边疆民族地区经济增长与就业关系比较研究

通过建立GDP就业模型揭示经济增长与就业的内在关系。要增加就业降低失业率，必须保持快速和稳定的经济增长和提高GDP就业弹性。比较分析边疆少数民族地区和东部发达地区的GDP就业弹性，发现由于东部发达地区经济更依赖于资本和技术进步，其GDP就业弹性、GDP对就业的“指数效应”比边疆少数民族地区的小。同时随着边疆少数民族地区经济的资本有机构成逐渐提高和进一步的资本深化，GDP就业弹性也在逐渐下降。东部发达地区GDP对就业的“乘数效应”比边疆民族地区的大，说明了东部发达地区依然是吸收就业和农村剩余劳动力的主要地区，并提出增加就业的对策建议。     

Dissertation abstract: Experiments on fairness and reputation

The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration. The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: in one treatment the paired player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has information on the paired player’s reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictators’ behavior towards a stranger is not statistically significantly different from their behavior towards an individual with an established reputation. The findings arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. The data also provides evidence that dictators are more generous when they know that their choices (but not their identities) will be revealed in the future. In the second experiment the dictators’ choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation. The second essay explores the ways in which information about others’ actions affects one’s own behavior in a dictator game. The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient’s within-game reputation on the dictator’s decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of motives helps to identify the mechanisms of social transmission of impulses towards selfish or generous behavior. The data analysis reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than social influence and identification. In the third essay¹ we examine the reputation effects in a labor market setting by analyzing the influence of negative technological shocks on long run relationships between firms and workers. The positive correlation between wage and effort in static conditions has been demonstrated in many experimental studies and has been one of the prominent explanations for the existence of wage rigidity. We subject these findings to further tests in a non-stationary environment that better corresponds to outside-the-lab market conditions. We observe the positive correlation of wages and effort but do not find support for downward wage rigidity in our data. Once the shocks occur, firms lower the wages and relationships often break down. The workers who accept a lower wage respond with exerting a lower effort. JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64 ¹Co-authored with Ninghua Du. Dissertation Committee: Dissertation Advisor: James C. Cox Martin Dufwenberg, Price V. Fishback, Ronald L. Oaxaca     

对外直接投资的贸易效应研究--基于中国经验的实证分析

对外直接投资与出口贸易之间的关系一直是相关理论和实证研究的争论主题。运用引力模型,对中国FD I的贸易效应进行实证分析表明:中国对东道国的直接投资促进中国对东道国的出口,但对从东道国的进口却具有替代效应。因此,大力促进中国对外直接投资,是促进中国的对外出口、绕开东道国贸易壁垒的重要途径。     

略论产业集群技术标准与集聚的正负效应之相关性

产业集群是现代产业发展过程中形成的一种具有典型特征的，介于企业和行业之间的产业组织形态。产业集聚的巨大正效应是产业集群形成和发展的重要原因。同时，产业集聚也会产生负效应，这些负效应可能导致产业集群发展缓慢，甚至衰退和消亡。找到正确有效的途径强化产业集聚的正效应，预防和消除产业集聚的负效应，是保持产业集群健康、持续发展的关键。技术标准对产业和企业的命运起着越来越重要的作用，技术标准与产业集群发展、运行秩序规范、负效应的防范与消除等方面都有着紧密的相关性，是促进产业集群发展的有效工具和手段。     

地方官员与经济增长——来自中国省长、省委书记交流的证据

通常认为地方官员在我国经济发展中扮演着积极角色,近来国家也有意通过干部交流促进省区平衡发展,但国内还没有定量识别地方官员影响经济增长的文献。本文基于1978—2005年间省长(书记)交流样本构造了省长(书记)与省区相匹配的面板数据,系统地实证分析省长(书记)交流对流入省区经济增长的影响(即省长交流效应),结果发现,整体而言,省长交流能够使流入地的经济增长速度提高1个百分点左右;这种省长交流效应是通过在流入地采取大力发展二产、重视一产、忽视三产的产业发展取向实现的。本文的发现是稳健的,有助于增进对加强干部交流破解省区发展不平衡的理解。     

浅谈所有权保留

在现代商品交易活动中，赊销、分期付款已成为非常普遍的交易方式，在这种交易方式中如何保护出卖人利益成为合同法理论和实践中的重要课题。本通过对合同法第134条关于所有权保留制度的阐述，论述了所有权保留的含义、客体、登记及当事人权利义务等内容，希对买卖合同实务有积极的指导意义。     

我国货币政策的透明度及效应分析

本文在评估了目前我国货币政策透明度现状的基础上，分析了提高透明度所产生的正效应，同时也指出我国央行透明度的制度建设还根不完善，尤其是决策透明度较低，产生了一些负效应，影响了政策的执行效果，最后提出了进一步提高透明度的建议。     

供应链中"牛鞭效应"案例分析及解决方法研究

“牛鞭效应”是供应链管理中一种普遍存在的现象，随着经济的发展，竞争的加剧，如何消除“牛鞭效应”产生的危害．已经成为人们关注的一个问题。本论文通过具体的案例分析，说明“牛鞭效应”对整个供应链产生的负面影响；并根据此例．提出了一些解决问题的方法。     

动态效率、生产性公共支出与结构效应

利用1979-2008年三次产业的数据和误差修正模型,本文估算了我国政府生产性公共支出与经济动态无效的长期关系,考察了政府生产性公共支出对三次产业的生产要素积累所产生的影响。研究发现:在结构效应为正的条件下,当期公共支出的增加能够影响资本和劳动在三次产业之间,以及三次产业内部不同行业之间的要素积累方式,起到改善经济结构、优化资源配置的作用;我国经济的投资拉动型增长方式及与之相伴随的公共品供给机制,通过"租金"创造机制诱导特定产业的发展,从而能够提升产业结构,促进资源和生产要素的优化配置,符合赶超型经济的目标要求。     

Dissertation abstract: Reputational benefits of altruism and altruistic punishment

Recent studies in experimental economics have shown that many people have other-regarding preferences, potentially including preferences for altruism, reciprocity, and fairness. It is useful to investigate why people possess such preferences and what functional purpose they might serve outside the laboratory, because evolutionary and social learning perspectives both predict that cooperative sentiments should only exist if they bring benefits that outweigh the costs of other-regarding behavior. Theories of costly signaling suggest that altruistic acts may function (with or without intention) as signals of unobservable qualities such as resources or cooperative intent, and altruists may benefit (possibly unintentionally) from the advertisement of such qualities. After reviewing the theories that could potentially account for the evolution of altruism (Chapter 1), I test some predictions about cooperation derived from costly signaling theory. In Chapter 2, I show that participants in experimental public goods games were more cooperative when they had cues that they could benefit from having a good reputation, and that there was apparently some competition to be the most generous group member. Furthermore, in subsequent trust games, people tended to trust high public goods contributors more than low contributors. Chapter 3 failed to find evidence that granting high status to people makes them more likely to contribute to public goods or punish free-riders, but there was suggestive evidence that physical proximity to the experimenter affected contributions and punishment. In Chapter 4, I found that people tended to trust others who were willing to incur costs to punish those who free-ride on group cooperation provided that such punishment was justified, and men were more punitive than women. In Chapter 5, I show that women find altruistic men more desirable than neutral men for long-term relationships. Together, these results suggest that humans do treat altruism as a signal of willingness to be cooperative. These findings are discussed with respect to the adaptive design of cooperative sentiments as well as the current debate over group selection. Dissertation: Department of Psychology, Neuroscience & Behaviour, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontarion Currently: Post-Doc, Department of Neurobiology & Behavior, Cornell University