混合双寡头模型下的R&D竞争:不确定性和模仿视角

通过引入模仿参数δ来衡量R&D容易被模仿的程度,对Joanna Poya-go-Theotoky(1998)的研究进行了拓展,验证了其基本结论的稳健性。此外,通过引入二次R&D成本函数,研究发现,混合双寡头与私人双寡头情况下的社会福利的比较是不确定的,除了依赖创新规模P以外,还取决于模仿参数d,即——(1)对于任意的d,创新规模越大,私人双寡头越倾向于占优混合双寡头,混合双寡头仅在创新规模较小的时候可能优于私人双寡头;(2)对于创新规模比较小的R&D,只有同时具备较容易的模仿程度,混合双寡头才会优于私人双寡头;(3)在不完全模仿(d≠1)的情况下,在R&D越来越容易被模仿的过程中,利率越高(低),私人双寡头优于混合双寡头的最低P值先上升(下降)后下降(上升)。     

On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in price–quantity games

This paper examines the existence and characteristics of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in oligopoly models in which firms simultaneously set prices and quantities. Existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium is proved for a class of price–quantity games. If the demand function is continuous, then the equilibrium outcome is similar to that of a price-only model. With discontinuous demand and limited spillover, there are rationing equilibria in which combined production falls short of market demand. Moreover, there might again be an equilibrium reflecting the outcome of a price game. Competition in price and quantity thus yields Bertrand outcomes under a variety of market conditions.     

两个销售商Bertrand竞争下的供应链需求信息共享

考虑包含一个上游制造商和两个下游销售商的单周期供应链系统。销售商销售不同质的产品且分别拥有关于需求的私有信息。他们之间进行基于价格的Bertrand竞争。建立了三阶段博弈模型，并计算出均衡结果。最后通过模型结果分析需求信息共享前后期望利润的变化，提出了制造商激励销售商其享需求信息的策略。结果表明销售商的需求信息共享在一定条件下是可以很好地实现的。     

完全信息动态条件下企业总成本领先战略探究

首先,从迈克尔.波特教授的著作中引入总成本领先战略;接着,从博弈论斯坦克尔伯格模型出发,来建立所要分析问题的一般化模型,并分析一般化的完全信息动态模型得到均衡解。在结论分析中,引入要讨论的总成本领先战略,通过对比分析先动的企业和跟随的企业在采取成本领先的时候其市场的份额和利润,得到讨论的结论;先动的企业采取成本领先可以获得行业竞争优势,跟随企业在采取足够低的成本领先的前提下,也可以获得更高的市场份额和利润空间,从而可以获得竞争优势。     

Robustness to strategic uncertainty

We introduce a criterion for robustness to strategic uncertainty in games with continuum strategy sets. We model a player's uncertainty about another player's strategy as an atomless probability distribution over that player's strategy set. We call a strategy profile robust to strategic uncertainty if it is the limit, as uncertainty vanishes, of some sequence of strategy profiles in which every player's strategy is optimal under his or her uncertainty about the others. When payoff functions are continuous we show that our criterion is a refinement of Nash equilibrium and we also give sufficient conditions for existence of a robust strategy profile. In addition, we apply the criterion to Bertrand games with convex costs, a class of games with discontinuous payoff functions and a continuum of Nash equilibria. We show that it then selects a unique Nash equilibrium, in agreement with some recent experimental findings.     

Winner-take-all price competition

Summary. We analyze an oligopoly model of homogeneous product price competition that allows for discontinuities in demand and/or costs. Conditions under which only zero profit equilibrium outcomes obtain in such settings are provided. We then illustrate through a series of examples that the conditions provided are “tight” in the sense that their relaxation leads to positive profit outcomes. Received: April 7, 2000; revised version: September 14, 2000     

Managerial Bonus Systems in a Differentiated Duopoly: A Comment

A differentiated Cournot duopoly is considered where firm owners delegate the output decision to a manager, who is rewarded on the basis of his performance. If this performance is measured in terms of (i) pure profits, (ii) a combination of profits and sales, (iii) a combination of profits and market share or (iv) relative profits, the latter option strictly dominates the others if the products are perfect substitutes. Recently it was claimed that this result does not hold for all levels of product substitutability. In this comment, we show however that this result is robust against the introduction of product differentiation. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

WHOLESALE PRICES AND COURNOT‐BERTRAND COMPETITION

This note considers the competing vertical structures framework with Cournot‐Bertrand competition downstream. It shows that the equilibrium wholesale price paid by a Cournot (Bertrand)‐type retailer is above (below) marginal costs of a corresponding manufacturer. This result contrasts with the one under pure competition downstream (i.e., Cournot or Bertrand), where the wholesale price is set below (above) marginal costs in case of a Cournot (Bertrand) game at the retail level.     

International duopoly with overseas production and strategic trade policies

This paper examines the strategic export policies in a reciprocal market model of an international Cournot duopoly where two firms in domestic and foreign countries reciprocally supply their products to other countries through overseas production as well as export. It also considers the fact that the firms must incur export costs in addition to production costs. Thus, this paper shows, among others, that the effects of export policies on firms' output and export choices do not depend on the slopes of firms' reaction curves. It is also shown that firms' total outputs are independent of the export policies, and the optimal domestic and foreign export subsidies are zero (laissez-faire).     

Cooperatives, regulation and competition in Norwegian agriculture

This article analyses the efficiency of current market regulations and market structure in Norwegian agriculture. Based on their potential to coordinate farmers' supplies, large marketing cooperatives are assigned a market regulation role. However, market prices frequently tend to fall below target prices, spurring costly additional market regulations. This is not necessarily a result of inefficient coordination by the cooperative. Using a mixed market model, the study shows that over production may be explained by the competition between marketing cooperatives and investor-owned wholesalers (IOW), typically weakening the cooperatives' ability to coordinate market supply. This conclusion is robust over a variety of IOW contracts. However, to what extent competition is to blame, depends on the target price level and the contract structure of the IOW. Moreover, it is shown that current market interventions to remove excess supplies may induce further incentives to increase production.