Raiders of the lost high-frequency forecasts: New data and evidence on the efficiency of the Fed's forecasting

We introduce a new dataset of real gross domestic product (GDP) growth and core personal consumption expenditures (PCE) inflation forecasts produced by the staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. In contrast to the eight Greenbook forecasts a year the staff produce for Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings, our dataset has roughly weekly forecasts. We use these data to study whether the staff forecasts efficiently. Prespecified regressions of forecast errors on forecast revisions show the staff's GDP forecasts exhibit time-varying inefficiency between FOMC meetings, and also show some evidence for inefficient inflation forecasts.     

The 1932 Federal Reserve Open-Market Purchases as a Precedent for Quantitative Easing

The $1 billion open-market operation conducted by the Federal Reserve, at the height of the Great Depression, was a successful precedent to the recent Quantitative Easing (QE) programs. The 1932 program entailed large purchases of medium- and long-term securities over a 4-month period. An event study analysis indicates that the program dramatically lowered medium- and long-term Treasury yields. A segmented markets model is used to analyze the effects of the open-market purchases on the economy. A significant degree of financial market segmentation is estimated, and partly explains the observed upturn in output growth. Had the Federal Reserve continued its operations and used the announcement strategy used in QE1, the Great Contraction could have been attenuated earlier. Our historical analysis suggests that the Federal Reserve in 2008 had a good predecessor to its actions.     

The effect of the Federal Reserve’s lending facility on PPP lending by commercial banks

We investigate whether the Federal Reserve’s Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility (PPPLF) boosted commercial bank Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) lending. To determine whether this facility had a causal effect, we use pre-existing familiarity with the Federal Reserve’s discount window as an instrumental variable. We show that the PPPLF materially bolstered bank PPP lending and provided a meaningful funding backstop for banks that did not use the facility. Our paper is one of the first to quantitatively illustrate the effectiveness of a central bank facility as a funding backstop.