木糖二级生化废水絮凝机理及条件的研究

文章通过选取几种不同的絮凝剂进行研究,来选出对木糖废水处理效果最佳的絮凝剂及其最佳絮凝条件、最佳去除率。从硫酸铝、三氯化铝、PAC、硫酸铁、硫酸亚铁、三氯化铁中选出PAC和Al2(SO4)3,然后针对这两种絮凝剂,研究确定其最佳絮凝条件及最大去除率。PAC的最佳实验条件为:投加量为1.6 g/L,pH=6,快速搅拌时间为30 s,沉降时间为30 min;Al2(SO4)3的最佳实验条件为:投加量为1 g/L,原水pH=6,快速搅拌时间为90 s,沉降时间为30 min。絮凝效果为:COD去除率分别为82.3%和75.38%,色度去除率都达到了90%以上。     

固网运营商的3G发展策略

3G,是英文3rd Generation的缩写,指第三代移动通信技术,相对第一代模拟制式移动通信(1G)和第二代GSM、CDMA等数字移动通信(2G) ,第三代移动通信一般地讲,是指将无线通信与国际互联网等多媒体通信结合的新一代移动通信系统。在中国本土通信市场上, 3G作为下一代商用的移动通信技术越来越近。3G对原有的固网运营商和移动运营商的未来发展的重要性以及对现实业务的冲击,都让运营商不得不高度重视3G市场,并投入大量的精力研究自身的3G发展策略。本文从目前的固网运营商及移动运营商各自的优势,对3G业务、用户市场的粗浅分析中,力求得出固网运营商可能的3G发展策略。     

GSM/TD-SCDMA系统互操作研究

文章主要介绍GSM/TD-SCDMA系统互操作的原则和策略,分析与总结了GSM/TD-SCDMA网络共存的可行性,提出基于成熟GSM网络的TD-SCDMA网络部署建议,减少投资并快速实现3G商用服务的运营目标。     

第三方物流企业提高运作效率的必要性分析

近年来,随着社会分工的细化,众多制造企业将非核心的物流业务外包,这极大地促进了第三方物流的发展,但同时也应当看到,其合作之中仍然存在着竞争,要想提高第三方物流企业的竞争力,必须首先提高其物流系统的运作效率。文章以石化销售企业的运作实际为背景,应用博弈理论分析比较了两种不同购销渠道的特点,最终指出第三方物流企业运作效率与其竞争能力之间的关系。     

Observability and incentive in organizations

The paper shows that producer-owned firms are more efficient in quality provision than investor-owned firms if input quality is observable, while they are less efficient when the input quality is unobservable and the size of the organization is large.     

Imposing local curvature in the QUAIDS

In this paper, we build on Ryan and Wales (1998), Moschini (1999), and Serletis and Shahmoradi (2007) and impose curvature conditions locally on the quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) model of Banks et al. (1997), an extension of the simple AIDS model of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) that can generate quadratic Engel curves [that is, rank-three demand systems, in the terminology of Lewbel (1991)]. In doing so, we exploit the Slutsky matrix of second order derivatives of the indirect utility function.     

Pace of work and piece rates

Using cross-industry survey data, I examine how the determinants of the pace of work affect the probability of using piece rates. Internal determinants raise the likelihood of piece rates, while response to external needs lowers the probability.     

Labor Regulations,Employment and Wages: Evidence from India's Apparel Sector

While India is among the world's largest producers and exporters of apparel products, the sector has not performed to its potential. This study analyzes why this might be so from the perspective of the structure of production in the sector, the most striking aspect of which is a firm size distribution heavily dominated by small firms. Using nationally representative firm‐level and labor force survey data, we argue that the dominance of firms operating at scales too small to apply modern production and management technologies is one proximate reason for India's relative underperformance. Further, we note that India's labor regulations and the associated enforcement regime are important policy drivers of Indian firms' tendency to avoid placing “too many workers under one roof”.     

Product attributes and models of multiple discreteness

Demand for product characteristics is examined within the context of models that allow for both corner and interior solutions corresponding to zero and non-zero demand. Product attribute information is associated with marginal utility and curvature (satiation) parameters of various utility functions. Empirical applications demonstrate the need for incorporating characteristics in a fairly general way. We also compare our approach to an ideal point and pure Lancasterian versions of our nonlinear utility model. The data support our model over either the ideal point or Lancasterian variants.     

Incentives and the Sorting of Altruistic Agents into Street‐Level Bureaucracies*

Many street‐level bureaucrats have the dual task of helping some clients, while sanctioning others. We develop a model of a street‐level bureaucracy, and we study the implications of its personnel policy on the self‐selection and allocation decisions of agents who differ in altruism towards clients. When bureaucrats are paid flat wages, they do not sanction, and the most altruistic types sort into bureaucracy. Pay‐for‐performance induces some bureaucrats to sanction, but it necessitates an increase in compensation, which can result in sorting from the top and bottom of the altruism distribution. We also explain why street‐level bureaucrats often experience an overload of clients.