关于上海地区屋顶绿化的思考

在上海市平面绿化工作已初见成效,大型公共绿地越来越多,城市越来越美之时,构建立体绿化 成为当务之急。本文通过对上海地区屋顶绿化的现状及存在的问题的阐述,结合绿化植物的选择和维护的一 些基本理论,展示了屋顶绿化广阔的发展前景。     

Discussion and Analysis about Duration Method Based on Marginal Analysis

The selective principle of mutually exclusive project is the maximum of net present value, It is difficult to make decision when NPVA is equal to NPVLB. Some assistant analyses are put forward in ＂Enterprise Investment Decision Management＂. The scientific marginal analysis shows that the assistant analyses including the duration analysis are wrong. This problem can be solved by the classical marginal analysis.     

Symmetry and order in the portfolio allocation problem

Summary. This research studies the role of multivariate distribution structures on random asset returns in determining the optimal allocation vector for an expected utility maximizer. All our conclusions pertain for the set of risk averters. By carefully disturbing symmetry in the distribution of the, possibly covarying, returns, we ascertain the ordinal structure of the optimized allocation vector. Rank order of allocations is also established when a permutation symmetric random vector is mapped into the returns vector through location and scale shifts. It is shown that increased dispersion in the vectors of location and scale parameters benefit, ex-ante, investors as does a decrease in the rank correlation coefficient between the location and scale parameter vectors. Revealed preference comparative static results are identified for the location and scale vectors of asset returns. For most issues addressed, we arrive at much stronger inferences when a safe asset is available. Received: August 8, 2000; revised version: January 8, 2001     

Collusion and group lending with adverse selection

In an environment with correlated returns, this paper characterizes optimal lending contracts when the bank faces adverse selection and borrowers have limited liability. Group lending contracts are shown to be dominated by revelation mechanisms which do not use the ex post observability of the partners' performances. However, when collusion between borrowers under complete information is allowed, group lending contracts are optimal in the class of simple revelation mechanisms (which elicit only the borrower's own private information) and remain useful with extended revelation mechanisms.     

A comparative site evaluation study for relocating Japanese government agencies out of Tokyo

As a national project of Japan, plans for the relocation of several government agencies out of Tokyo have been ongoing. This paper is concerned with the problem of site selection for this project. The National Land Agency, the agency responsible for this project, has declared that the process of site selection should be rational, open to the public and easily understandable. In an effort to meet these requirements, we propose a consensus-making method for reaching a group decision, based on a combination of the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) and the Assurance Region model of data envelopment analysis (DEA). Several strategic uses of these methodologies, e.g., Delphi procedures, are also discussed. Based on these analyses, the “Wise Men” Committee for deciding the best site has chosen two from among ten contenders, one from the North-East and the other from the Central part of Japan, as candidates for the best relocation site. We could not discriminate between the two with respect to the multiple criteria chosen for evaluating sites. The Committee recommended the two sites to the Prime Minister at the end of December 1999. The Prime Minister reported this conclusion to the Diet. This topic is currently the focus of political discussions in the Diet. In this report, the authors summarize the decision-making processes that the Wise Men Committee followed, putting emphasis on the methodological aspects.     

The Impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure on Information Asymmetry and Trading: An Intraday Analysis

This study examines the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) on liquidity, information asymmetry, and institutional and retail investors trading behavior. Our main findings suggest three conclusions. First, Regulation FD has been effective in improving liquidity and in decreasing the level of information asymmetry. Second, retail trading activity increases dramatically after earnings announcements but there is a significant decline in institutional trading surrounding earnings announcements, particularly in the pre‐announcement period. Last, the decline in information asymmetry around earnings announcements is closely associated with a lower participation rate in the pre‐announcement period and more active trading of retail investors after earnings releases.     

以历史发展的观点看公共财政与"三农"问题

“三农”问题是一个受到全社会普遍关注的大问题，本从历史发展的角度，追溯了“三农”问题产生的根源，并结合实际工作，提出了按照公共财政的要求对“三农”进行扶持的主要方面。     

中间选民理论在农民工市民化政策制定中的运用——基武汉市436位农民工的实证研究

The Median Voter Theory is an important theory in the neo-political economics. It can be applied to solve the collective choice paradox and analyze the policy making for the citizenization of peasant workers. Adopting the method of factor analysis, this paper makes an empirical study on peasant workers’ preference for citizenization. We find that there is a paradox of future residence preference and self-identification in peasant workers. On this basis, peasant workers are divided into 5 subgroups, and it is found that the median undecided peasant workers are the median voters. Based on the analysis of the median undecided peasant worker’s complaints and appeals, it is proposed that the country should strengthen the vocational training system, establish a social security system, expand the agricultural reform and promote educational reform to facilitate the citizenization of peasant workers. __________ Translated from Guanli Shijie 맜理世界 (Management World), 2007, (4): 40–67     

基于适应性商务智能的虚拟企业合作伙伴选择模型

合作伙伴选择是虚拟企业运行中至关重要的问题。迅速而准确地找到合适的合作伙伴并实现协调运作，直接影响到虚拟企业合作绩效和整体目标的实现。文章将环境感知和适应性商务智能理论引入虚拟企业合作伙伴选择中，提出了基于适应性商务智能的虚拟企业合作伙伴选择模型，设计了模型的基本架构，分析了模型的构成模块，探讨了模型的应用机理。     

Evolutionary Stability in the Investment-Opportunism-Retaliation Game

Can economically efficient outcomes be obtained and sustained in the absence of externally enforced property rights? We study the evolutionary properties of a game that exhibits two well-defined Nash equilibria: one generates an inefficient outcome while the other set generates an efficient outcome supported by the potential for retaliation. Although standard forward-looking refinements eliminate the efficient equilibrium, neither equilibrium type satisfies strict evolutionary stability criteria. However, both types of equilibrium define strategies that are neutrally stable, which makes them vulnerable to drift in dynamic environments. We conduct computer simulation experiments in which players learn adaptively via a tournament selection mechanism called sophisticated experimentation. Our simulations demonstrate that while the system spends a disproportionately high proportion of time in the inefficient equilibrium set, the efficient equilibrium is pervasive as the system drifts back and forth between the equilibrium sets, never settling on one or the other.