高精度温度、压力、电流综合传感器及其测控仪表的设计

本文讲述了实际应用中对温度、压力、电流三种参数实用的高精度测量方法,重点分析了压阻式压力传感器的温漂补偿以及铂电阻温度传感器的线性修正方法。     

数量折扣在供应链循环库存当中的应用研究

在简单分析数量折扣和循环库存的基本理论后,通过建立2种数量折扣的方案模型,对这2种模型进行深入分析,导出最佳批量,使得总成本实现最小化。文章在此基础上结合供应链循环库存自身的理论特点,对实施数量折扣的意义进行了阐述,并具体分析了数量折扣对循环库存所产生的建设性的影响及实施数量折扣方案的具体范围。     

The influence of lead indicator strength on the use of nonfinancial measures in performance management: Evidence from CEO compensation schemes

Nonfinancial measures (NFMs) are a common feature of strategic performance management frameworks. We examine the role of one widely used NFM: customer satisfaction, in one aspect of strategic performance management: CEO compensation schemes. Drawing on agency theory precepts, we hypothesize that the extent to which firms link CEO compensation to customer satisfaction is influenced by satisfaction's ability to act as a leading indicator of future profitability (lead indicator strength). We further hypothesize that the extent to which customer satisfaction's lead indicator strength influences the weighting of satisfaction in CEO compensation schemes has a positive influence on future shareholder value. Our empirical results offer strong support for both hypotheses and extend research on the use and efficacy of NFMs in CEO compensation schemes. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Upper‐echelon executive human capital and compensation: Generalist vs specialist skills

This study extends current knowledge of upper echelon executive compensation beyond the CEO, specifically CFO compensation, based on whether they possess generalist or specialist skills. We find that “strategic” CFOs with an elite MBA (generalist) consistently command a compensation premium, while “accounting” CFOs (specialist) and CFOs with a non‐MBA master's degree, even from an elite institution, do not. Further, scarce “strategic” CFOs are awarded both higher salaries and higher equity‐based compensation. Our findings support the view that unique complementarities between scarce CFOs and firms increase these executives' bargaining power leading to pay premium. Our results are robust to post‐hiring years, firm sizes, board characteristics, and CFO's insider/outsider status. We contribute at the confluence of upper‐echelon compensation, executive human capital, resource‐based view, and assortative matching literatures. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO compensation in EU telecom companies: Does the state design the right incentives?

This paper analyzes the structure of CEO pay in European fixed telecommunication companies, focusing on the impact of state ownership. Results show that, under the (partial or total) control of the state, the level of CEO compensation is lower and pay-performance sensitivity is higher than in privately-controlled firms. This finding suggests the state provides an incentive as well as a monitoring effect. However, when the state holds the majority of the shares, the pay level is significantly affected by the CEO power, suggesting that in these firms, CEOs are more likely to be entrenched with boards and succeed in raising their pay.     

分散决策下的双渠道供应链补偿策略——基于消费者渠道选择行为

为了有效解决由于对消费者的争夺从而引发的渠道之间关于定价、服务水平、利润等方面的冲突,基于消费者渠道选择行为,构建了网络直销市场与传统零售市场需求模型和双渠道供应链利润模型,运用Stackelberg模型,在制造商与零售商实施分决策时,通过制造商对零售商实施补偿激励前后的对比,分析了消费者渠道选择行为对网络直销渠道和传统零售渠道定价、制造商与零售商利润以及供应链总利润的影响,并求得最优定价及制造商的最优补偿额度和零售商的最优销售努力水平,进行了不同情况下的双渠道供应链利润的比较分析。结果表明,无论制造商是否实施补偿激励,都应随着网络消费者比例的增加而增加其网络直销价格;零售商的零售渠道价格应根据网络消费者比例的增加先降低到一定水平后再提升。当更多的消费者选择网络直销渠道时,制造商的补偿激励水平和零售商的销售努力程度均会下降。制造商应提高其补偿水平,进而激发零售商提高销售的努力水平,并使双方利润及供应链总利润最大化。研究结果为基于消费者选择行为的供应链补偿研究提供了新方法,对双渠道的供应链补偿研究有借鉴意义。     

Inventory model for an inventory system with time-varying demand rate

The standard inventory problems of the multi-period have been modeled under different situations. Specifically we have considered the demand subjects of a continuous distribution and a discrete distribution, and whether the demand of each period is unchanged or not. A method to get an economic order quantity in inventory systems with discrete and unchanged demand was presented in a previous paper, and this method has been generalized to an inventory model with varying continuous demand. However, it was not achieved due to there being many classified cases in the general situations. In this article the above method is discussed in the case discrete demand to determine whether it increases or decreases from period to period. A theoretical method is presented by using previous results and some examples are given which suggest how the concept can handle on inventory system. In order to make the decision, an algorithm is also presented under some conditions, and examples are shown by using the computer software program, Mathematica, which helps to explain the findings. In general cases, we view the optimal policy in the inventory problems in only a few periods.     

矿产开发负效应与资源生态环境补偿机制研究

矿产开发的负效应是指采矿活动造成的资源生态环境损失,主要表现为资源耗损、生态破坏、环境污染以及区域发展能力下降等。本文基于矿产开发的负效应,初步构建了矿产开发的资源生态环境补偿机制的基本框架。提出应采取资源补偿、生态环境补偿与矿区/区域补偿,实行防范性补偿、即时性补偿与修复性补偿,实施实体性补偿、功能性补偿与价值性补偿。不同的补偿类型,其补偿主体、客体、原则、标准、方式各不相同,但总体上都遵循立法约束、政策引导与行政监管相结合的三位一体的补偿运行模式。建议开展矿产开发的资源环境补偿机制建设试点工作;形成部门间协调管理的工作机制;加强对矿产开发生态环境补偿的监督和评估。     

Does accounting conservatism pay?

We investigate whether or not there is a link between conservative accounting practices and the sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance. Using several accrual‐based measures of accounting conservatism as well as alternative measures of accounting performance, we estimate an econometric model of CEO compensation that incorporates the interaction of accounting conservatism and accounting performance. Consistent with optimal contracting theory, we find that the sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance is higher for firms that report conservative accounting earnings. These results support the hypothesis that accounting conservatism, by limiting earnings management opportunities and improving the reliability of accounting performance measures, allows firms to formulate contracts that tie executive compensation more closely to accounting performance.     

顾客集中与管理层治理——基于薪酬契约和代理成本的视角

本文以创业板上市公司为研究样本,从薪酬契约和代理成本的视角,检验了顾客集中与管理层治理的关系。实证分析结果显示,顾客集中度与高管薪酬和代理成本存在显著负相关关系。结果表明：顾客集中显著影响公司薪酬契约,顾客集中降低了高管薪酬;顾客集中降低代理成本,减轻管理层代理冲突问题。这些研究结论丰富了公司治理的理论内容,同时对于缓解公司代理冲突、改善公司治理矛盾具有重要的现实意义。