Utilizing environmental information and pricing strategies to reduce externalities of tourism: the case of invasive species in the Galapagos

The increase in demand for nature-based tourism brings economic and educational benefits but risks the introduction of invasive species. Increasing the length of tourist trips can better balance these benefits and risks by maintaining revenues while reducing the number of unique contacts with tourists. Changing the relative prices of trips can induce tourists to take longer trips. We hypothesized that providing information about the negative externalities of tourism could improve the effectiveness of such pricing strategies.

We administered one of two discrete choice surveys to tourists considering a trip to the Galapagos. One of the surveys described the Galapagos as a fragile ecosystem susceptible to invasive species; the second described it as a standard nature-based destination. For each sample, we estimated the probability of the tourist choosing a short versus long trip, given the tourist's personal information and trip options presented to him. We then simulated the demand for trips using three pricing strategies. We found that providing information on invasive species significantly increased the efficacy of strategic pricing. We propose using a two-prong approach to tourism management: educate potential tourists about the islands’ vulnerabilities, and simultaneously increase the per-day cost of short trips relative to that of longer trips.     

Does Improved Environmental Policy Enhance Economic Growth?

The environmental impacts on an economy is studied over time using endogenous growth theory. Externalities from the environment on production are central in the analysis, and we examine whether an optimal path realizes more rapid economic growth. The paper focuses mainly on developing countries, where production is largely influenced by the environmental quality. The result of the analysis indicates that the economic growth rate may not depend on the internalization of the environmental externality, but rather on the internalization of the human capital externality. The level of economic activity, however, generally seems to depend on the internalization of both externalities.     

Local network externalities and market segmentation

This paper models interaction between groups of agents by means of a graph where each node represents a group of agents and an arc represents bilateral interaction. It departs from the standard Katz–Shapiro framework by assuming that network benefits are restricted only amongst groups of linked agents. It shows that even if rival firms engage in Bertrand competition, this form of network externalities permits strong market segmentation in which firms divide up the market and earn positive profits. The analysis also shows that some graphs or network structures do not permit such segmentation, while for others, there are easy to interpret conditions under which market segmentation obtains in equilibrium.     

财政外溢下的地方政府公共服务提供——以教育为例

主流财政分权和公共服务提供理论在强调地方政府竞争效率的同时,较少考虑联邦体制与单一集权体制的制度差异,而且忽视了地方政府在提供一些公共服务时面临着巨大的财政外溢。考虑到我国单一集权的政体背景,应用多任务代理框架来构建理论模型,可以发现。地方政府会忽视产出不易测量的文教卫生等社会民生类公共服务的提供。在人口大规模迁移使得教育支出具有显著财政外溢情况下,地方政府将进一步削减教育支出,并向居民转嫁。未来的政策调整方向是,淡化地方政府经济活动激励的同时,加大对社会民生类公共服务的激励强度,并增加对具有财政外溢的教育的专项转移支付,使其经费负担主体逐步上移。     

‘Market failure’ arguments are a poor guide to policy

‘Market failure’ is frequently offered as a justification for government intervention in the economy. Proponents of interventions can point to almost limitless examples of markets which do not meet all the criteria for Pareto optimality and argue that government taxation, subsidies or regulation can perfect them, maximising social welfare. But comparing market outcomes with an unattainable and unidentifiable ideal is not useful in a world of imperfect knowledge and government failure. It is better to compare market outcomes against realistic alternatives. Furthermore, even within the market failure paradigm, concepts such as ‘public goods’ and ‘negative externalities’ are routinely misunderstood and inconsistently applied. This leads to predictably poor policy outcomes.     

Spatial welfare economics versus ecological footprint: modeling agglomeration,externalities and trade

A welfare framework for the analysis of the spatial dimensions of sustainability is developed. It covers agglomeration effects, interregional trade, negative environmental externalities, and various land use categories. The model is used to compare rankings of spatial configurations according to evaluations based on social welfare and ecological footprint indicators. Five spatial configurations are considered for this purpose. The exercise is operationalized with the help of a two-region model of the economy, that is, in line with the ‘new economic geography.’ By generating a number of numerical ‘counter-examples,’ it is shown that the footprint method is inconsistent with an approach aimed at maximum social welfare. Unless environmental externalities are such a large problem that they overwhelm all other components of economic well-being, a ‘spatial welfare economic’ approach delivers totally different rankings of alternative land use configurations than the ecological footprint.      

Should the Good and the Selfish be Taxed Differently?*

In this paper, we consider an environment where individual actions have externalities and two types of agents exist: agents with social preferences (the good) and selfish agents. Selfish agents have pay‐off functions that do not take into account social welfare. The pay‐off of an agent is a linear combination of social welfare and the pay‐off of a selfish agent. We demonstrate that the corrective tax rates that maximize social welfare do not depend on the degree of social preferences. Hence, the good and the selfish should not be taxed differently.     

Should public policy respond to positional externalities?

A nice suit is one that compares favorably with those worn by others in the same local environment. More generally, a positional good is one whose utility depends strongly on how it compares with others in the same category.¹A positional externality occurs when new purchases alter the relevant context within which an existing positional good is evaluated.² For example, if some job candidates begin wearing expensive custom-tailored suits, a side effect of their action is that other candidates become less likely to make favorable impressions on interviewers. From any individual job seeker's point of view, the best response might be to match the higher expenditures of others, lest her chances of landing the job fall. But this outcome may be inefficient, since when all spend more, each candidate's probability of success remains unchanged. All may agree that some form of collective restraint on expenditure would be useful.In such cases, however, it is often impractical to negotiate private solutions. Do positional externalities then become legitimate objects of public policy concern? In attempting to answer this question, I employ the classical libertarian criterion put forth by John Stuart Mill³, who wrote the state may not legitimately constrain any citizen's freedom of action except to prevent harm to others. I argue that many positional externalities appear to meet Mill's test, causing not just negative feelings but also large and tangible economic costs to others who are ill-equipped to avoid them. I also discuss an unintrusive policy remedy for positional externalities, one modeled after the use of effluent charges to curb environmental pollution.The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 notes the deep similarity between the conditions that give rise to positional arms races and those that give rise to conventional military arms races. Section 2 follows with a review of evidence concerning the strength of concerns about relative position. Section 3 describes some of the tangible economic costs that people experience as a result of positional externalities arising from such concerns. Section 4 takes up the question of whether collective action directed against positional externalities is consistent with respect for individual rights. Section 5 describes how a progressive consumption tax could neutralize many of the most costly effects of positional externalities.     

Sustainability and externalities: Is the internalization of externalities a sufficient condition for sustainability?

In an important contribution in Ecological Economics, van de Bergh (2010) correctly concludes that sustainability does not imply zero externalities. However, he continues with the Delphic statement "(Delphic statements were uttered by the renowned oracle of ancient Greece at Delphi. They were phrased in such a way as to be self-fulfilling because alternative interpretations covered every possibility.)" "Without externalities the problem of sustainability vanishes". If this statement refers to an impossible economic process that produces no externalities then he is right. However, it might be interpreted as stating that whenever environmental policy internalizes environmental externalities then sustainability will be ensured. In this note, I assert that in the real world where externalities prevail, their internalization or neutralization in the traditional way cannot lead to sustainability. Only if internalization takes a very specific form that results in the inviolable preservation of environmental rights of future generations in pure biological terms can sustainability be ensured. After revised the original commentary I resubmit it. The issues raised by the editor have been carefully considered.