试论研究环境问题的三种理论框架

本文认为,对环境问题的理论研究大致分三种脉络:外部性与社会福利、公地的悲剧与环境产权、物质平衡模型与可持续发展规划。依据这三种理论框架,解决环境问题的对策措施需要同时从市场机制建设、人类社会发展目标确定与技术途径三个方面展开。     

宁波市上市公司盈利质量不高的原因与对策

盈利质量的不断改善和提高是企业可持续发展的根本。上市公司的主营业务利润比重与企业盈利质量存在正相关关系，即主营业务利润比重越大，上市公司的盈利质量越高，因此，提高盈利质量的关键就是要突出主业，壮大主业，不断提高主营业务利润比重，形成自己的核心盈利能力。     

教育产业及其发展的公共经济学分析

本文从公共经济学的视角探讨了我国教育产业及其发展的相关问题。首先，明确提出现代教育产业是一种混合产业，兼有公共经济与民间经济双重性质，中国现阶段必须将教育当做混合产业来发展，才有利于“科教兴国”战略的实施。其次，在明确现阶段应当以混合产业方式发展中国教育事业的基础上提出了我国应制定和实施的教育投入和管理的政策。     

公共项目分配效果评价指标

采用公平化指数、区域协调发展系数和国民收入分配系数，可以评价公共项目的收益在不同人群和区域的分配效果。本文应用以上述评价指标对秦巴项目进行了投资分配效果分析，结果表明该项目对收入分配的公平化和均衡化有较大贡献。     

Revealed preference and differentiable demand

Summary. We prove that, for finitely many demand observations, the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference tests not only the existence of a strictly concave, strictly monotone and continuous utility generator, but also one that generates an infinitely differentiable demand function. Our results extend those of previous related results (Matzkin and Richter, 1991; Chiappori and Rochet, 1987), yielding differentiable demand functions but without requiring differentiable utility functions.Received: 1 November 2001, Revised: 5 February 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D11, D12. Correspondence to: Kam-Chau WongThis is a much revised version of Lee and Wong (2001). We are grateful to the Referee for valuable suggestions. We also thank Professor Marcel K. Richter for his comments.     

战略环境评价中的公众参与及实施条件分析

本文简要介绍了战略环境评价中公众参与的含义，着重分析了我国公众参与战略环境评价的重要意义和作用，并立足我国国情对实施有效的公众参与所必需的制度框架和技术方法进行了深入探讨。     

技术资本价值增值效应：基本内涵、关键因素与政策取向

作为企业知识创造与应用的重要途径，技术资本具有显著的动态竞争优势、规模经济、范围经济和速度经济等效应，实现了技术研发、生产与市场的结合，促进了技术的有效转化及资本价值的增值。技术资本属性、技术体制等是影响技术资本价值增值效应的关键要素。旨在促进技术资本化的政策，应以促进这些要素积极效应的释放为重点。     

Timing of Public Information and Cost Reduction

Received July 31, 2000; revised version received July 18, 2001     

The Effects of Public Ownership and Regulatory Independence on Regulatory Outcomes

We examine the effects of public ownership and regulatory agency independence on regulatory outcomes in EU telecommunications. Specifically, we study regulated interconnect rates paid by entrants to incumbents. We find that public ownership of the incumbent positively affects these interconnect rates, and suggest that governments influence regulatory outcomes in favor of incumbents in which they are substantially invested. However, we also find that the presence of institutional features enhancing regulatory independence from the government mitigates this effect. In order to study regulatory independence, we introduce a new cross-country time-series database—the European Union Regulatory Institutions (EURI) Database. This database describes the development of institutions bearing on regulatory independence and quality in telecommunications in the 15 founding EU member states from 1997 to 2003 *We thank Laurent Pipitone for superb research assistance. Geoff Edwards thanks the Sasakawa Foundation and the Institute of Management, Innovation and Organization at the Haas School of Business for generous financial assistance, and London Business School for non-financial support. Leonard Waverman thanks the Global Communications Consortium for support     

Augmented serial rules for an excludable public good

Summary. We present a new class of rules named augmented serial rules for the provision of an excludable public good. First, we characterize this class by the four axioms of strategy-proofness, envy-freeness, access independence, and nonbossiness. Second, we identify two important subclasses by imposing an additional axiom: (i) anonymous augmented serial rules by anonymity, and (ii) Moulins serial rule by individual rationality.Received: 31 December 2002, Revised: 9 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D71, D82, H41.This paper is a substantial revision of Serial cost sharing with simple games. I would like to thank Hervé Moulin, Yoshikatsu Tatamitani, an associate editor, and three anonymous referees for helpful suggestions and detailed comments. This research was partially supported by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology in Japan (Grant-in-Aid for 21st Century COE Program Microstructure and Mechanism Design in Financial Markets).