判断.本文对此进行了严格的理论评析.交易成本不仅产生于信息不对称所造成的委托代理,也产生于人们所缔结的合约结构或所选择的组织形态不能与产权的多重属性达成必要的一致.与流行的观点不同,本文认为,农村集体产权或集体(合作)经济组织仍然是可选择的.在此基础上,本文概要性地比较了农村人民公社的集体产权与联产承包制下的集体产权的各自特征.     

契约理论下会计本质的探讨

会计的本质问题,向来就是会计学界最为关注又极富争论性的热点课题,会计理论界对于会计本质的认识也存在着不同的观点。本文采用经济学契约理论、管理学等研究方法,对这一基本理论问题做出探讨。     

美联储应对金融危机的货币政策:效果、特点与问题

2007年以来,美联储为了应对金融危机,实施了扩张性货币政策,并根据市场需要,创设了一系列非常规货币政策工具.在货币政策的调控下,市场信心得以恢复,金融机构倒闭现象得到遏制,并阻止了经济深度衰退.但极度扩张的货币政策也带来了后续的通货膨胀、债务风险等问题,需要采取有效措施加以解决.     

人民币加入SDR前后的国际货币权力变化及趋势

国际货币的权力分配随着国际货币体系演进呈现动态变化,近10年变化趋势与人民币的国际地位演进密切相关.本文使用货币共同变动回归方法,对2010-2016年和2016-2019年两个时期内储备货币区规模进行比较,研究不同国家货币与特别提款权(SDR)篮子的联动程度,得出人民币加入SDR前后的国际货币权力变化趋势.研究结果表...     

Mainstream Economic Analysis and the Case for Accommodation

The Federal Reserve has a dual mandate to foster both full employment and price stability. Most often these two goals are in alignment, so policies that support one objective generally support the other. However, at times the two aims can be at odds. When that happens, policies that target one goal may lead to misses on the other one. This article argues that taking a balanced approach between competing choices provides a solution that is in agreement with mainstream monetary policy rules.     

Agents or stewards in community forestry enterprises? Lessons from the Mayan Biosphere Reserve,Guatemala

Community forestry enterprises are increasing participation in forestry activity and have become a favoured approach for reaching goals of conservation, poverty reduction and community development. Much has been written about the importance of supportive policy frameworks, technical assistance, the broader market in which these enterprises operate and the need for more significant control by communities over forests and their benefits through secure resource rights as key points of action. However, there is still a considerable knowledge gap in terms of understanding their organizational behaviour and how it affects the accomplishment of their goals. This paper takes a first step in filling this gap and analyses managerial behaviour in CFEs through the use of theories on principal–agent relationships. Data collected from CFEs in the Mayan Biosphere Reserve in Petén, Guatemala reveal important insights about managerial behaviour in these firms and how embeddedness of the CFE within the wider community plays a major role in managerial decision-making. Several policy implications are derived from these findings.     

Lessons from a century of FED policy: Why monetary and credit policies need rules and boundaries

Wide operational and financial independence given to monetary and credit policies subjects the Federal Reserve to incentives detrimental for macroeconomic and financial stability. The absence of a monetary policy rule created go-stop incentives that produced inefficient volatility of both inflation and unemployment during the Great Inflation. Fed credit policy has undergone massive “mission creep” since the Fed was established. Being debt-financed fiscal policy, Fed credit policy beyond ordinary temporary lending to solvent depositories creates friction with the fiscal authorities and jeopardizes the Fed׳s independence. An ambiguous boundary of expansive Fed credit policy creates expectations of Fed accommodation in financial crisis—that blunts the incentive of private entities to take protective measures beforehand (to shrink counter-party risk and reliance on short-term finance, and build up equity capital) and blunts the incentive of the fiscal authorities to prepare procedures in advance to act systematically in times of credit turmoil. These points are illustrated with reference to the 2007–09 financial crisis. Part of the problem is that the independent Fed does not have the same incentive as the 19th century Bank of England to follow Bagehot׳s Rule. The paper concludes with a set of principles to preserve a workable, sustainable division of responsibilities between the independent central bank and the fiscal authorities.