A dual agency view of board compensation: the joint effects of outside director and CEO stock options on firm risk

This paper contributes to multiple agency theory by examining how the compensation schemes awarded to outside directors and the CEO jointly affect firm‐level risk taking. Using data of the S&P 1500 firms from 1997 to 2006, we find support for earlier arguments that providing the CEO, the outside directors, or both with stock options increases risk taking. More importantly, we find that compensating outside directors with stock options has significantly stronger effects than CEO stock options. Finally, contrary to what one would expect, we find that these effects are mutually substituting; that is, if both the outside directors and the CEO are provided with stock option compensation, outside directors' incentives weaken the effect of the CEO's incentives on firms' risk taking. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Competition,concentration and risk taking in Banking sector of MENA countries

This paper tests the relationship between competition and bank stability for 356 banks operating in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) countries during the period 2005–2012. Our results show that for the overall sample, a U-shaped relationship between competition and banks’ risk taking for MENA banks. The negative linear relationship between Z-Score and H-statistics in Gulf countries shows that an increase in competition leads to a reduction in the level of financial stability. In the case of other non-Gulf countries, the increase of competition in uncompetitive markets can lead to an increase in stability. The results confirm the importance of the market structure as an explanatory factor for financial stability, but also indicate that concentration is not associated with uncompetitive markets.     

The unintended consequences of the zero lower bound policy

We study the impact of the zero lower bound interest rate policy on the industrial organization of the U.S. money fund industry. We find that in response to policies that maintain low interest rates, money funds: change their product offerings by investing in riskier asset classes; are more likely to exit the market; and reduce the fees they charge their investors. The consequence of fund closures resulting from interest rate policy is the relocation of resources in affected fund families and in the asset management industry in general, as well as decline in capital of issuers borrowing from money funds.     

实际货币供给、企业风险承担与营运资本目标结构的动态调整选择

基于权衡理论,分析了风险承担水平对企业营运资本目标结构回调速度的影响,实证研究结果表明：风险承担水平提高会加快企业营运资本目标结构回调速度,实际货币供给水平的增加能够显著放缓企业营运资本目标结构回调速度;同时,实际货币供给水平的提高可以降低企业风险承担水平所带来的风险敞口,从而降低企业风险承担对营运资本目标结构回调速度的影响。进一步检验不同风险偏好倾向下,企业风险承担以及不同风险承担下实际货币供给对企业营运资本目标结构回调速度的影响,结果显示：具有风险偏好倾向的企业,风险承担水平与营运资本目标结构回调速度呈正相关关系;随着企业风险承担水平提高,具有风险规避倾向的企业,其营运资本目标结构的偏离度会进一步加大。另外,在风险偏好型企业中,实际货币供给水平的提高会放大营运资本目标结构偏离度,并且对低风险承担企业的影响更甚;在风险规避型企业中,企业营运资本目标结构回调速度并未对实际货币供给水平表现出显著的敏感性反应,并在高或低风险承担企业中表现出类似效应。     

The role of reference point in CEO restricted stock and its impact on R&D intensity in high‐technology firms

Prior work based on agency theory and behavioral agency model has focused on how absolute pay values affect firm outcomes. Departing from this traditional approach, we draw from behavioral decision theory to explain how relative pay levels influence firm risk taking. We investigate how CEO restricted stock value relative to reference point influences R&D intensity in high‐technology firms. We propose that negative deviation increases are related to R&D increases and positive deviation increases lead to R&D decreases, while negative deviation has greater effect than positive deviation. We establish theoretical boundary conditions by considering CEO duality and board vigilance as moderators. Drawing from agency theory, we predict the main effects will be enhanced under duality and weakened under high board vigilance. Our hypotheses are largely supported. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

