Endogenous Verifiability and Optimality in Agency

This paper investigates the optimal contract design in a principal-agent model where verification of an agent's action is endogenously determined through strategic interactions between contracting parties. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the first best outcome to be implemented as an equilibrium. The equilibrium has the following features: (i) The action level that the agent chooses is not verified even if it is possible. (ii) Nevertheless, the first best can be attained by making a contract contingent on the unverified action. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D20, K40.     

Dynamic Incentive Contracts under No-Commitment to Periodic Auditing and a Non-retrospective Penalty System

This paper generalizes Khalil’s (1997) static model to a multiperiod one. The associated optimal dynamic contracts are derived and analyzed. At every-period’s equilibrium, the principal conducts no sure auditing. While duplication of the Baron-Myerson-type (1982) contract cannot be optimal, duplication of the Khalil-type (1997) contract can be optimal when the cheating penalty is large or discount factors are small. This implies that static contracts with no-commitment to auditing can describe players’ long-run behavior only under specific conditions. Moreover, our separating and pooling equilibria are compared with Baron and Besanko’s (1984a) and Laffont and Tirole’s (1987) equilibria, respectively.     

偷税罪“二次行政处罚”犯罪成立标准的立法缺陷及其完善

我国刑法对于偷税罪"二次行政处罚"犯罪成立标准的规定存在诸多立法缺陷,而且不符合税收征管实际,在实践中难以操作。应对此进行相应的修改予以完善:明确规定"二次行政处罚"的时限与数额;将扣缴义务人因偷税被税务机关二次行政处罚又偷税的行为犯罪化。     

农民工教育与工作匹配状态及收入效应

文章基于教育与工作是否适配及其收入效应的视角,根据2013年的CGSS 数据,在运用实际匹配法评估农民工教育与工作匹配状态的基础上,进一步采用D-H 模型和V-V模型估算了农民工教育的收入效应,并且据此讨论了教育获益与教育惩罚的问题。研究表明：(1)在教育适配状态下,农民工的教育收益率最高。(2)就农民工群体而言,教育不足发生率比较高,但并非不存在教育过度情形。(3)男性农民工具有教育过度工资溢价和教育不足工资折价并存的特征,女性农民工不具有这样的特征。(4)在短期内,企业主不仅愿意为教育过度农民工支付工资溢价,同时也会对教育不足农民工实施工资折价。     

均值计数模型下汽车保险索赔频数的估计方法

汽车保险的索赔频数预测问题是非寿险精算理论和应用研究的一个重要内容。但是，在含有高维附加信息的情形下，传统的估计方法就不再适用。本文在均值计数模型基础上，利用凸惩罚函数进行变量选择，找到影响车险索赔频数的显著性因子，并通过模拟和实例分析来评价该模型和所提出的方法的可行性。     

标准施工招标文件与JCT调价方法的比较研究

介绍了我国标准施工招标文件的调价方法及特点,提出了该调价方法在我国房屋建筑工程实施过程中所遇到的一系列问题,并进行了分析。给出了英国JCT合同的调价方法及原则,从几个方面分析了标准施工招标文件与英国实行的JCT合同调价方式的差异,同时引入数据案例对JCT调价的基本方法和框架进行了演示,以详尽说明JCT调价的部分特点。通过对比分析提出划分基本工作并逐项调价,建立我国建筑行业物价体系及修正延误工期后重复惩罚制度等建议,从而提高我国工程合同的准确性和公平性。     

试论受贿罪

受贿犯罪不仅严重侵犯了国家工作人员履行公务活动的廉洁性,而且对国家机关的正常管理活动造成了严重的损害,司法机关要正确认定受贿罪,必须严格把握受贿罪的构成要件,注意区分罪与非罪的界限,在刑事处罚上准确适用法律。     

Analysis of ruin measures for the classical compound Poisson risk model with dependence

In this paper, we consider an extension to the classical compound Poisson risk model. Historically, it has been assumed that the claim amounts and claim inter-arrival times are independent. In this contribution, a dependence structure between the claim amount and the interclaim time is introduced through a Farlie–Gumbel–Morgenstern copula. In this framework, we derive the integro-differential equation and the Laplace transform (LT) of the Gerber–Shiu discounted penalty function. An explicit expression for the LT of the discounted value of a general function of the deficit at ruin is obtained for claim amounts having an exponential distribution.     

The effect of career breaks on the working lives of women

In this paper we examine the effect of career breaks on the working lives of women using survey data from the state of Queensland in Australia. After estimating the income penalty faced by women with career interruptions – according to the duration of, and reasons for, the interruptions – we seek to address a wider set of issues regarding: patterns of job change and income gains or losses related to job change; determinants of career re-entry plans; and satisfaction with hours worked. As women increasingly combine motherhood and employment, they face both penalties and costs, particularly if they have taken a career break in order to care for their young. This general labor market failure that penalizes motherhood should be addressed by relevant measures related to their income, working hours, and the type and status of employment, particularly on their re-entry into employment after a child-related career break.     

GUARANTEED MINIMUM WITHDRAWAL BENEFIT IN VARIABLE ANNUITIES

We develop a singular stochastic control model for pricing variable annuities with the guaranteed minimum withdrawal benefit. This benefit promises to return the entire initial investment, with withdrawals spread over the term of the contract, irrespective of the market performance of the underlying asset portfolio. A contractual withdrawal rate is set and no penalty is imposed when the policyholder chooses to withdraw at or below this rate. Subject to a penalty fee, the policyholder is allowed to withdraw at a rate higher than the contractual withdrawal rate or surrender the policy instantaneously. We explore the optimal withdrawal strategy adopted by the rational policyholder that maximizes the expected discounted value of the cash flows generated from holding this variable annuity policy. An efficient finite difference algorithm using the penalty approximation approach is proposed for solving the singular stochastic control model. Optimal withdrawal policies of the holders of the variable annuities with the guaranteed minimum withdrawal benefit are explored. We also construct discrete pricing formulation that models withdrawals on discrete dates. Our numerical tests show that the solution values from the discrete model converge to those of the continuous model.