金融自由化、经济转轨与农民相对贫困的恶化

金融自由化通过如下机制影响农民相对收入水平:经济增长、金融服务、金融发展和金融危机。转轨经济的特殊性使上述4个渠道都使农民相对收入增长受到不利影响。经济增长的再分配效应是不确定的。在转轨过程中,国有经济和国有银行从农村地区大规模撤退,减少了农民的金融机会和金融服务。在金融发展过程中,农民分享经济增长和金融发展外部性的难度提高。金融危机的再分配效应更是不利于农民。综合效应是,伴随金融自由化的推进,农民金融机会集合变窄,城乡收入差距快速扩大。     

创新培训理念、培育新型农民的几点思考——基于河南省326个农户劳动时间利用情况的调查

以河南省HA市、HB县和HC县①34个村的326个农户调查数据为基础,探讨了当前农村劳动力培训中存在的问题,针对如何培育新型农民,提出创新培训理念、细分培训对象,使培训由政府主导的"强制型"向"诱致型"转变。     

特色化项目教学在高职《计算机应用基础》教学中的研究与实践

本文提出对高职院校《计算机应用基础》课程应与学生专业相结合的实施方案,采用项目化教学,让学生掌握好计算机应用基本知识,提高实际操作技能,从而提高计算机应用基础课程的教学质量。     

FINANCE,DISTRIBUTION AND THE ECONOMIC OBJECTIVE OF FINANCIAL COOPERATIVE INSTITUTIONS

This paper proposes a model where the structure rather than the size of the financial sector explains its influence on income distribution. Because of information asymmetries, a financial sector dominated solely by profit‐maximizing financial intermediaries will increase income and wealth inequality as it gives preferential access to credit for high‐income agents, whereas a diversified inclusive financial sector with alternative models of finance, like cooperatives, will reduce the inequality gap. No full convergence in income distribution can be realized through finance only and there is still a need for redistribution policies. Accordingly, an objective function for cooperative financial institutions should define a desired pricing behaviour that can increase the income of members at a rate higher than the average growth rate of the economy.     

农村社区公共物品的农户自愿供给——基于声誉理论的分析

农户的声誉不仅能给农户带来直接效用,它还具备信息效应与资本效应,对农户参与农村社区公共物品供给博弈的均衡路径产生重要影响。在独立博弈下,声誉的直接效用能使农户采取合作行动;在关联博弈和重复博弈中,声誉的信息及资本效应对农户的偷懒行为有很强的约束,将导致博弈进入合作均衡。因此基于声誉损益的考虑,由农户自愿供给农村社区内的公共物品会是一个有效的结果。     

专业市场型混合功能聚落的形态演进与机制解析——浙江“义乌模式”的商住共同体实证

混合功能聚落是经营单元与居住组团的高度整合体。以专业市场为增长极,混合功能聚落成为浙江商贸主导型城镇化发展的特殊动因,并直接推动了区域职住二元的协同。基于义乌地区的样本实证,解析专业市场下的混合功能聚落生成、聚合、扩张、集约的演进轨迹。一方面,结合聚落类型,阐释市居一体化的空间组织范式及其形态建构;另一方面,基于商住交织活动,对混合功能空间进行绩效评价。进而,通过差异化、兼容性和弹变式的导控原则,提出专业市场下商住混合聚落发展的适宜性营建机制。     

BARGAINING AMONG FARMERS,GOODWILL, AND THE SUCCESS OF COOPERATIVES

A model of concessional bargaining among farmers explains the success (or lack thereof) of cooperative institutions in rural farm settings in the developing regions. Concessional bargaining in day‐to‐day interactions generates goodwill, which helps smoothen future dealings amongst farmers as well as with outside agents. In particular, we model the existence of goodwill amongst farmers as enhancing their ability to collectively bargain with an outside dealer that buys their farm produce. Results suggest that when dealing with each other, farmers offer higher concessions when the risk of loss or reversal in bargaining power is high; however, the level of concession is also influenced by the degree of reciprocity and parameters that affect bargaining surplus. Findings provide further insights over the success of cooperative institutions in rural farm settings where inter‐farmer goodwill dynamics determines the cooperative's bargaining outcomes. Specifically, when farmers generously reciprocate each other's goodwill gestures, it leads to better outcomes through increasing their cooperative reservation price. In contrast, when the degree of reciprocity is lower, or when the risk of bargaining power switching is higher, farmers extract more surplus from other farmers, and this also lowers the cooperative's bargaining outcomes and makes the cooperative arrangement unviable in the long term.     

当前失地农民问题的几点思考

随着城镇化建设力度加大,城市住房和非农用地需求增大,大量农业用地转为城市用地,导致失地农民越来越多,不仅制约农村经济的发展、影响农村的稳定与进步,还会影响全面建设小康社会目标的实现,影响以人为本、构建和谐社会的进程。因此,探索失地农民面临的问题及有效的解决途径具有现实意义。     

散户参与家庭农场的稳定性分析--基于随机演化博弈视角

家庭农场在我国是一种新兴的农业生产组织形式,它的规模效益取决于散户流转到家庭农场主体的土地等资源,稳定的散户群体是确保家庭农场正常运转的基础。然而,散户的决策易受周围人或事物的影响,具有随机性。文章运用演化博弈理论,在散户的人均收益、放弃其他产业的机会成本以及具有约束性质的惩罚成本等因素之基础上增加随机项,构建含有随机项的复制动态方程,并得出判断散户参与家庭农场稳定性的依据,通过契约调整和制度建设能够实现家庭农场的稳定发展。最后文章基于安徽省家庭寄卖数据对模型进行数值模拟,提出相关政策建议。     

论龙头企业与农户之间信用关系的治理机制

本文从资产专用性的角度对公司与农户之间信用关系进行了理论和案例分析,进而得出对于公司与农户之间的信用关系,应该根据不同的资产专用性选择不同的治理机制,以此提高交易双方的信用水平:对于专用性程度小的农产品交易,应由市场治理;对于具有较高资产专用性的农产品交易,需要混合治理模式;对于资产专用性程度特别高的农产品交易,等级治理(纵向一体化)将是最优选择。