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91.
《Bulletin of economic research》2018,70(1):35-50
In this paper we revisit the issue of the scope of bargaining between firms and unions by considering a more general union's utility function with distinct preferences and sequential negotiations. First, we compare exogenously given labour market institutions; i.e., right‐to‐manage (RTM) and sequential efficient bargaining (SEB). We show that the conventional wisdom, which states that firms always prefer RTM, no longer holds. In fact, when unions are adequately wage aggressive and have strong enough bargaining power, firms may prefer SEB negotiations; however, firms switch their preference to RTM when unions are very strong. Moreover, we show that a conflict of interest between the parties may emerge when unions are sufficiently employment oriented as well as sufficiently wage aggressive and not too strong or too weak in bargaining. Second, we analyse the endogenous choice of the bargaining agenda. We show that a rich plethora of equilibria may occur and new situations of conflict/agreement of interests between the bargaining parties arise in particular when unions are sufficiently wage‐aggressive. 相似文献
92.
Felix Vrdy 《Games and Economic Behavior》2004,49(2):137-400
We study Stackelberg games in which the follower faces a cost for observing the leader's action. We show that, irrespective of the size of the cost, the leader's value of commitment is lost completely in all pure-strategy equilibria. However, there also exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium that fully preserves the first-mover advantage. In this type of equilibrium, the probability that the follower looks at the leader's action is independent of the cost of looking. 相似文献
93.
从不同的保护目的出发,可将最优关税区分为最佳福利关税和最大收入关税。假定一个国家自身生产一种产品,同时进口另外一种产品,且两种产品的质量不同,分析最佳福利关税和最大收入关税问题,结果发现：第一,如果本国的产品质量较低而进口的产品质量较高,那么,无论企业之间是进行Bertrand竞争还是Cournot竞争,假如国外企业的效率较高（低）,那么最大收入关税大（小）于最佳福利关税;此外,Cournot竞争条件下的最佳福利关税和最大收入关税分别高于Bertrand竞争条件下的最佳福利关税和最大收入关税。第二,如果本国的产品质量较高而进口的产品质量较低,那么当本国企业的效率较低（高）时,最大收入关税高（低）于最佳福利关税。 相似文献
94.
费威 《湖北商业高等专科学校学报》2012,(6):11-18
在双寡头企业产量竞争的基本模型基础上,考虑了政府规制水平的影响,分析了生产高、低质量安全水平的两个食品企业分别在古诺和斯塔克尔伯格博弈模型中的均衡质量水平及其相互关系,结果揭示了不同模型中两个企业的最优质量安全水平之间的关系及其均衡点。在斯塔克尔伯格模型中,以生产高质量安全水平产品的企业为产量领导者时,其产品质量安全水平、价格、产量和利润远高于追随企业;两个企业的均衡质量安全水平、价格和产量都随着政府相关部门规制水平的提高而上升。 相似文献
95.
This paper explores experimentation and learning in asymmetric duopoly markets with product differentiation and demand uncertainty. We define the concepts of strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity in information and we show how both the mode of information competition and the transmission of information across markets affect duopoly experimentation. We relate information competition with market competition and we find that, when goods are substitutes and the correlation between market shocks is negative, firms will have a higher incentive to experiment in asymmetric markets than in symmetric ones. The opposite result follows when such correlation is positive. Also, when goods are complements the above findings are reversed.JEL Classification: D83, C72The authors thank partial financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology under project B2000-1429, from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science under project SEJ2004-07554 and from the “Generalitat Valénciana” under project GRUPOS04/13. 相似文献
96.
Ismail Saglam 《Bulletin of economic research》2023,75(1):180-201
In this paper, we study the licensing of cost-reducing innovations in a duopoly under supply function competition. We show that the innovator prefers fixed-fee licensing to no licensing if its cost advantage is not extremely large. Moreover, if its cost advantage is not extremely small, the innovator prefers fixed-fee licensing and mixed licensing to revenue-royalty licensing. This second result arises only because of our assumption that the cost functions are quadratic. We show that if the cost functions are linear and royalty payments are per unit of output, the innovator strictly prefers royalty licensing to fixed-fee licensing. We also show that in our model, consumer surplus is remarkably higher under any type of licensing than under no licensing. However, revenue-royalty licensing is slightly superior for consumers to the other two types of licensing and only so if the cost advantage of the innovator is sufficiently large. 相似文献
97.
Jeroen Hinloopen 《Journal of Economics》1997,66(2):151-175
Comparing the effect on private R&D investments of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D with that of providing R&D subsidies reveals that in general the latter policy is more effective than the former in promoting R&D activity. Analyzing the implementation of both policies simultaneously reveals that subsidizing cooperative and noncooperative R&D leads to the same market outcome. The preferred R&D-stimulating policy is to subsidize optimally an agreement according to which firms only share the outcomes of their independent research. 相似文献
98.
Toshihiro Matsumura 《Journal of public economics》1998,70(3):385
We investigate a quantity-setting duopoly involving a private firm and a privatized firm jointly owned by the public and private sectors. The private firm maximizes profits, while the privatized firm takes both profits and social welfare into consideration. We consider how many shares the government should hold in the privatized firm. We find that neither full privatization (the government does not hold any shares) nor full nationalization (the government holds all of the shares) is optimal under moderate conditions. 相似文献
99.
Manuel Rocha Armada Lawrence Kryzanowski Paulo Jorge Pereira 《European Financial Management》2011,17(2):305-330
This paper extends the literature dealing with the option to invest in a duopoly market for a leader‐follower setting. A restrictive assumption embodied in the models in the current literature is that investment opportunities are semi‐proprietary in that the two identified or positioned firms are guaranteed to hold at least the follower's position. More competition is realistically captured in our model by introducing the concept of hidden rivals so that the places in the market can be taken not only by positioned firm but also by these hidden competitors. The value functions and the optimal triggers for the positioned firms differ materially in settings with(out) the presence of hidden rivals. Unlike existing models, our model allows for (a)symmetric market shares and investment costs for the leader and the follower. Cooperative entrance by the two positioned firms is also modelled. 相似文献
100.
为研究政府组合政策对于绿色创新能力不同的寡头企业生产策略的影响,构建演化博弈模型,在环境税税率和创新补贴额度不同的情境下,通过数值仿真模拟企业生产决策的动态选择过程。研究表明:高强度环境税制和高额的创新补贴极大地激励了两寡头企业绿色创新。环境税一定时,补贴值到一定额度,创新能力强的企业率先选择生产绿色产品,进一步提高时,创新能力弱的企业也将选择绿色生产。当环境税税率和补贴都比较低时,两类企业均选择生产普通产品,政府的宽松管控,低额补贴无法激起企业的绿色创新积极性。生产绿色产品的单位成本增额越高,或者消费者对于绿色产品的消费意愿不足时,需要政府的补贴力度越大。 相似文献