Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: Theory and application

We consider a non-cooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers in a general situation for which players differ in recognition probability and time preference. We characterize an efficient equilibrium as the generalized Nash bargaining solution that belongs to the core. The model is applied to wage bargaining between an employer and multiple workers. Although involuntary unemployment may occur in equilibrium, full employment emerges as players become sufficiently patient.     

Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence

In the contract-theoretic literature, there is a vital debate about whether contracts can mitigate the hold-up problem, in particular when renegotiation cannot be prevented. Ultimately, this question has to be answered empirically. As a first step, we have conducted a laboratory experiment with 960 participants. We consider investments that directly benefit the non-investing party. While according to standard theory, contracting would be useless if renegotiation cannot be ruled out, we find that option contracts significantly improve investment incentives compared to a no-contract treatment. This finding might be attributed to Hart and Moore?s (2008) recent idea that contracts can serve as reference points.     

Must improved labor standards hurt accumulation in the targeted sector? Stylized analysis of a developing economy

This paper analyzes a stylized small open economy that consists of two tradable output-producing sectors: a manufacturing sector and a (mainly tourism-related) services sector. Assuming sectoral differences based on stylized facts, we explore the impact of higher labor standards in the manufacturing sector on the long-term prospects of the economy using comparative dynamic exercises to analyze changes in relative prices, foreign capital flows, and the sectoral distribution of investment and output. We find, in particular, that imposing higher standards across the manufacturing sector could, under certain conditions, shift the structure of the domestic economy in favor of that sector. This result is driven by changes in relative profitability in the presence of learning-by-exporting.     

How effective is European merger control?

This paper applies an intuitive approach based on stock market data to a unique dataset of large concentrations during the period 1990–2002 to assess the effectiveness of European merger control. The basic idea is to relate announcement and decision abnormal returns. Under a set of four maintained assumptions, merger control might be interpreted to be effective if rents accruing due to the increased market power observed around the merger announcement are reversed by the antitrust decision, i.e. if there is a negative relation between announcement and decision abnormal returns. To clearly identify the events' competitive effects, we explicitly control for the market expectation about the outcome of the merger control procedure and run several robustness checks to assess the role of our maintained assumptions. We find that only outright prohibitions completely reverse the rents measured around a merger's announcement. On average, remedies seem to be only partially capable of reverting announcement abnormal returns. Yet they seem to be more effective when applied during the first rather than the second investigation phase and in subsamples where our assumptions are more likely to hold. Moreover, the European Commission appears to learn over time.     

Exploiting old customers and attracting new ones: The case of bank deposit pricing

Recent theoretical contributions suggest that deposit interest rates should be higher in geographic areas characterized by greater in-migration and lower for depositors at banks with greater shares of existing (or so-called “locked-in”) depositors. These hypotheses are tested using a rich data set obtained for the Spanish banking industry. Results confirm that, all else equal, banks offer higher deposit rates in territories characterized by greater in-migration, and also that they tend to offer lower rates, the larger the number of their locked-in depositors. These findings confirm the existence of the trade-off between exploiting old customers and attracting new ones.     

Ironing without control

I extend Myerson?s [R. Myerson, Optimal auction design, Math. Oper. Res. 6 (1981) 58–73] ironing technique to more general objective functions. The approach is based on a generalized notion of virtual surplus which can be maximized pointwise even when the monotonicity constraint implied by incentive compatibility binds. It is applicable to quasilinear principal-agent models where the standard virtual surplus is weakly concave in the allocation or appropriately separable in the allocation and type. No assumptions on allocation rules are required beyond monotonicity.     

Industry dynamics: Foundations for models with an infinite number of firms

This paper explores the connection between three important threads of economic research offering different approaches to studying the dynamics of an industry with heterogeneous firms. Finite models of the form pioneered by Ericson and Pakes (1995) capture the dynamics of a finite number of heterogeneous firms as they compete in an industry, and are typically analyzed using the concept of Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE). Infinite models of the form pioneered by Hopenhayn (1992), on the other hand, consider an infinite number of infinitesimal firms, and are typically analyzed using the concept of stationary equilibrium (SE). A third approach uses oblivious equilibrium (OE), which maintains the simplifying benefits of an infinite model but within the more realistic setting of a finite model. The paper relates these three approaches. The main result of the paper provides conditions under which SE of infinite models approximate MPE of finite models arbitrarily well in asymptotically large markets. Our conditions require that the distribution of firm states in SE obeys a certain “light-tail” condition. In a second set of results, we show that the set of OE of a finite model approaches the set of SE of the infinite model in large markets under a similar light-tail condition.     

Entry costs, industry structure, and cross-country income and TFP differences

Entry costs vary dramatically across countries. To assess their impact on cross-country differences in output and TFP, we construct a model with endogenous entry and operation decisions by firms. We calibrate the model to match the U.S. distribution of employment and firms by size. Higher entry costs lead to greater misallocation of productive factors and lower TFP and output. In the model, countries in the lowest decile of the entry costs distribution have 1.32 to 1.45 times higher TFP and 1.52 to 1.75 times higher output per worker than countries in the highest decile. As in the data, higher entry costs are associated with lower entry rates and business density.     

Quantal response equilibria with heterogeneous agents

This paper introduces a model of quantal response equilibrium with heterogeneous agents and demonstrates the existence of a representative agent for such populations. Except in rare cases, the representative agent?s noise terms cannot be independently and identically distributed across the set of actions, even if that is assumed for the individual agents. This result demonstrates a fundamental difference between a representative agent and truly heterogeneous quantal responders and suggests that when fitting quantal response specifications to aggregate data from a population of subjects, the noise terms should be allowed to be jointly dependent across actions. Even though this introduces additional degrees of freedom, it makes the model well specified. The representative agent inherits a regular quantal response function from the actual agents, so this model does impose falsifiable restrictions.     

Outside versus inside bonds: A Modigliani–Miller type result for liquidity constrained economies

When agents are liquidity constrained, two options exist – sell assets or borrow. We compare the allocations arising in two economies: in one, agents can sell government (outside) bonds and in the other they can borrow by issuing (inside) bonds. All transactions are voluntary, implying no taxation or forced redemption of private debt. We show that any allocation in the economy with inside bonds can be replicated in the economy with outside bonds but that the converse is not true. However, the optimal policy in each economy makes the allocations equivalent.