基于产品差分与溢出内生化的企业合作研发研究

论文分析一个三阶段研发博弈模型,在模型中溢出系数如果由企业内生化自主决定,那么,溢出系数只存在角点解。论文考虑了不合作研发与合作研发古诺竞争、不合作研发与合作研发伯川德竞争四种情形,发现无论产品差分如何,在古诺竞争和伯川德竞争情形下,合作研发效率总是高于不合作研发;在产品互补或替代条件下,当不合作研发时伯川德竞争效率高于古诺竞争效率,而合作研发时古诺竞争效率高于伯川德竞争效率,当产品独立时,无论是否合作研发,古诺竞争效率等于伯川德竞争效率。     

双寡头企业产量竞争的均衡质量安全水平研究——以受规制的食品企业为例

在双寡头企业产量竞争的基本模型基础上,考虑了政府规制水平的影响,分析了生产高、低质量安全水平的两个食品企业分别在古诺和斯塔克尔伯格博弈模型中的均衡质量水平及其相互关系,结果揭示了不同模型中两个企业的最优质量安全水平之间的关系及其均衡点。在斯塔克尔伯格模型中,以生产高质量安全水平产品的企业为产量领导者时,其产品质量安全水平、价格、产量和利润远高于追随企业;两个企业的均衡质量安全水平、价格和产量都随着政府相关部门规制水平的提高而上升。     

差异伯川德模型下战略性贸易政策的实验研究

采用经济学实验的方法,本科生作为被试,货币作为激励手段,研究Eaton和Grossman（1986）提出的差异伯川德竞争方式下一国政府的最佳贸易政策理论。实验设计时考虑实验参与者间交互作用的特性以及被试对＂政策＂与＂征税＂的各种可能的反应,设计了四个设置的实验,对实验数据从被试的决策动机、被试决策时的考虑因素进行分析,运用数学及统计软件进行分析。实验结果显示政府不愿干预国际贸易,不会对本国产品征收出口税;同时分析了本实验研究的现实意义。     

Subject pool effects in price competition games: students versus professionals

Questioning the external validity of experiments that rely on student participants is an evergreen theme in experimental economics. Yet, there is ambiguous evidence of potential subject-pool bias. We add to the subject-pool debate by enlarging the set of experiments for which subject-pool differences have been studied. In a duopolistic Bertrand market setup designed to test for collusive behaviour, we test two treatments. The first is a baseline treatment, where participants cannot communicate with each other, while the second is a communication treatment in which participants are allowed to communicate. Each treatment is first conducted with students and then replicated with professionals. Our results show that student subjects and professionals differ significantly. However, these differences manifest themselves in quantitative rather than qualitative terms. Professionals do collude more, but their behavioural difference between treatments is similar. Students are thus a valid surrogate, if the research question is qualitative, but results generated by student samples should be handled with caution, if quantitative differences matter.     

Price competition and the Bertrand model: the paradox of the German mobile discount market

We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms. Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects even after price increase.     

Partial privatization in mixed duopoly

We investigate a quantity-setting duopoly involving a private firm and a privatized firm jointly owned by the public and private sectors. The private firm maximizes profits, while the privatized firm takes both profits and social welfare into consideration. We consider how many shares the government should hold in the privatized firm. We find that neither full privatization (the government does not hold any shares) nor full nationalization (the government holds all of the shares) is optimal under moderate conditions.     

横向兼并的均衡影响分析——基于供给函数竞争的兼并模型

对于横向兼并所产生的影响,现有研究成果多是在产量竞争的古诺模型或基于价格竞争的伯川德模型基础上进行的.本文以Ugue(2004)提出的供给函数竞争概念为基础,考察了横向兼并、产业集中与福利权衡的关系,分析在同质产品市场上,供给函数竞争对企业横向兼并产生的均衡影响,并与古诺模型做了对比分析.基本结论为:供给函数竞争下,任何兼并都会使产业的总产出下降,价格升高.供给函数竞争导致产量的下降,不仅仅由于兼并企业减少产量,而且非兼并企业也会减少供给,结果导致兼并总是有利可图.     

基于博弈分析的民营快递业竞争策略研究

针对民营快递业收入增长出现下滑迹象,以及顾客满意度不高等问题,通过构建替代程度不同的伯特兰德博弈模型进行分析,提出了民营快递业应积极创新,采取差异化竞争策略增加企业收入,同时提出民营快递业要充分利用综合型交通运输平台,尝试利用MOOC对快递人员进行培训,缩短快递服务时效,提高快递人员的专业技能和职业道德素养。     

Product Differentiation,the Volume of Trade and Profits under Cournot and Bertrand Duopoly

This article analyses how product differentiation affects the volume of trade under duopoly using Shubik-Levitan demand functions rather than the Bowley demand functions used by Bernhofen (2001). The drawback of Bowley demand functions is that an increase in product differentiation increases the size of the market so the increase in the volume of trade may be the result of the increase in the size of the market rather than the increase in product differentiation per se. The Shubik-Levitan demand functions have the advantage that an increase in product differentiation does not increase the size of the market, but consumers still have a ‘love of variety’. It is shown that the volume of trade in terms of quantities falls with increasing product differentiation when the trade cost is relatively low, but rises with increasing product differentiation when the trade cost is relatively high. Among the results, it is shown that the trade liberalisation is more likely to be profitable under Cournot duopoly than under Bertrand duopoly for differentiated products with a positive trade cost.     

Market share dynamics in a duopoly model with word-of-mouth communication

We analyze dynamic price competition in a homogeneous goods duopoly, where consumers exchange information via word-of-mouth communication. A fraction of consumers, who do not learn any new information, remain locked-in at their previous supplier in each period. We analyze Markov perfect equilibria in which firms use mixed pricing strategies. Market share dynamics are driven by the endogenous price dispersion. Depending on the parameters, we obtain different ‘classes’ of dynamics. When firms are impatient, there is a tendency towards equal market shares. When firms are patient, there are extended intervals of market dominance, interrupted by sudden changes in the leadership position.