Dynamic modelling of pollution abatement in a CGE framework

This paper deals with the specification of pollution abatement in dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) models and analyses the dynamic feedback mechanisms between economy and abatement in the context of environmental policy. A Ramsey-type economic model is presented, in which bottom-up technical and economic information on abatement techniques is integrated in a top-down dynamic CGE context. The practical suitability of the specification is illustrated by an empirical application for climate change and acidification in the Netherlands. The results show that a mixture of some slowdown of economic growth, a substantial restructuring of the economy and implementation of most technical abatement measures is optimal.     

绿色物流在化工生产过程中实现途径的探讨

文章从化工生产过程及其物流的特点出发,结合广义绿色物流的观点,提出化工生产物流走绿色物流之路的必要性,并探讨了化工生产实现绿色物流的途径。     

International Trade and the Environment: Theoretical and Policy Linkages

I review and extend three approaches to trade and environmental policies: competitive general equilibrium, oligopoly and monopolistic competition. The first two have surprisingly similar implications: deviations from first-best rules are justified only by constraints on policy choice (which motivates what I call a “single dividend” approach to environmental policy), and taxes and emissions standards differ in ways which reflect the Le Chatelier principle. I also show how environmental taxes may lead to a catastrophic relocation of industry in the presence of agglomeration effects, although not necessarily if there is a continuum of industries which differ in pollution intensity. *An earlier version was presented as an invited plenary lecture to the European Association for Environmental and Resource Economics Conference, Oslo, 1999.     

Transboundary Environmental Problems with Mobile but Heterogeneous Populations

Most of the literature on transboundaryenvironmental problems treats population ineach country or region as constant, ignoringpopulation mobility. We showed previously thatif there is perfect population mobility betweenregions, and populations are homogeneous, asocially efficient outcome can be supported asa Nash equilibrium of the game of uncoordinatedpolicy setting, even without any internationalenvironmental agreement. In the present paperwe introduce heterogeneous population, and showthat when people differ, a non-cooperativeoutcome is generally inefficient. We alsodemonstrate that for a particular set ofobjective functions for the regionalgovernments, there is an equilibrium of thegame of uncoordinated policy setting that isefficient. Finally, we give an example wherethe decentralized outcome is efficient whenthere is no population mobility, butinefficient when there is population mobility.     

淮河流域污染治理需要企业实施绿色营销

作为我国重要的农产区和传统工业生产基地,淮河流域污染严重,治理污染刻不容缓。由于淮河最主要的污染源来自工业企业,本文着重从工业企业这一微观角度出发,引入绿色营销的概念,分析了企业加强环保意识的重要性,并通过对企业实施绿色营销的博弈分析,指出绿色营销是企业保证可持续发展的必然选择。     

Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden

If a regulator is unable to measure firms’ individual emissions, an ambient tax can be used to achieve the socially desired level of pollution. With this tax, each firm pays a unit tax on aggregate emissions. In order for the tax to be effective, firms must recognize that their decisions affect aggregate emissions. When firms behave strategically with respect to the tax-setting regulator, under plausible circumstances their tax burden is lower under an ambient tax, relative to the tax which charges firms on the basis of individual emissions. Firms may prefer the case where the regulator is unable to observe individual firm emissions, even if this asymmetric information causes the regulator to tax each firm on the basis of aggregate emissions.     

环境库兹涅茨曲线假说及其在中国的检验

经济与环境协调发展是我国经济发展中的重大课题。本文从环境库兹涅茨曲线假说出发,利用中国各个省市区1989～2004年数据建立面板数据模型,运用固定效应模型和随机效应模型对其进行估计,以此剖析我国经济增长与环境污染水平的演变规律。结果表明,环境库兹涅茨曲线假说在我国并不成立。因此,我国不能盲目重复发达国家"先污染,后治理"的传统模式,而应该走环境与经济持续协调发展的道路。     

Managing the international commons: Resource use and pollution control

The simultaneous management, in an international context, of free-access renewable resources and transboundary pollution, is examined in a dynamic game framework. First-best outcomes under international cooperation are determined and compared to noncooperative outcomes when countries follow linear Markov strategies. An international policy consisting of taxes on emissions and harvesting, with international redistribution of tax receipts, is used to achieve the cooperative solution. In addition, side payments may be required to prevent free riding and thus make the international policy implementable.Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the International WorkshopEconomic Aspects of International Water Resources Utilization in the Mediterranean Basin, Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei, Milan, October 1993, and the Fifth Annual Conference of EAERE, Dublin, June 1994. I would like to thank Peter Berck, Charles Kolstad, Mordechai Schechter, and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments.     

Adoption of improved irrigation and drainage reduction technologies under limiting environmental conditions

Modern irrigation technologies have been suggested as a means of conserving scarce water and reducing environmental pollution caused by irrigated agriculture. This paper applies an economic model of technology selection that provides a general framework to analyzing adoption of irrigation technologies under various environmental conditions. Data from the San Joaquin Valley of California is used to verify the theoretical relationships. Results suggest key variables to be considered by policy makers concerned with adoption of modern irrigation technologies. Among these variables are crop prices, water technology costs, farm organization characteristics, and the environmental conditions of the farm or the field. Policy implications were discussed and analyzed.This research was conducted while the first author was a visiting scholar with the Dept. of Agricultural Economics, University of California, Davis, and USDA-ERS, USA.     

畜禽养殖业的环境影响及经济分析

畜禽业污染是我国农业面源污染的主要来源。本文估算了我国畜禽养殖业污染物排放量,阐述了畜禽养殖的环境影响,分析了畜禽污染内在的经济原因,并提出了防治畜禽污染的经济政策和措施,包括发展循环畜牧业、建设现代化的畜禽业物流体系、采纳各种环境经济手段、界定农村公共资源产权、实施优质畜禽产品品牌化战略、鼓励发展环保产业。