投资者关系管理与企业风险承担

公司治理的功效不仅体现在提高企业经营业绩上,促进企业科学决策,合理进行风险控制,实现企业的长期稳定发展也同等重要。本文以2012—2017年我国沪深A股上市公司为样本,利用南京大学联合中国证监会开展的投资者关系管理状况调查,实证检验投资者关系管理对企业风险承担的影响。研究发现:(1)投资者关系管理越好的企业,企业承担的风险水平越低,表明投资者关系管理具有自主性治理效应,能抑制企业过多的风险性行为,从而有效降低企业所承担的风险水平。(2)投资者关系管理的这一治理效应在内部和外部监督机制薄弱的企业中更为显著,说明良好的投资者关系管理一定程度上能形成企业内外部监督机制的弥补,从而对企业所承担的风险产生治理作用。(3)投资者关系管理通过抑制企业过度负债和过度投资降低了企业所承担的风险水平,而与此同时,没有证据表明投资者关系管理导致了企业投资不足,从而带来投资效率的损失。(4)CEO财务背景和董秘专业能力的内部因素以及机构投资者调研、网络媒体平台开通的外部因素对于企业投资者关系管理水平具有显著的促进作用。     

国家腐败治理与企业风险承担——兼论政商关系的改善作用

本文着重考察在国家加强腐败治理的背景下,企业风险承担行为的变化及异质政企纽带的作用差异。研究结果表明,国家腐败治理负向影响企业的风险承担,国有产权性质弱化腐败治理对企业风险承担行为的负向影响;相对于非政治关联民营企业,政治关联民营企业在腐败治理影响下风险承担显著下降更多,说明在建立新型政商关系的要求下,民营企业的政治关联不再是"护身符"而可能成为"紧箍咒"。进一步将风险承担行为细分后发现,企业风险承担的下降很大程度上是源于更加谨慎的总体投资,但有利于企业价值增加的风险承担行为在国家腐败治理影响下有所提高。此外,处于政府管制行业的企业风险承担显著下降更多,同时过度投资程度降低,说明腐败治理制约了高腐败领域的盲目冒险倾向,企业风险承担的下降其实是良性谨慎的结果。     

A multilevel investigation of the link between ethical leadership behaviour and employees green behaviour in the hospitality industry

The present study develops a multilevel model that examines the effects of supervisory ethical leadership behavior at the team level on employees green behaviour mediated by CSR at the organisational level, employees well-being, and taking responsivity at the individual level. Data were collected from a sample of 936 supervisors and 2284 employees from 184 hotels in United Arab Emirates. Utilizing multisource data and multilevel path analysis, the results indicated that supervisory ethical leadership behavior has indirect effect on green behavior through CSR, employees-wellbeing and taking responsibility behavior. These findings provide important implications for ethical leadership-green behavior link by developing and validating a multilevel model empirically in the hospitality industry.     

青少年吸毒预防教育之德育方法思考

当前，青少年中吸毒现象日趋严重，应引起社会关注。针对云南滇南地区青少年吸毒现象及青少年对毒品的认知情况调查分析认为，应从学校德育角度出发，采用德育方法，即说理教育法、心理辅导法、交往对话法、典型示范法，做好青少年吸毒的预防教育工作。     

The impact of prior performance on the risk-taking of mutual fund managers

We analyze the impact of prior performance on the risk-taking behavior of mutual fund managers. We contribute to the existing literature by using different measures of risks, a larger data set, and an econometric approach capturing non-linear effects and assigning exact probabilities to the mutual fund managers’ adjustment of behavior. We find that prior performance in the first half of the year has, in general, a positive impact on the choice of the risk level in the second half of the year. Successful fund managers increase the volatility, the beta, and assign a higher proportion of their portfolio to value stocks, small firms, and momentum stocks in comparison to unsuccessful fund managers. Unsuccessful fund manager increase, on average, only the tracking error. We thank an anonymous referee, Bernd Brommundt, Alexander Ising, Stephan Kessler, Axel Kind, Angelika Noll, Jennifer Noll, Ralf Seiz, Stephan Süss, Rico von Wyss, and Andreas Zingg for valuable comments. We acknowledge helpful comments of the participants from the Joint Research Workshop of the University of St. Gallen and the University of Ulm in 2005.