Sources of business fluctuations: Financial or technology shocks?

Despite the widespread belief that technology shocks are the main source of business fluctuations, recent empirical studies indicate that in the absence of financial frictions, a shock to the marginal efficiency of investment is the main source and is closely related to financial conditions for investment. We incorporate a financial accelerator mechanism and two types of financial shocks to the external finance premium and net worth in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with shocks to the marginal efficiency of investment, the investment-good price markup, and the rates of neutral and investment-specific technological changes. This model is estimated using eleven US time series that include data on loan, net worth, the loan rate, and the relative price of investment. Our estimation results show that the (non-stationary) neutral and investment-specific technology shocks primarily drive output and investment fluctuations, while the external finance premium shock plays an important role for investment fluctuations. This financial shock induced substantial falls and subsequent sharp hikes in the external finance premium and caused boom–bust cycles over the past two decades.     

Truthful germs are contagious: A local-to-global characterization of truthfulness

We study the question of which social choice functions from an abstract type space to a set of outcomes are truthful, i.e., implementable by truthful mechanisms, when utilities are quasi-linear. For convex domains, our main theorem characterizes truthful social choice functions as those satisfying two properties: local weak monotonicity and vortex-freeness. The first of these constrains the function values at any two sufficiently proximal points, while the second asserts that its line integrals around sufficiently small triangular loops must vanish.The characterization implies a local-to-global principle that allows one to deduce truthfulness of a function from its behavior on arbitrarily small neighborhoods of each point. Other consequences include a simple alternate derivation of the Saks–Yu Theorem that weak monotonicity characterizes truthfulness of functions having a convex domain and finite range, and a sufficient condition for constructing truthful functions by “stitching together” truthful subfunctions on different subsets of the domain.     

经济增长与不平等对我国农村脱贫时间的影响

选择FGT贫困指数和脱贫时间指数，利用世界银行公布的我国农村贫困线和收入分配分组数据。对比分析了1981年-2005年以来的农村贫困变化趋势。研究发现，农村贫困状况虽然总体上呈缓解趋势，但在脱贫时间指数的构成中，由于不平等所延长的脱贫时间，无论从绝对量还是相对量上都明显提高，这说明收入分配的恶化已经成为反贫困的严重障碍，这种变化趋势值得高度关注。     

酒店行业协会的运行机制及其变迁——以广州地区酒店行业协会为例

行业协会在酒店业发展进程中发挥越来越大的作用,但在国内现行条件下,行业协会发展面临多重困难。文章以广州地区酒店行业协会为案例,采用实地调查和深度访谈的方法,讨论行业协会的运行机制及其变迁。研究认为,第一,"政会不分"是目前行业协会管理的主要问题,政府应创新行业协会管理机制,加快"政会分开"的进程,推进部分行业职能向协会转移;第二,酒店行业协会应大胆创新,依据地区、行业发展环境动态调整组织架构,丰富协会职能发挥,以此达到激活协会运行机制的目标。基于此,酒店行业协会可以更好地为会员酒店服务,提升行业专业化管理水平。     

Interpolating the Lorenz Curve: Methods to Preserve Shape and Remain Consistent with the Concentration Curves for Components

C¹‐class interpolation methods that preserve monotonicity and convexity and are thus suitable for the estimation of the Lorenz curve from grouped data are not widely known. Instead, parametric models are usually applied for such estimation. Parametric models, however, have difficulty in accurately approximating every part of income/expenditure distributions. This paper proposes two types of C¹‐class shape‐preserving interpolation methods. One is a piecewise rational polynomial interpolation (proposed independently by Stineman and Delbourgo) that enables consistent interpolation of the concentration curves for income/expenditure components, attaining approximately the same accuracy as that of the existing methods when applied to decile‐grouped data or to more detailed aggregation. Another is a Hybrid interpolation that employs pieces of curves derived from parametric models on end intervals. Empirical comparisons show that the Hybrid interpolation (with the assistance of parametric models for class‐boundary estimation) outperforms the existing methods even when applied to quintile‐grouped data without class boundaries.     

The veto mechanism in atomic differential information economies

We establish new characterizations of Walrasian expectations equilibria based on the veto mechanism in the framework of differential information economies with a complete finite measure space of agents. We show that it is enough to consider the veto power of a single coalition, consisting of the entire set of agents, to obtain the Aubin private core. Moreover, we investigate on the veto power of arbitrarily small and big coalitions, providing an extension to mixed markets of well known Schmeidler (1972) and Vind’s (1972) results in terms of Aubin private core allocations.     

Assessing Poverty Trends in Indonesia by International Poverty Lines

Indonesia has made well-documented and drastic progress in raising average incomes and reducing poverty. This article adds to the literature by providing a complementary perspective of poverty between 1984 and 2011. We discuss the evolution of poverty in Indonesia using international poverty lines—$1.25 per person per day (in 2005 purchasing power parity dollars) and $2.00 per day, and we add $10.00 per day. We generate estimates of poverty since 1984 and make projections based on various trends in growth and inequality. We find that Indonesia has the potential to become a high-income country by around 2025 and end $1.25-per-day and $2.00-perday poverty by 2030, but this will require strong economic growth and favourable changes in distribution. Looking ahead, the end of poverty in Indonesia may mean that a large proportion of the population will remain vulnerable to poverty for some time to come, suggesting that public policy priorities will need to balance insurance and risk-management mechanisms with more ‘traditional’ poverty policy.     

Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers

When a group of voters selects a committee out of a set of candidates, it is common and often desirable to endow these voters with some veto power. I present impossibility results showing that even limited veto power makes many mechanisms of interest manipulable. This applies in particular (i) to mechanisms the range of which contains a degenerate lottery in which a committee is chosen for sure and (ii) to mechanisms that are constructed from extensive game forms with a finite number of strategies. These impossibilities hold on a large set of domains including the domain of additive preferences, and even when probabilistic mechanisms are allowed and voters can report cardinal preferences.     

Do the poor benefit from globalization regardless of institutional quality?

Despite significant progress towards the Millennium goals, more than one billion people live on less than 1.25 US dollars per day. Previous research suggests that globalization stimulates poverty reduction, but does not investigate what role institutions play in this relationship. Theoretically, globalization could act as either a complement or a substitute to institutional quality in reducing poverty. We find that the poverty-reducing effect of globalization is stronger when institutions are weak. In particular, increasing social globalization reduces poverty more when corruption is high and democratic accountability is low. Thus, globalization has the power to reduce poverty even in countries with low institutional quality.     

Dynamic decision and coordination in a low-carbon supply chain considering the retailer's social preference

We establish dynamic game models in a low-carbon supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer with social preference. This study investigates the complex dynamic characteristics of pricing decision and carbon abatement strategy in the supply chain and focuses on the impact of the retailer's social preference on pricing decision, carbon emission abatement strategy, profits, supply chain coordination, and complexity of dynamic models. We find that adjustment parameters of pricing and carbon emission abatement should be maintained in a certain range; otherwise, the system will be unstable and even chaotic through period double bifurcation or wave shape chaos. A higher social preference of the retailer is always beneficial to carbon abatement and the manufacturer and helps maintain the stability of the supply chain system. However, the impact on the long-term profitability of the supply chain is related to the state of the system. Compared with the setting of a centralized decision, the optimal carbon abatement strategy and supply chain profit in a decentralized decision are always less than those in a centralized setting, regardless of whether the retailer has social preference. Therefore, a side-payment self-executing contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain and achieve Pareto improvement. The coordination mechanism proposed in this study not only leads to Pareto improvement but also increases the stability of the supply chain system. Finally, this study enlightens management in operating a low-carbon supply chain.