The benefits of being small: Duopolistic competition with market segmentation

Consider a duopolistic market in which consumers are not necessarily aware of the firms' existence. The market is characterized by the existence of four segments: a duopolistic segment which consists of consumers who are aware of both firms, a segment of consumers who are unaware of either firm and two captive market segments. We assume that by advertising, firms control the proportion of consumers who are aware of their existence. The relative sizes of the four segments affect the equilibrium of the duopolistic pricing game. We show that being large may be disadvantageous, and that even if gaining awareness is costless firms may wish to remain small.We would like to thank Paul Klemperer and an anonymous referee for valuable comments.     

基于博弈分析的民营快递业竞争策略研究

针对民营快递业收入增长出现下滑迹象,以及顾客满意度不高等问题,通过构建替代程度不同的伯特兰德博弈模型进行分析,提出了民营快递业应积极创新,采取差异化竞争策略增加企业收入,同时提出民营快递业要充分利用综合型交通运输平台,尝试利用MOOC对快递人员进行培训,缩短快递服务时效,提高快递人员的专业技能和职业道德素养。     

Market Power,Industrial Organization and Tradeable Quotas

Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) wereintroduced into the Mid-Atlantic Surf Clam and OceanQuahog fishery to reduce over-capitalization whileconserving clam populations. Because the number ofoperators in the fishery declined drastically sincethe introduction of this policy, there is concernabout its effect on competitiveness. This paperutilizes Bertrand Pricing Models to show thatmonopoly power is absent from the surf clam andocean quahog markets. Concentration ratios, Lorenzcurves and Gini Coefficients estimated for thefishery for periods before and after ITQintroduction support the results of the Bertrand model.     

Managerial firms’ profitability,unions, and environmental taxes

This article examines how determining an optimal environmental tax in a Cournot duopoly with unionized labour markets and managerial firms departing from the strict profit-maximization. It is shown that firm-specific monopoly unions that set wages (1) reduce both the environmental tax and environmental damage and (2) counterintuitively, increase firms’ profitability when the abatement technology is not too “efficient”, and the public evaluation of environmental quality is sufficiently high. Within this framework, the work also develops the endogenous game played by firms that must choose between sales delegation (SD) and profit-maximization. Results show that the SD contract always emerges as the unique, deadlock sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium, thereby solving the (prisoner's) dilemma emerging in the related existing literature assuming a competitive labour market.