Pay or pray? The impact of charitable subsidies on religious attendance

The economic argument for subsidizing charitable giving relies on the positive externalities of charitable activities, particularly from the religious institutions that are the largest recipients of giving. But the net external effects of subsidies to religious giving will also depend on a potentially important indirect effect as well: impacts on religious participation. Religious participation can be either a complement to, or a substitute with, the level of charitable giving. Understanding these spillover effects of charitable giving may be quite important, given the existing observational literature that suggests that religiosity is a major determinant of well-being among Americans. In this paper, I investigate the impact of charitable subsidies on a measure of religious participation, attendance at religious services. I do so by using data over three decades from the General Social Survey, as well as confirming the impact of such subsidies on religious giving using the Consumer Expenditure Survey. I find strong evidence that religious giving and religious attendance are substitutes: larger subsidies to charitable giving lead to more religious giving, but less religious attendance, with an implied elasticity of attendance with respect to religious giving of as much as −1.1. These results have important implications for the debate over charitable subsidies. They also serve to validate economic models of religious participation.     

Subsidizing charitable contributions: a natural field experiment comparing matching and rebate subsidies

We report the results of a field experiment conducted in conjunction with a mailed fundraising campaign of a nonprofit organization. The experiment is designed to compare the response of donors to subsidies in the form of matching amounts or rebated amounts. Matching subsidies are used by many corporations as an employee benefit; the US federal tax system encourages giving using a rebate subsidy by making donations tax deductible. The design includes a control group and two levels of subsidy of each type. Our main result is that matching subsidies result in larger total donations to charities than rebate subsidies, a result that is qualitatively similar to the lab findings. The estimated price elasticities for the matching subsidy are very similar to (and insignificantly different from) the lab experiments, while rebate subsidies lead to lower contributions in the field than in the lab. Since rebates in the field involve substantial lags and additional complications as compared with the “instant rebates” of the lab, this latter difference is not unexpected. The matching results are an important step in validating lab estimates of responsiveness to subsidies of charitable giving.

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Electronic Supplementary Material  The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.      

论社会捐赠的制度激励与保护——5·12汶川地震社会捐赠引发的思考

5·12汶川大地震的社会捐赠,因其捐赠主体范围广、捐赠额度大,受到社会各界的空前关注,也对我国现行社会捐赠制度设计进行了整体透视.在慈善事业相关立法、慈善组织管理体制、税收政策等诸多制度性缺陷充分显现的同时,慈善组织的公信力也面临着严峻考验.本文从完善社会捐赠相关立法、改变政府在慈善事业中的主导地位、建立慈善组织的评价、监督与信息披露机制,以及规范社会捐赠的税收政策等方面,提出了激励与保护社会捐赠,促进我国慈善事业健康发展的政策建议.     

Are people less generous after a family member gives to charity? The interaction of self-construal and relationship type

Extant research shows that people become more generous after learning about the charitable giving of in-group members (e.g., family or friends). The present research demonstrates an exception: While a friend’s donation increases both the interdependents’ and the independents’ charitable giving, a family member’s donation decreases the interdependents’ but increases the independents’ charitable giving. Six studies, including a field experiment and an online survey that captures historical behavior, provide converging evidence in support of an interaction effect of consumers’ self-construal and their relationship type with previous donors on their generosity, showing that the interdependents become less generous after a family member (vs friend) donates. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the interaction effect is driven by the perception of shared responsibility and that this interaction effect is weakened when consumers’ personal responsibility is enhanced or when the donation currency is time rather than money. Finally, the theoretical and practical implications of the work are discussed.     

企业慈善捐赠是伪善吗——基于股价崩盘风险视角的研究

什么原因促使企业进行慈善捐赠,本文结合股价崩盘风险独特视角,试图发现企业慈善捐赠背后的动机。研究发现:慈善捐赠与股价崩盘风险显著正相关,这可以用代理问题解释;进一步分析表明,慈善捐赠作为隐瞒负面信息的工具是加剧股价崩盘风险的潜在途径,隐瞒的负面信息最终被资本市场发现,从而引发崩盘。因此,经理人出于自利动机不正当地使用慈善捐赠引发股价崩盘,而非慈善捐赠本身所致。本文同时发现,在信息透明度高的情景下,企业更倾向将慈善捐赠作为隐瞒负面信息的工具。     

我国慈善捐赠税收政策体系的完善研究

近年来,我国慈善捐赠事业不断发展,但与之相关的慈善捐赠税收政策较为分散,尚未形成完整的政策体系。梳理我国慈善捐赠相关税收政策法规发现,我国慈善捐赠税收政策体系目前存在较多问题亟待解决。进一步完善我国现行慈善捐赠税收政策体系,需要借鉴国际经验,从全局考虑,统筹规划各税种的税收优惠政策,使各税种的优惠政策和税收征管共同作用,充分保障捐赠者和受赠者权益,从而更好促进我国慈善捐赠事业发展。     

New hope for the voluntary contributions mechanism: The effects of context

This research examines how three common contextual factors can affect contributions in the linear voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM). Using business student subjects and a low marginal per capita rate of return, the results show that contributions in the last of ten rounds range from 18% for the traditional VCM with no initial cheap talk, no voting, and a status quo of not giving to 94% in a VCM with initial cheap talk, voting, and a status quo of giving. The results demonstrate that context can make the VCM produce sustained efficiencies similar to incentive-compatible public-good mechanisms.     

Transfers and bequests: a portfolio analysis in a Nash game

This paper develops a two-stage non-cooperative Nash game framework of parental–children interactions to explain the equal division puzzle in bequests. In the analysis, a portfolio approach is adopted for characterizing how altruistic parents allocate their inheritable wealth between inter-vivos transfers and post-mortem bequests. The model includes elements of strategic altruism, exchange of family-specific merit goods, transfer-seeking behavior by competing siblings, and parents’ “post-mortem reputation” in bequest division. Allowing for children’s heterogeneity and interactions, we find that inter-vivos transfers are unevenly distributed between the children, despite an equal degree of parental altruism. Moreover, we show the compatibility of unequal inter-vivos transfers and equal bequests, regardless of earnings differentials across children.      

Encouraging Charitable Donations via Charity Gift Cards: A Self-Determination Theoretical Account

Charities seeking to increase donations are now offering charity gift cards (CGCs), which allow recipients to select how their gift card is allocated across various charitable projects. Supporting a model derived from self-determination theory, an experiment shows that U.S. consumers are more satisfied and more likely to donate to the card-sponsoring charity after using a CGC than after learning a donation has been made in their name, because CGCs enhance consumers’ felt autonomy, competence, and relationship with the charity and its projects, which predict a more charitable self-concept and satisfaction with the gift. Theoretical and managerial implications are discussed.