Towards a complete real-time electricity market design

The general design for the real-time electricity market presented in this paper optimizes and prices both real and reactive power simultaneously in an AC setting, where all assets—generation, load and transmission—are allowed to bid and are financially settled at the locational price times energy consumed or produced. The result is that transmission lines are compensated for both capacity and admittance, providing incentives for efficient operation of transmission-related assets such as FACTS devices, if price-taking behavior is assumed. Losses are incorporated into the design and become an operating cost for transmission. The market design is shown to be revenue neutral and, under some assumptions, nonconfiscatory.      

Environmental Valuation with Imperfect Information The Case of the Random Utility Model

This paper considers welfare analysis with therandom utility model (RUM) when perceptions ofenvironmental quality differ from objectivemeasures of environmental quality. Environmental quality is assumed to be anexperience good, so that while perceptions ofquality determine choices, ex postutility is determined by objective quality. Given this assumption, I derive a measure ofthe welfare impact of changes in environmentalquality, and I show how this new welfaremeasure differs from the traditional welfaremeasure developed by Hanemann (1982). This newwelfare measure provides an approach tomeasuring the value of information aboutenvironmental quality within the framework ofthe random utility model.     

网络环境下企业内部控制探讨

网络技术和经济促进了企业控制环境的变革、会计系统体系结构重组及企业内部控制程序的完善 ,同时也增加了安全控制的难度。相应的网络安全策略     

财政补贴改革刍论

财政补贴是国家宏观调控的杠杆之一,但是,目前补贴不规范,财政补贴数额大、项目繁杂,补贴效果‘异化’,加大了社会不公。为了强化财政补贴杠杆功能,提高财政补贴效益,必须按照建立公共财政的要求,本着满足公共需要原则、弹性补贴制度原则和补贴方式间接化原则,改变“一刀切”和补贴刚性的局面,确保采暖费收支合理化,取消肉食、副食品、粮食等价格补贴,改革国有企业的亏损补贴制度。     

峰荷需求、资本配置效率与中国网络型基础产业投融资机制改革——对阿弗奇-约翰逊模型的一个扩展

阿弗奇—约翰逊模型(A—J模型)表明规制对象具有过度使用资本倾向,相应的实证检验中同时存在肯定和否定的结果,但基本的A—J模型、已有扩展和实证检验都忽略了受规制行业的峰荷需求特征。本文从基本的A—J模型出发,假定生产要素单位使用成本与规制机构所认可的单位核算成本不同,考察了峰荷需求特征下受规制网络型基础产业的投资行为,提供了资本配置效率的衡量标准。本文的基本结论在于,峰荷需求条件下受规制企业不一定投资过多,这也解释了为何A—J效应的实证检验存在相互矛盾的结果。     

Experience and enlightenment of recycling system of packaging waste in Europe

As economy explodes and packaging industry flourishes, it is a critical issue that international community encounters the waste of resources and environmental pollution caused by packaging waste. As far as the Packaging Waste Management is concerned, European countries are abundant in worthwhile experiences, which could be used for reference to China＇s Construction of Packaging Waste Recycling System. Based on the analysis of industrial chain of European Packaging Waste Recycling System, this paper illuminates the corresponding policies, managements and role of distinguished interest-individual in different stages, which administers suggestions on how to put forward policies and implementing ordinance to China＇s Packaging Waste Management.     

人口老龄化背景下农村养老的困境及其路径选择——基于安徽省砀山县的实证分析

在中国农村人口老龄化程度快速发展背景下，中国农村养老面临的形势不容乐观。文章基于对安徽省砀山县农村养老状况的调查，在论述当前农村养老的基本现状以及存在的主要问题的基础上，提出了农村养老保障体系建设应遵循既要使农村社会的养老资源得到充分整合又要体现社会主义新农村建设的要求的基本思路。同时，积极推进农村养老保险制度创新、尽快编织农村最低生活保障“安全网”以及不断完善新型农村合作医疗制度是当前农村养老保障工作的重心。     

论服务性企业的内部信息流管理——从服务质量管理角度

不同类型的服务性企业，其产品的种类、顾客化程度、顾客参与性程度和劳动密集程度等特征各有不同，但由于服务产品的某些共同特性，形成了企业内部信息流管理的共同规律。也决定了服务性企业内部信息流管理的必然性和特殊性。企业的信息流管理是企业加强顾客和企业之间以及企业各部门之间沟通的重要基石。掌握信息流管理原理，应对顾客意见，保持信息的容易获得性、流转顺畅性、对改变的自适应性和信息反馈机制，对不断提高服务质量、提高顾客满意度至关重要。     

完善我国证券市场监管体制研究

如何完善我国的证券市场监管体制是保证我国证券市场能够持续、健康、稳定发展的重要课题.本文首先对市场监管失灵的理论进行了介绍,然后深入分析了我国证券市场监管体制的形成过程及其特点,最后就如何完善我国的证券监管体制提出了建议.     

Research on principal-agency of stockholders and managers under asymmetric information condition

In modem enterprises, a separation of the right of ownership and management results in asymmetric information problems between stockholders and managers. In conditions of principal-agency relationship, the game behaviors between principle and agency within enterprises are impacted by asymmetric information. This study discusses the game behaviors between stockholders and managers by using information economic theories from the perspective of asymmetric information. Based on the model of the principal-agency relationship between stockholders and managers, our research uses quantitative analysis to reveal how to achieve maximum profit expected of stockholders through an incomplete contract, under asymmetric information condition.