土地出让收入的区域差异分析

近年来我国土地出让收入的区域差异明显,主要原因在于地区间经济发展水平不平衡、土地出让价格差异较大以及对土地供应缺乏有效控制。土地出让收入的区域差异加剧了区域间财政收入能力的横向失衡,也加大了中央政府均衡区域间财政能力的难度,应采取相应的政策措施加以解决。     

日本经济长期萧条的根本原因--在于"政府为特殊利益集团俘虏"吗?

从日本泡沫经济产生的根源、不良债权难以有效解决的原因、结构性经济改革难以推进的制约因素等方面分析，认为“政府为特殊利益访华团俘虏”是造成日本经济长期萧条的根本原因缺乏坚实的现实依据。仅从金融业的层面思考和解决不良债权问题不会从根本上解决该问题，仅从利益再调整的角度分析结构性改革的难度也没有完全理解改革的复杂性。     

Triple jump about urban land potential release in China

Recent two decades, the great changes take place in China, especially in land use area. After the marketization, the urban land potential of China releases gradually. Three models in this paper show the three stages of reforming land use system. This paper will give a clear picture of urban land use in China that spans nearly thirty years.     

企业信息化过程中知识转移能力研究

考虑到企业信息化建设过程中知识转移的能力具有灰色性和模糊性的特点,传统的分析方法具有很大的局限性。本文采用基于信息熵权值的多层次灰色评价理论,对信息化过程中知识转移的能力的多级指标体系进行综合评判,为企业提供决策以及改进的依据,最后给出运用该方法的一个实例。该方法具有较强的实际应用价值。     

Long-Term Performance Following Rights Issues and Open Offers in the UK

Abstract:  This study finds evidence of significant long-term underperformance following rights issues made during 1986-95 in the UK. The findings are resilient to a number of methodological controls. In contrast, our results for a smaller sample of open offers made during 1991-95 show strong positive performance over a 5-year post-issue period, implying that firms making open offers had better growth prospects than firms making rights issues. During 1986-90, a period when open offers were rarely used, firms appeared to be making rights issues to exploit overvaluation. However, this was not evident for rights issues made during 1991-95, a period when open offers were more commonly used.     

构建我国进城务工人员社会保障制度体系的思考

从进城务工人员这个群体的特殊性出发，构建他们的社会保障制度必须要从我国城乡社会保障及其对接角度通盘考虑。通过建立进城务工人员双重社会保障制度，逐步实现城乡社会保障制度的对接。这既关系进城务工人员的权益问题，也关系城乡社会保障衔接问题，更关系着我国社会保障制度一体化目标的实现问题。     

Control of intellectual assets in client relationships: implications for innovation

This empirical study of business‐to‐business service firms examines the determinants and effects of control rights to intellectual assets in a property rights theoretic framework. Regression analyses using survey data suggest that service suppliers that retain control over their intellectual output are more innovative. In long‐term relationships, service firms' clients may thus be better off balancing their need to control outsourced activities with the suppliers' incentives to invest in learning and innovation. Additionally, and aligned with property rights theoretic predictions, service suppliers' bargaining power and their indispensability in service projects are positively associated with their ability to retain control rights. In contrast, innovation capabilities are not very significant in determining control rights allocation between service suppliers and their clients. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Valuing Food Store Access: Policy Implications for the Food Stamp Program

Food stamp recipients may lack access to larger stores, reducing the availability of nutritious food. Reliance on smaller stores may have undesirable impacts. Policy alternatives include limiting food stamp redemption to larger stores and subsidizing store development. I estimate that limiting redemption to supermarkets and grocery stores, or supermarkets alone, results in losses ranging from $499.2 million to $1.05 billion, or $1.17 billion to $2.44 billion (respectively) annual loss in food stamp recipient welfare nationwide. The impact of improving access is also significant, ranging from $333.6 million to $931.2 million.     

Stop and Go Agricultural Policies with a Land Market

This article studies the design of farm policy in the presence of asymmetric information about farmers' productivity, a government objective to insure farmers a minimum "parity" income, an endogenous land rent, and diminishing returns on alternative (nonprogram crop) land uses. In this setting, acreage set asides are never part of an optimal farm policy, although compensated acreage limits are. When there are new farmer entrants who cannot be excluded from farm programs, optimal policy takes the form of a pure voluntary acreage limitation—or "buyout"—program in which high-cost producers participate and low-cost producers do not.