Stochastic models for risky choices: A comparison of different axiomatizations

For a long time researchers have recognized the need for applying stochastic models for analyzing data generated from agents’ choice under risk. This paper compares and discusses recent axiomatizations of stochastic models for risky choice given by Blavatskyy (2008) and Dagsvik (2008). We show that some of Blavatskyy’s axioms are equivalent to some of Dagsvik’s axioms. We also propose new axioms and derive their implications. Specifically, we show that some of the results of Dagsvik (2008) can be derived under weaker axioms than those he proposed originally.     

Teaching About Heterogeneous Response Models

Individuals vary in their responses to incentives and opportunities. For example, additional education will affect one person differently than another. In recent years, econometricians have given increased attention to such heterogeneous responses and to the consequences of such responses for interpreting regression estimates, especially regression estimates based on instrumental variables. In this article, the author offers illustrative cases with which to introduce masters-level and advanced undergraduate students to the interpretive challenges posed by heterogeneous responses in econometric models.     

对尴尬境地中的“大学语文”的价值审视

大学语文在当前的教育环境中遭遇尴尬,在此种教育环境下我们有必要对大学语文课的价值再次进行深刻审视:在人文价值方面,既承担着塑造高尚的人文精神和品德修养的作用,又充分发挥了文学的审美功能;在工具价值方面,既培养了各种学习能力,又夯实了就业能力。     

Governing uncertain and unknown effects of genetically modified crops

This paper analyzes the capabilities of three different governance regimes for adequately handling uncertain and unknown effects of genetically modified (GM) crops. Adequate handling requires the development of sound procedures for identification of uncertainty and ignorance (U&I), reduction of U&I, decisions on how to treat irreducible U&I and monitoring of unexpected effects. The nature of U&I implies, however, that these procedures will be highly incomplete. Governance mechanisms that facilitate cooperative adaptation and communicative rationality are therefore needed. The three governance regimes (GRs) compared are: GM-crops are produced by private firms and these firms are made liable for harm (GR1); GM-crops are produced by private firms and the government decides whether the crops should be marketed (GR2); and GM-crops are produced and the government decides whether the crops should be marketed (GR3). The effect of bringing the civil society into the decision-making process is also analyzed. GR3 will be stronger in cooperative adaptation and communicative rationality than GR2. Public research organizations have fewer conflicts of interest with the government than private firms, and academic norms are important. Difficulties in proving harm and identifying the responsible firm will make GR1 weak in cooperative adaptation and communicative rationality.     

Learning to Open Monty Hall's Doors

The analysis in this paper searches for individual and group determinants of learning behavior in Monty Hall's Three Door problem examined in Friedman (1998, American Economic Review. 88, 933–946). The results show that the size of monetary incentives, individuals' initial abilities, and social interactions with others are all important determinants of initial choices and subsequent learning in this problem: (i) More able students have a greater initial propensity to make the right choice than less able students, and their learning curves are initially steeper; (ii) Individual learning can also be enhanced through social interactions; (iii) Interestingly, less able students benefit more than more able students from social interactions in the sample. These findings support the argument that learning models that take into account individuals' abilities and that allow for social interactions where agents can exchange information hold a great deal of promise for enhancing our understanding of actual learning environments, learning processes, and the formation of rationality.     

Imperfectly competitive factor markets and price normalization

A two-sector general equilibrium model with imperfectly competitive labor markets is set up. Noncooperative equilibria with wage setting at the sectoral level are shown to depend on the choice of price-normalization rule even though all agents behave fully rationally. Hence, imposing rationality is not sufficient to deprive the choice of price-normalization rule of its importance. It is argued that the importance of the choice of price-normalization rule may follow from the strategic interaction of agents and not from imperfectness of competition per se, and some examples are provided.     

Complexity and individual rationality in a dynamic duopoly: an experimental study

This paper reports the results of a dynamic duopoly experiment where individual decisions are matched with optimal strategies in treatments with different strategic environments. Experimental evidence confirms that the rival's behavior is a factor affecting the individual performance. At the aggregate level, we have found that the subjects' ability to identify the theoretical benchmark increases (decreases) when the rival is cooperative (aggressive). Moreover, the analysis of individual dynamic decisions shows that the subjects follow a best reply process and that learning is quicker when the rival is cooperative. This evidence points out that the intensity of competition is a determinant of the complexity of a oligopoly situation.     

我国粮食安全的经济与生态合理性研究

1978年开始的农村经济改革改变了我国粮食长期匮乏的局面,并实现了自给有余。但长期追求较高的粮食自给率,又使我国农业资源要素供给从充裕转向短缺,粮食供给从不足转向过剩,生态环境不断恶化。在经济全球化背景下,面对我国的经济和资源环境状况,固守以粮食大量生产和储备来保证粮食安全的传统观念既不具有经济合理性,也不具有生态安全性。保障我国粮食安全应立足于提高国内农业综合生产能力,适当降低粮食自给率,对粮食的生产能力进行储备,利用国际粮食市场调剂余缺,以最低的经济成本、最小的环境代价保证粮食安全。     

基于企业契约理论的机会主义行为分析

分析了机会主义行为产生的条件，阐述了机会主义行为在不同情况下的表现，总结了机会主义行为与经济学其他假设之间的互动关系。     

从行为金融学看金融学的现实化趋向

本文通过分析行为金融学产生的背景,行为金融学的内容体系及其与现代规范金融学之间的关系,阐述了行为金融学的深刻逻辑和金融学发展的现实化趋向。通过描述中国证券市场的特征,指出金融学现实化对中国证券市场的意义。