Dynamical analysis of corporate bonds based on the yield spread term-quality surface

Our aim of this research is to propose a model which estimates implied relative credit reliability from the yield spread of defaultable bonds and evaluates their spread risk. We introduce “yield spread term-quality surface” (YSTQS) which is defined on the space of duration and credit reliability of the issuers, and express their yield spread. First, we review the general pricing theorem of defaultable bonds with unpredictable recovery in the no-arbitrage context based on the external hazard rates. Second, we show that the dynamics of state variables determine the shape of the YSTQS, and they drive the YSTQS if the loss-adjusted hazard rates are described by a function of them. Finally, we show an empirical analysis of our model with daily yield spread, duration, and the credit ratings of corporate bonds.

高层管理者应具备品德的实证研究

本项研究以高层管理者应具备的品德作为研究对象,对340名在读MBA学员进行了问卷调查。研究发现,责任心、守信、自信、创新、团队合作、进取、公正和坚韧不拔被认为是最重要的品德,而无私奉献、平易近人、谦虚、坦率、热忱、关心人、忠诚、廉洁则处于相对次要的位置。     

团队生产的纳什均衡及合作博弈空间

本文在霍姆斯特姆所做贡献的基础上认为团队生产问题在本质上等同于囚徒困境问题,并指出霍姆斯特姆的实施强制契约的解决方法存在逻辑漏洞,在现实社会中一般是无效的.本文依据社会经济人个人效用最大化的条件定义了团队生产的合作战略博弈空间,合作战略博弈空间的均衡极点(即个人效用最大化点)就是团队生产收益分配博弈的纳什均衡解.如果个人收益的总和等于集体收益的最优值,那么个人理性与集体理性之间就达到统一,处于帕累托最优状态,即不存在道德风险;反之,则说明存在道德风险.并给出了在团队生产中通过改变合作战略博弈空间达到帕累托最优的一个特例,指出了科学合理地改变合作战略博弈空间在社会经济发展中的重要作用     

中学思想政治教育存在的问题与归因分析

思想政治教育积极引导中学生的积极的、健康的、向上的品格,对于实现德育目标,充分发挥德育的功能起着重要作用。但在思想政治教育发展过程中仍存在一些问题,分析问题的成因并积极应对问题,对于中学思想政治教育有着重要意义。     

新农合道德风险与逆选择及其规避研究

道德风险和逆选择并不是医疗保险中特有的现象,它们在任何商业保险和社会保险中都存在,但在医疗保险中更为严重。在新农合中,由于农民有自愿投保的选择权而保险机构却没有拒保权,面对的又是处于艰难生存环境的农村卫生机构,其道德风险和逆选择现象要严重得多,如果不能处理好新农合中道德风险和逆选择问题,将可能导致新农合的市场萎缩与效率的下降。本文就是在研究新农合中逆选择与道德风险生成机理的基础上,提出一些规避措施,为新农合的长期可持续发展奠定微观制度基础。     

初创战略导向对新创企业存活率的影响机制

新创企业初创阶段的战略导向对其未来存续具有持久影响,但具体影响机理有待论证。采用STROBE六维划分法,连续4年对D&B数据库中的抽样企业进行调研与“健康检查”,基于523家美国新创企业数据, 剖析6种初创战略导向对新创企业存活率的差异化影响机理。结果表明：竞争企图性战略持续消耗组织资源从而增加失败风险;分析性战略提升组织决策质量从而降低失败风险;防御性战略使组织积极运用科学管理方法与技术工具从而增加生存机会;前瞻性战略对新创企业存续没有显著影响;先动性战略推动组织创新从而开拓更佳发展前景;风险承担性战略使组织不断学习、广泛探索、保持领先,最大幅度地提高新创企业存活机率。     

员工创造力与越轨创新:心理特权和道德推脱视角

既有研究多聚焦于员工创造力对组织创新绩效的正向影响,对其可能产生的负面结果及发生机制探讨较少。基于道德自律和心理特权构建核心理论框架,通过道德推脱（中介效应）、心理特权（调节作用）解释员工创造力影响越轨创新行为的内在机理和边界条件。运用230份个案调查数据进行实证检验,结果显示：员工创造力能够正向预测越轨创新行为;道德推脱在创造力与越轨创新行为间起部分中介作用;心理特权在创造力与道德推脱间起正向调节作用。研究有效揭示了员工越轨创新行为发生机制和约束条件,为工作场所创造型员工管理提供了新的理论视角和实践启示。     

道德哲学视域下的关公崇拜

在中国传统民间信仰之中,关公崇拜是俗文化兴起的产物,是社会道德情感社会潜意识孕育产生的一个道德模范,经典的三国演义为关公崇拜提供了有力的文本支撑,历代统治者的推波助澜也为这种崇拜发展起了重要作用。同时,关公崇拜背后有着深厚的道德内涵和社会价值,它所推崇的义是一种超越传统血亲关系的品德。这种品德即使在今天的商业社会也有着其存在发展的土壤,这也是关公崇拜得以延续至今的重要原因。     

Wealth effects and agency costs

We analyze how the agent's initial wealth affects the principal's expected profits in the standard principal–agent model with moral hazard.We show that if the principal prefers a poorer agent for all specifications of action sets, probability distributions, and disutility of effort, then the agent's utility of income must exhibit a coefficient of absolute prudence less than three times the coefficient of absolute risk aversion for all levels of income, thus strengthening the sufficiency result of Thiele and Wambach (1999). Also, we prove that there is no condition on the agent's utility of income alone that will make the principal prefer richer agents. Moreover, we show that, for an interesting class of problems, the principal prefers a relatively poorer agent if agent's wealth is sufficiently large. Finally, we discuss how alternative ways of modeling the agent's outside option affects the principal's preferences for agent's wealth.     

Dynamic market for lemons with endogenous quality choice by the seller

We analyze a dynamic market for lemons in which the quality of the good is endogenously determined by the seller. Potential buyers sequentially submit offers to one seller. The seller can make an investment that determines the quality of the item at the beginning of the game, which is unobservable to buyers. At the interim stage of the game, the information and payoff structures are the same as in the market for lemons. Our main result is that the possibility of trade does not create any efficiency gain if (i) the common discounting is low, and (ii) the static incentive constraints preclude the mutually agreeable ex-ante contract under which the trade happens with probability one. Our result does not depend on whether the offers by buyers are private or public.