成本差异对双寡头企业行为的影响分析

文章构建了生产成本不对称双寡头研发生产模型,采用逆推归纳法求解模型的Nash均衡解,研究了生产成本差异系数与参与程度、研发水平、产量间的关系。研究结果表明,生产成本差异系数与研发水平间呈正向关系、与参与程度和总产量间呈负向关系。     

Foreign market entry,upstream market power,and endogenous mode of downstream competition

In a differentiated duopoly model of trade and FDI featuring both horizontal and vertical product differentiation, we examine whether globalization and trade policy measures can generate welfare gains by leading firms to change their mode of competition. We show that when a high-quality foreign variety is manufactured under large frictions due to upstream monopoly power, a foreign firm can become a Bertrand competitor against a Cournot local rival in equilibrium, especially when the relative product quality of the foreign variety is sufficiently high and trade costs are sufficiently low (implying higher input price distortions due to double marginalization). Our results suggest that such strategic asymmetry is welfare improving and that the availability of FDI as an alternative to trade can make welfare-enhancing strategic asymmetry even more likely, especially when both input trade costs and fixed investment costs are sufficiently low and trade costs in final goods are sufficiently large.     

Rebates in a Bertrand game

We study a price competition game in which customers are heterogeneous in the rebates they get from either of two firms. We characterize the transition between competitive pricing (without rebates), mixed strategy equilibrium (for intermediate rebates), and monopoly pricing (for larger rebates).     

Bertrand Games and Sharing Rules

We consider asymmetric Bertrand games with arbitrary payoffs at ties or sharing rules, and identify sufficient conditions for the zero-profit outcome and the existence of Nash equilibria. Subject to some technical conditions on non-tied payoffs the following hold. If the sharing rule is strictly tie-decreasing all players but one receive zero equilibrium payoffs, while everybody does so if non-tied payoffs are symmetric. Mixed (pure) strategy Nash equilibria exist if the sharing rule is (norm) tie-decreasing and coalition-monotone. I would like to thank Fernando Branco, the audience at Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona), ISEG (Lisbon), University of Mannheim, ESEM 2003 (Venice), EARIE 2005 (Porto), two anonymous referees, and the editor Dan Kovenock for very useful comments. This research received financial support under project POCTI/ECO/37925/2001 of FCT and FEDER.     

Indifference to profit-sharing is consistent

The incentive for a firm unilaterally to switch from a conventional wage to profit-sharing is analyzed for a duopoly as a function of the degree of market power. The point of indifference is shown to be the consistent-conjectures mode of conduct; more competitive firms will not switch while less competitive firms will switch. A proportional tax on corporate profits will not alter the incentive of a firm to adopt or reject profit-sharing.This paper embodies the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve System or of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.     

Tacit Collusion in a Spatial Model with Delivered Pricing

Received August 5, 1999; revised version received July 20, 2001     

Satisficing behavior, Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem and Nash Equilibrium

Summary. We show that Nash Equilibrium points can be obtained by using response maps or reply functions that simply use better responses rather than best responses. We demonstrate the existence of a Nash Equilibrium as the fixed point of a better response map and since the better response map is continuous the fixed point can be established by simply using Brouwers fixed point theorem. The proof applies to games with a finite number of strategies as well as to games with a continuum of strategies. In case the games have a continuum of strategies the payoff functions have to be continuous on the action sets and quasi concave on the players action set.Received: 22 September 2003, Revised: 31 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D00, D40. Correspondence to: Robert A. BeckerWe have benefited from comments on an earlier draft made by participants at Indiana Universitys Microeconomics workshop (October 2002) and the Midwest Economic Theory Conference held at the University of Pittsburgh (May 2003). We also thank Roy Gardner for comments on earlier versions. We thank the Associate Editor, Mark Machina, for his detailed comments and suggestions. This project began when Subir Chakrabarti was a visitor in the Department of Economics, Indiana University, Bloomington in the Spring of 2002. He thanks that department for its support.     

纵向差异化下的双寡头信息性广告竞争模型

本文以Butters(1977)关于信息性广告的开创性模型为基础,引入Mussa和Rosen(1978)提出的纵向差异化分析模型,借鉴泰勒尔(1997)基于Grossman和Shapiro(1984)模型改进基础上的对横向差异化下的双寡头信息性广告竞争的分析方法,建立了一个纵向差异化下的双寡头信息性广告竞争模型。我们通过Matalab软件计算了模型的数值解,得出结论:(1)均衡时,高质量产品生产企业的价格、广告与利润水平较高;(2)纵向差异化程度越高,均衡时,企业价格越高,做广告越多,利润越大;(3)做广告的成本越高,均衡时,企业做广告越少,价格越高,利润越大。     

Computing welfare losses from data under imperfect competition with heterogeneous goods

We study the percentage of welfare losses (PWL) yielded by imperfect competition under product differentiation. When demand is linear, even if prices, outputs, costs and the number of firms can be observed, PWL is arbitrary in both Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. If in addition the elasticity of demand (resp. cross elasticity of demand) is known, we can calculate PWL in a Cournot (resp. Bertrand) equilibrium. When demand is isoelastic and there are many firms, PWL can be computed from prices, outputs, costs and the number of firms. We find that price–marginal cost margins and demand elasticities may influence PWL in a counterintuitive way. We also provide conditions under which PWL increases or decreases with concentration.     

Optimal pollution taxation in a Cournot duopoly

It is well known that the optimal pollution tax in a competitive industry is equal to the marginal damage inflicted by the pollution. It has also been shown that the optimal pollution tax on a monopoly is less than the marginal damage. In this paper, I derive the optimal pollution tax for a Cournot duopoly. If firms have different production costs, the optimal tax rate may exceed the marginal damage. This is so because the tax may be an effective instrument for allocating production from the less to the more efficient firm. It is also shown that, if one firm has a positive most preferred pollution tax, the sum of consumer and producer surpluses will be declining in the tax at this level.