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121.
DAVID G. MCMILLAN 《International Review of Applied Economics》2005,19(3):359-368
The present paper examines whether there exists a long‐run cointegrating relationship between a stock market index and output and interest rates. Moreover, estimation is conducted over the full sample and both a recursive and rolling sample to examine any time variation in the nature of the relationship. The results support evidence of a single cointegrating vector, where stock prices typically exhibit a positive relationship with industrial production and a negative relationship with interest rates. However, there is significant time variation and periods of time where contrary results are observed. As such any model of stock prices needs to account for such time variation 相似文献
122.
Christophe Chamley 《European Economic Review》2004,48(3):477-501
The general model of social learning with irreversible investment and endogenous timing is analyzed for any distribution of private informations. Strategic complementarities and multiple equilibria appear which are generated solely by information externalities. Different equilibria generate strikingly different amounts of information. The impacts of various assumptions (bounded beliefs, large number of agents, discrete time and short periods) are examined carefully. The properties are robust to the introduction of observation noise with a continuum of agents. 相似文献
123.
When does a preference relation on a finite set have a concave or a strictly concave utility function? We provide a complete answer. Our proof is an application of the Theorem of the Alternative, and constructs a concave utility if one exists. 相似文献
124.
125.
Summary We consider both Nash and strong Nash implementation of various matching rules for college admissions problems. We show that all such rules are supersolutions of the stable rule. Among these rules the lower bound stable rule is implementable in both senses. The upper bound Pareto and individually rational rule is strong Nash implementable yet it is not Nash implementable. Two corollaries of interest are the stable rule is the minimal (Nash or strong Nash) implementable solution that is Pareto optimal and individually rational, and the stable rule is the minimal (Nash or strong Nash) implementable extension of any of its subsolutions.We wish to thank Professor William Thomson for his efforts in supervision as well as his useful suggestions. We are grateful to the participants in his reading class, workshops at Bilkent University, University of Rochester, and in particular Jeffrey Banks, Stephen Ching, Bhaskar Dutta, Rangarajan Sundaram and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments. 相似文献
126.
Ed Nosal 《Economic Theory》1997,10(3):413-435
Summary. When players are unable to write complete state contingent contracts it is shown, within the context of a non-cooperative
contracting-renegotiation game, that the only subgame perfect equilibrium allocations are those that correspond to the set
of first-best allocations. Players are able to implement this set of allocations by signing an initial contract that is subsequently
renegotiated in all states of the world. The contracting-renegotiation problem is complicated in an interesting way by assuming
that the state space is continuous. The issue of the existence of an initial contract, that is subsequently renegotiated to
the set of first-best allocations, must be resolved. Unlike Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey [1994], the results here do not require
nor depend upon the comonotonicity of the objective functions.
Received: January 27, 1995; revised version July 1, 1996 相似文献
127.
A.W. Beggs 《Journal of Economic Theory》2005,122(1):1-36
This paper examines the convergence of payoffs and strategies in Erev and Roth's model of reinforcement learning. When all players use this rule it eliminates iteratively dominated strategies and in two-person constant-sum games average payoffs converge to the value of the game. Strategies converge in constant-sum games with unique equilibria if they are pure or if they are mixed and the game is 2×2. The long-run behaviour of the learning rule is governed by equations related to Maynard Smith's version of the replicator dynamic. Properties of the learning rule against general opponents are also studied. 相似文献
128.
In this paper we examine a number of issues that arise in investigating labor force dynamics using the Spanish Labor Force
Survey (EPA). These issues are by no means specific to the Spanish case and apply to most European-style labor force surveys.
Our main conclusions may be summarized as follows. First, survey nonresponse cannot be neglected. Second, the EPA tends to
underestimate employment and participation of high-educated young people, and to overestimate those of the low-educated elderly.
Finally, we find little evidence that attrition causes important selection biases in estimating quarterly transition probabilities. 相似文献
129.
Glenn W. Harrison 《Empirical Economics》1994,19(2):223-253
The experimental evidence against expected utility theo or unconvincing. When one modifies the experiments to mi tends to support traditional theory.Dewey H. Johnson Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, College of Business Administration, University of South Carolina. I am grateful for comments from seminar participants at the University of Melbourne, University of South Carolina, University of Stockholm, and the University of Western Ontario. John Hey provided a firm, but sympathetic, editorial hand. 相似文献
130.
Overlapping generations model of fiat money yields an infinity of competitive equilibrium solutions, only one of which is stationary. Economies reported in this paper involved a sequence of overlapping generations of three or four individuals; each individual lived for two periods. In their young age individuals were endowed with chips that could be traded for fiat money wish the individuals of the old generation. In their old age, individuals could exchange their units o flat money for the consumption good. Results of the experiments exhibit some support for the stationary solution. The results are robust to two designs of exchange institutions (double oral auctior and supply schedule auction) and to two different endogenous ways of converting money into chips at the end of the game (average price prevailing during the last period the game is actually played and the average price forecast made during the last period the game is actually played).A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the meeting of the Economic Science Association and at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. The authors are grateful for comments received from various participants at both presentations. Financial support was provided by the McKnight Foundation, the Honeywell Foundation, National Science Foundation (SES 89-12552), and Richard. M. and Margaret Cyert Family Funds. 相似文献