Poverty Traps, Indeterminacy, and the Wealth Distribution

We consider a one-sector growth model in continuous time with a production externality and endogenous labor supply. There is a continuum of households who have identical preferences but differ with respect to their initial wealth. We show that there exist economies such that an indeterminate steady state exists for some wealth distribution but not for others. A second result is that a redistribution of wealth may drive the economy from a steady state with strictly positive output to a poverty trap in which output converges asymptotically to zero. These results indicate that differences in the wealth distribution may be responsible for drastic differences in the long-run standard of living. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D31, D50, O41.     

Dissertation abstract: “Essays in applied economics on the intervention of a third player in agency relationships”

Agency theory has established that appropriate incentives can reconcile the diverging interests of the principal and the agent. Focusing on three applications, this dissertation evaluates the empirical relevance of these results when a third party interacts with the primary contract. The analyses provided rely on either laboratory or natural experiments. First, corruption is analyzed as a two-contract situation: a delegation contract between a Principal and an Agent and a corruption pact concluded between this Agent and a third player, called Briber. A survey of the recent microeconomic literature on corruption first highlights how corruption behavior results from the properties of those two agreements. We thereafter show that the Agent faces a conflict in reciprocities due to those two conflicting agreements. The resulting delegation effect, supported by observed behavior in our three-player experimental game, could account for the deterrence effect of wages on corruption. Second, health care is governed by contradictory objectives: patients are mainly concerned with the health provided, whereas containing health care costs is the primary goal of health care administrators. We provide further insights into the ability of incentives to balance these two competing objectives. In this matter, our theoretical and econometric analysis evaluates how a new mixed compensation scheme, introduced in Quebec in 1999 as an alternative to fee-for-services, has affected physicians’ practice patterns. Free switching is shown to be an essential feature of the reform, since it implements screening between physicians. Finally, the demand for underground work departs from the traditional Beckerian approach to illegal behavior, due to the dependence of benefits from illegality on competitors’ behavior. We set up a theoretical model in which the demand for underground work from all producers competing on the same output market is analyzed simultaneously. We first show that competition drastically undermines the individual benefits of tax evasion. At equilibrium, each firm nonetheless chooses evasion with a positive probability, strictly lower than one. This Bertrand curse could then account for the “tax evasion puzzle” i.e. the overprediction of evasion in models that ignore market interactions. We thereafter show that allowing firms to denounce competitors’ evasion is not likely to solve this curse—by providing a credible threat against price cuts, it fosters illegal work. Empirical evidence from a laboratory experiment confirms these predictions. Without denunciation, experimental firms often choose evasion whereas evasion benefits are canceled out by competition. When introduced, denunciation is rarely used by firms, but the threat makes evasion profitable. JEL Classification K42, I18, D21, C25, C91     

供应链竞争环境分析模型

本文将扩展后的波特模型用于分析供应链上几个连续环节组成的整体的竞争环境以及环节间的整合趋势。并采用新的模型分析了实现“厂网分离、竞价上网”改革后的电力供应链的竞争状态与发展趋势。     

基于不对称需求信息的激励机制模型研究

针对由单制造商和单销售商组成的供应链,提出了供应链双方需求信息对称情况下的激励机制模型,并在此基础上建立了供应链双方在需求信息不对称情况下的运作策略模型。制造商通过折扣,运用激励相容机制使销售商诚实申报需求信息,使得供应链利润最大化的同时供应链成员实现双赢。数字试验结果表明:①所提策略是有效的;②该策略不仅能提高制造商利润,而且也能改善销售商的利润。     

核心企业集约的多产品、多级供应链库存控制策略研究

在供应链环境及结构稳定情况下,供应链上的各节点企业,根据需求来调整相应的运作策略。基于多层供应商及供货产品为多品种且集约到一个核心企业的供应链网络,根据该供应链网络供需结构和特点分析了各节点的需求特征,得出了订货提前期为随机条件下的最佳库存费用,并利用各节点服务水平约束下的临界值及库存费用凸函数特性确定了供应链的运作策略。     

绿色供应链管理的系统研究

人口、资源与环境三者之间的矛盾日益突显,要求企业的经营活动必须与环境相容。绿色供应链管理是从可持续发展的思想出发解决制造业与环境之间冲突的有效方式,是一种现代企业的可持续发展模式。目前绿色供应链的研究刚刚开始,尚未形成理论体系。进行绿色供应链管理的研究对提高产品在国际市场上的竞争力、保护环境和实施可持续发展战略具有十分重要的意义。     

供应链环境下产品创新过程分析及评价研究

供应链环境下产品创新流程设计及对供应商的评价成为产品创新的关键。本文分析了知识经济条件下的产品创新的新模式,提出供应链环境下产品创新的基本流程,并进一步研究了基于成本-时间模型的产品创新供应链节点企业的评价模型。     

对培育我国高科技产业集群的思考

产业集群的要素有企业、市场、品牌、协作关系、生产基地、专业化配套环境、公共研发机构、制度创新等。产业集群的模式有轴轮武产业集群、多核武产业集群、网状武产业集群等。培育产业集群的思路是制定产业集群发展规划、建设配套环境、实施专业化园区建设、培育品牌集群以及实施“目标招商”和“策划招商”。     

基于组合权的灰色关联分析在供电企业营销效果综合评价中的应用

在供电企业电力营销效果综合评价中,客观赋权法体现了指标的信息量,而主观赋权法体现了指标的价值量,综合评价应当体现二者的统一.针对电力营销效果评价,提出了基于组合权的灰色关联分析方法.对传统的灰色关联法进行改进,将该方法用于供电企业电力营销效果评价,得到了较好的结果.     

基于循环经济绿色供应链管理绩效评价体系的研究

循环经济是当前世界经济发展的主要方向,已被我国确定为今后经济的发展模式。本文根据绿色供应链管理的定义、内涵和循环经济"3R"原则,设计出基于循环经济绿色供应链管理绩效评价指标体系,即将绿色信息作为绿色供应链管理绩效评价的主要衡量指标之一,并将各个指标具体化,形成一个二级指标评价体系。根据指标体系的特点进行模糊多层次综合评价,最后给出一个算例进行说明,为基于循环经济的绿色供应链管理绩效评价提供了理论依据。