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1.
This paper addresses a simple question: why do people vote? Though simple, this question remains unanswered despite the considerable attention it has received. In this paper, I show that purely rational–instrumental factors explain a large fraction of turnout variations, provided that the effect of the margin of victory on implemented policy is considered. I extend Myerson's models of elections based on Poisson games, and show that, when platforms are responsive to vote shares, the predictions of the model become consistent with several stylized facts, including the secular fall in turnout rates in the US. 相似文献
2.
Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We suggest an equilibrium concept for a strategic model with a large number of players in which each player observes the actions of only a small number of the other players. The concept fits well situations in which each player treats his sample as a prediction of the distribution of actions in the entire population, and responds optimally to this prediction. We apply the concept to a strategic voting model and investigate the conditions under which a centrist candidate can win the popular vote although his strength in the population is smaller than the strengths of the right and left candidates. 相似文献
3.
Ines Lindner 《Economic Theory》2008,35(3):607-611
We extend Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité
des voix. De l’imprimerie royale, 1785) to weighted voting games with voters of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of
‘major’ voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of ‘minor’ voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but
where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain the limiting probability that the jury will
arrive at the correct decision as a function of the competence of the few major players. As in Condorcet’s result the quota
q = 1/2 is found to play a prominent role.
I wish to thank Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. 相似文献
4.
董事会建设一直是我国公司治理的核心,该文则将董事会置于公司内部控制环境中,从控制角度探讨董事会的重要性、当前我国公司董事会存在的主要问题及其解决思路。 相似文献
5.
Danilo Coelho 《Economics of Governance》2005,6(2):159-175
In the context of a probabilistic voting model with dichotomous choice, we investigate the consequences of choosing among voting rules according to the maximin criterion. A voting rule is the minimum number of voters who vote favorably on a change from the status quo required for it to be adopted. We characterize the voting rules that satisfy the maximin criterion as a function of the distribution of voters’ probabilities to favor change from the status quo. We prove that there are at most two maximin voting rules, at least one is Pareto efficient and is often different to the simple majority rule. If a committee is formed only by “conservative voters” (i.e. voters who are more likely to prefer the status quo to change) then the maximin criterion recommends voting rules that require no more voters supporting change than the simple majority rule. If there are only “radical voters”, then this criterion recommends voting rules that require no less than half of the total number of votes.Received: June 2003, Accepted: September 2004, JEL Classification:
D71Salvador Barberá, Carmen Beviá, Mirko Cardinale, Wioletta Dziuda, Joan Esteban, Mahmut Erdem, Bernard Grofman, Matthew Jackson, Kai Konrad, Raul Lopez, Jordi Massó, Hugh Mullan, Shmuel Nitzan, Ana Pires do Prado, Elisabeth Schulte, Arnold Urken and two anonymous referees provided helpful comments. Finally, I also acknowledge financial support from Capes, Brazilian Ministry of Education and Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology (Project BEC2002-02130). 相似文献
6.
刘威 《郑州经济管理干部学院学报》2007,22(1):57-59
新《公司法》与旧《公司法》比较而言,尽管引入了许多新的制度,有很大的进步,但仍没有摆脱“缺乏可操作性”这个固有法律弊端,就公司治理中最为重要的累积投票制度和股东衍生诉讼制度而言,这种情况尤为严重。立法部门应立足我国公司治理的具体情况,完善上述制度。 相似文献
7.
8.
Malte Müller 《The Australian journal of agricultural and resource economics》2020,64(2):533-554
Leadership is critical for the viability of rural groups. The way in which leadership is legitimised can mediate leader and group member behaviour in the face of social dilemmas. Yet there has been scant research on leader‐follower dynamics in naturally occurring groups. Highlighting the case of agricultural machinery circles in Tajikistan, the effect of leading by example on investments to a collective good is studied in a framed field experiment. To increase realism, and contrary to standard economic experiments, this investment is a voucher allowing the group to make a real‐world machinery purchase at reduced costs. Two treatments manipulate leaders’ legitimisation. Elected leaders achieve 30 per cent higher contributions to the collective investment against a baseline version without a leader. Contributions remain, on average, relatively stable over the course of the game. The results are discussed with reference to the debate on external intervention in agricultural producer organisations. 相似文献
9.
Frederic Vermeulen 《Applied economics》2013,45(9):1089-1092
In Heien and Wessells (1990), a two-step estimation procedure, that makes use of Heckman-type corrections, is proposed to estimate consumption on household budget surveys. It is shown that this approach, which draws from switching regressions models, leads to inconsistent estimates. 相似文献
10.
The paper examines the effect of population ageing on public education spending. On the one hand, ageing is expected to have a negative effect on education, as an increasing number of retirees results in ‘intergenerational conflict’ and, hence, the condemnation of education expenditure. On the other hand, ageing, in combination with pay-as-you-go pension systems, offers incentives for the working-age generation to invest in the public education of the young in order to ‘reap’ the benefits (that is, higher income tax/contributions) of their greater future productivity. Empirical evidence derived from the application of a fixed effects approach to panel data for OECD countries shows that the increasing share of elderly people has a non-linear effect on education spending. This indicates a certain degree of intergenerational conflict. Nevertheless, we find that future population ageing, which reinforces the mechanism linking public education and pensions, reflects positively on education expenditure. Furthermore, by disaggregating total education expenditure by educational levels, we observe that this effect is led by levels of non-compulsory education, probably as a reflection of the direct connection to labor productivity. 相似文献