Probability of survival in a random exchange economy with dependent agents

Summary. In this paper I analyze the general equilibrium in a random Walrasian economy. Dependence among agents is introduced in the form of dependency neighborhoods. Under the uncertainty, an agent may fail to survive due to a meager endowment in a particular state (direct effect), as well as due to unfavorable equilibrium price system at which the value of the endowment falls short of the minimum needed for survival (indirect terms-of-trade effect). To illustrate the main result I compute the stochastic limit of equilibrium price and probability of survival of an agent in a large Cobb-Douglas economy. Received June 7, 2001; revised version: January 7, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I would like to thank Mukul Majumdar and Thomas DiCiccio for helpful discussion and an anonymous referee for valuable comments and suggestions.     

Performance pay and worker cooperation: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment

We report the results of an artefactual field experiment with bicycle messengers in Switzerland and the United States. Messenger work is individualized enough that firms can choose to condition pay on it, but significant externalities in messenger behavior nonetheless give their on-the-job interactions the character of a social dilemma. Second-mover behavior in our sequential prisoner's dilemma allows us to characterize the cooperativeness of our participants. Among messengers, we find that employees at firms that pay for performance are significantly less cooperative than those at firms that pay hourly wages or who are members of cooperatives. To examine whether the difference is the result of treatment or selection we exploit the fact that firm type is location-specific in Switzerland and that entering messengers must work in performance pay firms in the U.S.     

Book Reviews

The evaluative function of local public actors has been exacerbated in recent years with the individualisation of social policies. One of their tasks is to select the appropriate informational basis in order to assess welfare claimants. Amartya Sen's capability approach offers a theoretical and normative framework to analyse this evaluative function. In particular, it insists on the importance of “objectivating” people's preferences with reference to their capabilities. The weight that is to be attached to individual preferences in the course of public action can be a matter of controversy. Claimants “capability for voice”, we argue, should be developed. This capability refers to their effective possibility to express their concerns with regard to the choice of the informational basis. It is argued that local institutions prohibiting capability for voice will produce adaptive preferences, whereas procedural institutions promoting reflexive public evaluation and capability for voice will result in a fairer wording of individual preferences. At a situated level, the way to connect subjective and objective information when assessing people very much depends on the position of the evaluator. Several illustrations show that the fairness of evaluation, and its impact on the people's capability set, depend on this positional perspective.     

Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion

This paper reinterprets the evidence on lying or deception presented in Gneezy (Am. Econ. Rev. 95(1):384–394, 2005). We show that Gneezy’s data are consistent with the simple hypothesis that people are one of two kinds: either a person will never lie, or a person will lie whenever she prefers the outcome obtained by lying over the outcome obtained by telling the truth. This implies that so long as lying induces a preferred outcome over truth-telling, a person’s decision of whether to lie may be completely insensitive to other changes in the induced outcomes, such as exactly how much she monetarily gains relative to how much she hurts an anonymous partner. We run new but broadly similar experiments to those of Gneezy in order to test this hypothesis. While we also confirm that there is an aversion to lying in our subject population, our data cannot reject the simple hypothesis described above either.

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Electronic Supplementary Material  The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.      

农村社区公共物品的农户自愿供给——基于声誉理论的分析

农户的声誉不仅能给农户带来直接效用,它还具备信息效应与资本效应,对农户参与农村社区公共物品供给博弈的均衡路径产生重要影响。在独立博弈下,声誉的直接效用能使农户采取合作行动;在关联博弈和重复博弈中,声誉的信息及资本效应对农户的偷懒行为有很强的约束,将导致博弈进入合作均衡。因此基于声誉损益的考虑,由农户自愿供给农村社区内的公共物品会是一个有效的结果。     

Optimal portfolios under worst-case scenarios

In standard portfolio theories such as Mean–Variance optimization, expected utility theory, rank dependent utility heory, Yaari’s dual theory and cumulative prospect theory, the worst outcomes for optimal strategies occur when the market declines (e.g. during crises), which is at odds with the needs of many investors. Hence, we depart from the traditional settings and study optimal strategies for investors who impose additional constraints on their final wealth in the states corresponding to a stressed financial market. We provide a framework that maintains the stylized features of the SP/A theory while dealing with the goal of security in a more flexible way. Preferences become state-dependent, and we assess the impact of these preferences on trading decisions. We construct optimal strategies explicitly and show how they outperform traditional diversified strategies under worst-case scenarios.     

以历史发展的观点看公共财政与\"三农\"问题

“三农”问题是一个受到全社会普遍关注的大问题,本从历史发展的角度,追溯了“三农”问题产生的根源,并结合实际工作,提出了按照公共财政的要求对“三农”进行扶持的主要方面。