The determinants of foreign direct investment into European transition economies

Using a panel dataset of bilateral flows of foreign direct investment (FDI), we study the determinants of FDI from Western countries, mainly in the European Union (EU), to Central and Eastern European ones. We find the most important influences to be unit labor costs, gravity factors, market size, and proximity. Interestingly, host country risk proves not to be a significant determinant. Our empirical work also indicates that announcements about EU Accession proposals have an impact on FDI for the future member countries. Journal of Comparative Economics 32 (4) (2004) 775–787.     

Capital needs in Eastern countries

This paper reviews estimated capital needs for Eastern Europe and rejects most of the claimed foreign capital contributions as too high and, in fact, unnecessary. It argues that whilst foreign investments may usefully assist reforms, they can neither substitute for reforms nor assure the success of reforms. Historically there is no evidence of sustained growth predominantly financed by foreign capital anywhere. The West's effort should therefore focus on assisting reform efforts, providing some capital but, above all, opening its markets to Eastern products.Opinions expressed in this paper are strictly personal. I would like to thank H. Handler for his comments.     

政府信息化项目的策略模式选择

政府信息化项目的策略模式选择,对于降低政府信息化投资风险与投资成本、提高效益水平至关重要。以信息化项目的全生命周期为分析视角,探讨了政府信息化项目在各个环节可选择的各种策略模式,分析了不同策略模式的特点,并给出了策略模式选择的建议。     

Does seeing more deeply into a game increase one’s chances of winning?

The substantively rational value of the games studied in this paper does not help predict subject performance in the experiment at all. An accurate model must account for the cognitive ability of the people playing the game. This paper investigates whether the variation in measured rationality bounds is correlated with the probability of winning when playing against another person in games that exceed both players’ estimated rationality bound. Does seeing deeper into a game matter when neither player can see to the end of the game? Subjects with higher measured bounds win 63 percent of the time and the larger the difference the more frequently they win.     

Asymmetric FDI and tax-treaty bargaining: theory and evidence

Tax treaties are often viewed as a mechanism for eliminating tax competition, however, this approach ignores the need for bargaining over the treaty's terms. This paper focuses on how bargaining can affect the withholding taxes set under the treaty. In a simple framework, we develop hypotheses about patterns in treaty tax rates. A key determinant for these patterns is the relative size of bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) activity. In plausible situations, more asymmetric countries will negotiate treaties with higher tax rates. This theory is then tested using 1992 data from US and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) bilateral tax treaties. Overall, the data supports the prediction that greater asymmetric FDI activity increases the negotiated tax rates.     

Existence of a competitive equilibrium in a one sector growth model with heterogeneous agents and irreversible investment

Summary. We prove existence of a competitive equilibrium in a version of a Ramsey (one sector) model in which agents are heterogeneous and gross investment is constrained to be non negative. We do so by converting the infinite-dimensional fixed point problem stated in terms of prices and commodities into a finite-dimensional Negishi problem involving individual weights in a social value function. This method allows us to obtain detailed results concerning the properties of competitive equilibria. Because of the simplicity of the techniques utilized our approach is amenable to be adapted by practitioners in analogous problems often studied in macroeconomics. Received: September 13, 2001; revised version: December 9, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We are grateful to Tapan Mitra for pointing out errors as well as making very valuable suggestions. Thanks are due to Raouf Boucekkine and Jorge Duran for additional helpful discussions. We also thank an anonymous referee for his/her helpful comments. The second author acknowledges the financial support of the Belgian Ministry of Scientific Research (Grant ARC 99/04-235 “Growth and incentive design”) and of the Belgian Federal Goverment (Grant PAI P5/10, “Equilibrium theory and optimization for public policy and industry regulation”). Correspondence to: C. Le Van     

东道国ESP系统与东道国外商直接投资特征研究--以中国为例

国际直接投资地域结构的时空差异性对忽视东道国因素的传统国际投资理论提出了挑战。文章研究了东道国因素对国际生产资本地域运动的影响，提出了国际直接投资是东道国因素与投资主体三优势综合作用的结果，东道国环境、体制、政策系统的状态特征决定了东道国外资特征等观点，并实证研究了中国改革开放进程与外商对华投资规模和结构的内在互动性。     

Selection dynamics and adaptive behavior without much information

This paper uses the experimental method to investigate behavior in a coordination game when the information available to subjects is limited to their feasible choices and their experienced payoffs. In the experiment subjects converge to an absorbing state at rates that are orders of magnitude faster than reinforcement learning algorithms, but slower than under complete information. This state is very close to a mutual best response outcome. All cohorts converged to the market statistic predicted by the interior equilibrium regardless of the information conditions or the stability conditions. Eric Battalio programmed the graphical user interface. The National Science Foundation and Texas Advanced Research Program provided financial support. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation or the Texas Advanced Research Program.     

Why Skew Selection, a Model of Parental Exploitation, Should Replace Kin Selection

Synopsis In his 1964 paper, William Hamilton wrote that inclusive fitness trumps direct fitness if, and only if, the effect of interactions among siblings on their parent’s fitness is ‘zero’. Kin selection models have succeeded only because they have ignored the fact that, if an altruist dies saving two siblings, the ‘zero impact on their parent’s fitness’ constraint is violated. Imagine a parent with three offspring. If two offspring drown, parental fitness is 1. On the other hand, if one altruistic offspring dies saving its two drowning siblings, parental fitness doubles to 2. Thus, direct fitness trumps inclusive fitness as an explanation for the evolution of altruism. In other words, parents that produce some portion of altruistic offspring willing to die to save some of their siblings (who would die without the intervention of the altruist) will realize greater fitness than parents producing no altruists. Skew selection, a bioeconomic extension of Michael Ghiselin’s (1974) parental exploitation model, is presented to explain the evolution of altruism from a direct fitness point of view.     

基于我国证券市场羊群行为的宏观与微观策略

证券市场的羊群行为是指投资者在证券投资中模仿其他投资者决策,在股票价格波动中追涨杀跌的行为.导致我国证券市场羊群行为的原因包括宏观和微观两个层面.为此,本文从宏观和微观两个层面提出抑制羊群行为的相应策略,即培育市场理性与培育理性投资主体两项对策.具体包括:完善信息披露制度;改善证券市场供求关系;完善合理的交易制度;规范证券公司"信息串联"行为;培育理性投资者等.以此来实现改善上市公司的信息披露质量,促进证券市场效率,以减轻羊群行为之害.