A Phillips curve interpretation of error-correction models of the wage and price dynamics

This paper presents a model of employment, distribution andinflation in which a modern error correction specification ofthe nominal wage and price dynamics (referring to claims onincome by workers and firms) occupies a prominent role. It isbrought out, explicitly, how this rather typical error-correctionsetting, which actually seems to capture the wage and pricedynamics of many large-scale econometric models quite well,is fully compatible with the notion of an old-fashioned Phillipscurve with finite slope. It is shown how the steady-state impactof various shocks to the model can be profitably conceived ofand interpreted in terms of (and to some extent even calculatedby means of) this long-run Phillips curve.     

Contracts with endogenous information

I study covert information acquisition and reporting in a principal agent problem allowing for general technologies of information acquisition. When posteriors satisfy two dimensional versions of the standard First Order Stochastic Dominance and Concavity/Convexity of the Distribution Function conditions, a first-order approach is justified. Under the same conditions, informativeness and riskiness of reports are equivalent. High powered contracts, that make the agent's informational rents more risky, are used to increase incentives for information acquisition, insensitive contracts are used to reduce incentives for information gathering. The value of information to the agent is always positive. The value of information to the principal is ambiguous.     

Escalating penalties for repeat offenders: a note on the role of information

The severity of the sanction for a given offense is often determined by the offense history of the offender. We establish that this policy can be welfare-maximizing if individuals are imperfectly informed about the magnitude of the sanction. Imperfect information distorts individuals’ perception of the expected sanction of the first offense. Once detected, individuals learn about the sanction applicable to their act, making this argument less relevant for consecutive offenses.      

Toward a more practical approach to evaluating programs: The Multi‐Objective Realization approach

Emerging trends indicate that programs are being used to deliver benefits that may not be fully harnessed from single sets of uncoordinated projects. To support this movement, it is essential to have suitable measurement frameworks to assess the contribution of these activities and supply decision makers with valuable data on whether their objectives are being realized. This paper introduces the Multi‐Objective Realization Method (MORE) to help measure the strategic contributions of programs. The main principles of MORE underline the importance of a formal strategy to elicit and develop program objectives and to frame those objectives within defined measurement dimensions.     

Monopoly Rents and Price Fixing in Betting Markets

Betting markets provide an ideal environment in which to examinemonopoly power due to the availability of detailed information on product pricing. In this paper we argue that the pricing strategies of companies in the U.K. betting industry are likely to be an important source of monopoly rents, particularly in the market for forecast bets. Pricing in these markets are shown to be explicitly coordinated. Further, price information is asymmetrically biased in favor of producers. We find evidence, based on U.K. data, that pricing of CSF bets is characterized by a significantly higher markup than pricing of single bets. Although this differential can in part be explained by the preferences of bettors, it is reasonable to attribute a significant part of the differential as being due to monopoly power.     

Research notes and communications first-mover effects in multiple dynamic markets

A study of first-mover effects in semi-submersible oil-drilling suggests that first-entrants in international markets maintain higher market share after controlling for market localization and life cycle. Examining only surviving entrants at a point in time inflates this pioneering-market share relationship. Pioneering has an inter-market effect on market share, greater than the intra-market effect. Multinational firms may use market pioneering to resist localization pressures and enhance survival in foreign markets. The study suggests the importance of careful first-mover identification and market definition, a wider examination of first-mover effects over multiple markets, and control for measurement timing.     

基于信息交流技术的组织权威演化机制

沿袭巴纳德组织理论关于信息交流技术对组织权威影响的思路,对组织权威的本质进行了讨论,在此基础上,进一步讨论了信息交流技术对组织权威演化进程的影响。     

基于KIFA的物流外包服务商选择机制研究

本文主要研究昆明国际花卉拍卖交易中心(KIFA)物流外包服务商的选择机制,从KIFA拍卖交易完成后到最终的鲜花零售店的各个物流环节。本文提出了基于招投标的配送服务商的初选方法,再用AHP方法[1]最终确定最佳配送服务商。从而提高了昆明国际花卉拍卖交易中心的花卉物流服务、降低了成本、提高了客户满意度,同时,为同类花卉拍卖交易中心物流服务商的选择提供参考依据。     

The exit decision in the European venture capital market

This article analyses the exit decision in the European venture capital market, studying when to exit and how it interacts with the exit form. Using a competing risks model we study the impact on the exit decision of the characteristics of venture capital investors, of their investments and of contracting variables. Our results reveals that the hazard functions are non-monotonic for all exit forms and suggest that, in Europe, Initial Public Offering candidates take longer to be selected than trade sales. Moreover our results show that, in Europe, venture capitalists associated with financial institutions have quicker exits (stronger for trade sales), and highlight the importance of contracting variables on the exit decision. An unexpected result is that the presence on the board of directors leads to longer investment durations.     

考虑终止权的两阶段研发投资激励和合同设计

针对产品研发过程中的投资激励问题,分别建立了存在终止权和不存在终止权两种情况下的两阶段研发投资决策模型,并利用逆向归纳法讨论了委托方的偿付合同设计。研究结果表明:当第一阶段的研发结果为高质量时,代理人在第二阶段的投资积极性更高,代理人在第一阶段的投资水平和委托方支付的最优偿付都随着低质量时研发成功的比例系数而单调递减;研发活动的终止威胁导致代理人的投资积极性降低;在一定范围内,或有终止权偿付合同能够缓解信息不对称时的投资不足问题、提高双方的研发合作效率。