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141.
Ingrid Seinen 《European Economic Review》2006,50(3):581-602
In the economic literature, reciprocity is typically studied in situations of repeated interaction between two individuals. It refers to one individual rewarding kind acts of the other or punishing hostile acts. In contrast, this paper studies indirect reciprocity, where a cooperative action is rewarded by a third actor, not involved in the original exchange. We provide experimental evidence on indirect reciprocity. The experiment is based on the ‘repeated helping game’ developed by Nowak and Sigmund (J. Theoret. Biol. 194 (1998) 561; Nature 393 (1998) 573), involving random pairing in large groups. Pairs consist of a donor and a recipient. Donors decide whether or not to provide costly ‘help’ to the recipients they are matched with, based on information about the recipient's behavior in encounters with third parties. We observe clear evidence of indirect reciprocity. Many decision-makers respond to the information about previous decisions (whether or not to help others) of the recipients. In our experiments, this indirect reciprocity is largely based on norms about how often the recipient should have helped others in the past. We show that these norms develop similarly within groups of interacting subjects, but distinctly across groups. This leads to the emergence of group norms. 相似文献
142.
Differences in exchange rate pass-through in the euro area 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
This paper focuses on the pass-through of exchange rate changes into the prices of imports made by euro area countries originating outside the area. Using data on import unit values for 13 different product categories for each country, we estimate industry-specific rates of pass-through across and within countries for all euro members. In the short-run, pass-through rates differ across industries and countries and are less than one. In the long-run neither full pass-through nor equality of pass-through rates across industries and countries can be rejected. Differences exist across euro area countries in the degree that a common exchange rate movement gets transmitted into consumer prices and costs of production indices. Most of these differences in transmission rates are due to the distinct degree of openness of each country to non-euro area imports rather than to the heterogeneity in the structure of imports. 相似文献
143.
Jean-Robert Tyran 《European Economic Review》2006,50(2):469-485
We use a model of self-centered inequality aversion suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (Quart. J. Econom. 114 (3) (1999) 817) to study voting on redistribution. We theoretically identify two classes of conditions when an empirically plausible amount of fairness preferences induces redistribution through referenda. We test the predictions of the adapted inequality aversion model in a simple redistribution experiment and find that it predicts voting outcomes far better than the standard model of voting assuming rationality and strict self-interest. 相似文献
144.
Huseyin Yildirim 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,136(1):167-196
This paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the proposer. In equilibrium, agents’ effort choices are influenced by the prize and cost effects. The (endogenous) prize is the difference between the residual surplus an agent obtains when he is the proposer and the payment he expects to receive when he is not. Main results include: (1) under the unanimity voting rule, two agents with equal marginal costs propose with equal probabilities, regardless of their time preferences; (2) under a nonunanimity rule, however, the more patient agent proposes with a greater probability; (3) while, under the unanimity rule, the social cost decreases in group heterogeneity, it can increase under a nonunanimity rule; and (4) when agents are identical, the unanimity rule is socially optimal. 相似文献
145.
We formalize the link between optimal cost-sharing contracts and the production technology in the presence of moral hazard by appealing to several well-known results from duality theory. Building on intuitions from the interlinkage literature, we show that optimal contractual structure is determined by the (i) substitution possibilities that exist between different observable factor inputs, as well as (ii) between these inputs and unobservable effort. We endogenize contractual choice using landlord characteristics as instruments, exploiting the fact that, in our dataset, landlords interact with several tenants and vice versa. The approach is applied to an unbalanced plot-level panel of cost-sharing contracts in a Tunisian village, using a translog representation of the restricted profit function. Contractual terms are found to be a significant determinant of input use and therefore lead to Marshallian inefficiency, while the optimality of the underlying contractual structure is rejected. 相似文献
146.
The comparative static predictions of the Baron and Ferejohn [Baron, D.P., and Ferejohn, J.A., (1989). Bargaining in legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (4), 1181-1206] model better organize behavior in legislative bargaining experiments than Gamson's Law. Regressions similar to those employed in field data produce results seemingly in support of Gamson's Law (even when using data generated by simulating agents who behave according to the Baron-Ferejohn model), but this is determined by the selection protocol which recognizes voting blocks in proportion to the number of votes controlled. Proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted in the closed rule Baron and Ferejohn model, as coalition partners refuse to take the small shares given by the continuation value of the game. Discounting pushes behavior in the direction predicted by Baron and Ferejohn but has a much smaller effect than predicted. 相似文献
147.
Abstract. Researchers have used stylized facts on asset prices and trading volume in stock markets (in particular, the mean reversion
of asset returns and the correlations between trading volume, price changes and price levels) to support theories where agents
are not rational expected utility maximizers. This paper shows that this empirical evidence is in fact consistent with a standard
infinite horizon – perfect information – expected utility economy where some agents face leverage constraints similar to those
found in todays financial markets. In addition, and in sharp contrast to the theories above, we explain some qualitative differences
that are observed in the price-volume relation on stock and on futures markets.
We consider a continuous-time economy where agents maximize the integral of their discounted utility from consumption under
both budget and leverage constraints. Building on the work by Vila and Zariphopoulou (1997), we find a closed form solution,
up to a negative constant, for the equilibrium prices and demands in the region of the state space where the constraint is
non-binding. We show that, at the equilibrium, stock holdings volatility as well as its ratio to stock price volatility are
increasing functions of the stock price and interpret this finding in terms of the price-volume relation.
We would like to thank the editor and two anonimous referees for valuable substantive comments. Our gratitude also to Franklin
Allen, Kerry Back, Domenico Cuoco, Xavier Freixas, Sanford Grossman, Michel Habib, Lutz Hendricks, Richard Kihlstrom, Fernando
Restoy, Mary Thomson, Jean-Luc Vila, participants to seminars at Birkbeck College, Carnegie-Mellon, Columbia, ESSEC, HEC,
IAE, INSEAD, London Business School, London School of Economics, McGill, Michigan, National University of Singapore, Pompeu
Fabra, North Carolina, Washington-St-Louis, Wharton, the Jornadas de Economía Financiera BBV, and the Meetings of the Society
for Economic Dynamics and Control and the American Finance Association. Special thanks are due to Süleyman Basak for his enthusiastic
support and many helpful suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. We gratefully acknowledge the support of the BBV and Caja
de Madrid Foundations and CREF (both authors) and of the Spanish Ministry of Education under DGICYT grant no. PB93-0388 (first
author). 相似文献
148.
149.
This paper employs duration analysis to investigate the timing of default in the UK mortgage market. Our analysis is performed on an ex ante basis, in that our explanatory variables are available to mortgage lenders when the loan is first made. We estimate both standard Weibull distributions and generalizations of the Weibull that permit non-monotonic hazard functions. The models fit the data well, suggesting that we have captured the major sources of variation in duration. We find that ‘cash flow’ variables, such as salary and interest rate paid, play the largest role. Surprisingly, loan-to-value ratios are either insignificant or influence default times in a counter-intuitive direction. 相似文献
150.
Public goods in networks 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Yann Bramoullé 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,135(1):478-494
This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are non-excludable along social or geographic links. We find, first, that networks can lead to specialization in public good provision. In every social network there is an equilibrium where some individuals contribute and others free ride. In many networks, this extreme is the only outcome. Second, specialization can benefit society as a whole. This outcome arises when contributors are linked, collectively, to many agents. Finally, a new link increases access to public goods, but reduces individual incentives to contribute. Hence, overall welfare can be higher when there are holes in a network. 相似文献