Double Moral Hazard,Monitoring, and the Nature of Contracts

generalized double-sided moral-hazard model, with risk-averse parties who mutually monitor each other (to get a reasonable idea of outcome/effort). The model considers trade-off between monitoring costs and moral hazard costs, which are endogenously determined by the extent of monitoring. Using this model, we formally prove a generalized version of Coase's conjecture – that the optimal contract minimizes the agency and risk costs. We then show how varying assumptions about the feasibility or cost of monitoring of the outcome or the worker's effort lead to different contracts being optimal. The analysis is then used to explain the nature of contracts observed in practice under many different situations. We will give an explanation as to why industrial workers typically work under wage contracts, while share contracts are common in agriculture and will explain why profit sharing is more common for senior managers than for the production workers. Received September 19, 2000; revised version received October 30, 1997     

Welfare reducing licensing

In this paper, we characterize situations where licensing a cost reducing innovation to a rival firm using two-part tariff contracts (a fixed fee plus a linear per unit of output royalty) reduces social welfare. We show that it occurs if (i) the firms compete in prices, (ii) the innovation is large enough but not drastic, and (iii) the goods are close enough substitutes. Moreover, we show that, regardless of the type of competition, first, the optimal contract always includes a positive royalty and, second, even drastic innovations are licensed whenever the goods are not homogeneous.     

基于复合战略控制系统的战略执行力研究

从控制理论的角度对战略控制系统与战略执行力的关系、传统战略控制系统进行了分析,在此基础上构建了基于复合战略控制系统的战略执行流程,为提高战略执行力提供了一种新思路。     

Joint implementation under asymmetric information and strategic behavior

Joint Implementation (JI) under the Framework Convention on Climate Change means that countries could partly offset their national abatement commitments by investing in CO₂ abatement projects abroad. JI is introduced as a mechanism for achieving a certain global abatement target less costly by separating the commitments from the implementation of measures. This paper studies the design of a JI contract when the investor has incomplete information about the foreign firm which carries out the JI project (the host). Asymmetric information leads to a decrease in the potential cost savings from JI. Furthermore, private information held by the potential host firm could give the firm a significant positive utility of participating in JI projects. The possibility of being a host for a JI project in the future can prevent potential host firms from investing in profitable abatement projects today. The paper analyzes the impact on emissions of CO₂ of strategic behavior among potential hosts for JI projects.     

逆向选择条件下技术许可中非排他性价格契约研究

通过经典的委托代理理论的应用,文章揭示了一类逆向选择条件下的技术许可中非排他性价格契约理论的内在机理。文章认为,通过针对差的类型的技术使用者的包含可变费用的契约和对好的类型的技术使用者的纯固定费用的契约,可以达到有效的排他性技术许可的目的;但为了有效的激励,技术所有者事前要对好的类型的技术使用者转移一定的信息租。     

会展业中顾客抱怨处理的关系契约方法

本文从会展业的特点出发，指出多数顾客对于会展中出现的一些服务问题责任归属不能确认．因而难以认准投诉对象，影响了满意度。通过主办方与会展中心之间的关系契约，相互委托处理这些抱怨投诉，可以很好解决上述问题。     

中国粮食期货市场的发展:困境、原因和未来的道路

目前，中国粮食期货市场规模小，交易品种少，市场交易量萎缩，在整个经济中的影响力较弱。这是受我国期货市场制度创新的动机、推动主体及外部环境制约的结果。今后，我们应从健全期货市场三级监管体制、培育套期保值主体、放宽对投资主体的限制，提高市场的流动性、增加粮食期货交易品种等方面入手，促进中国粮食期货市场的发展。     

Asset Specificity and Vertical Integration

Asset specificity is usually considered to be an argument for vertical integration. The main idea is that specificity induces opportunistic behavior, and that vertical integration reduces the cost of preventing opportunism. In this paper I show that asset specificity can be an argument for non‐integration. In a repeated‐game model of self‐enforcing relational contracts, it is shown that when parties are non‐integrated, increasing degrees of asset specificity make it possible to design relational contracts with higher‐powered incentives.     

Two-settlement Systems for Electricity Markets under Network Uncertainty and Market Power

We analyze welfare and distributional properties of a two-settlement system consisting of a spot market over a two-node network and a single energy forward contract. We formulate and analyze several models which simulate joint dispatch of energy and transmission resources coordinated by a system operator. The spot market is subject to network uncertainty, which we model as a random capacity derating of an important transmission line. Using a duopoly model, we show that even for small probabilities of congestion (derating), forward trading may be substantially reduced, and the market power mitigating effect of forward markets (as shown in Allaz and Vila 1993) may be nullified to a great extent. There is a spot transmission charge reflecting transportation costs from location of generation to a designated hub whose price is the underlying for the forward contract. This alleviates some of the incentive problems associated with the forward market in which spot-market trading is residual. We find that the reduction in forward trading is due to the segregation of the markets in the constrained state, and the absence of natural incentives for generators to commit to more aggressive behavior in the spot market (the strategic substitutes effect). In our analysis, we find that the standard assumption of no-arbitrage across forward and spot markets leads to very little contract coverage, even for the case with no congestion. We present an alternative view of the market where limited intertemporal arbitrage enables temporal price discrimination by competing duopolists. In this framework, we assume that all of the demand shows up in the forward market (or that the market is cleared against an accurate forecast of the demand), and the forward price is determined using a market clearing condition.     

自发性会计变更、监管契约与契约成本

笔者对我国上市公司自发性会计变更的行为从契约理论的角度进行了分析。对证券市场监管规定和强制性会计政策——两种不同的监管契约对自发性会计变更的不同影响从单向强制性契约成本构成及契约成本最小化方面进行了解释,对证券市场监管契约成本和强制性会计政策契约成本进行了比较研究。