博奕论视角下的资产评估职能研究

传统资产评估理论将资产评估活动视为机械化与程式化的过程,因而对资产评估的职能认识比较单一和狭隘。随着社会的进步和经济的发展,在资产评估过程中探求各种因素,尤其是人的因素如何影响评估结果的准确性,以求规避不准确性结果的出现,将有很强的现实意义。本文用博弈论的相关理论对资产评估活动进行研究,以期对其职能准确界定提供参考。     

两阶段供应链企业间合作博弈分析

合作是供应链管理的核心。文中以一个供应商和一个零售商组成的供应链系统为背景,研究了两阶段供应链,运用合作博弈理论进行了分析,强调建立伙伴关系,实现"双赢"。     

投资者与股市博弈模型

本文从个股的角度，运用博弈论剖析了投资者在股市上的投资战略。研究表明，投资者是选择“较小止损”战略还是选择“较大止损”战略取决于该股票下跌的幅度。     

Observability and overcoming coordination failure in organizations: An experimental study

Motivated by problems of coordination failure in organizations, we examine how overcoming coordination failure and maintaining coordination depend on the ability of individuals to observe others’ choices. Subjects’ payoffs depend on coordinating at high effort levels in a weak-link game. Treatments vary along two dimensions. First, subjects either start with low financial incentives for coordination, which typically leads to coordination failure, and then are switched to higher incentives or start with high incentives, which usually yield effective coordination, and are switched to low incentives. Second, as the key treatment variable, subjects either observe the effort levels chosen by all individuals in their experimental group (full feedback) or observe only the minimum effort (limited feedback). We find three primary results: (1) When starting from coordination failure the use of full feedback improves subjects’ ability to overcome coordination failure, (2) When starting with good coordination the use of full feedback has no effect on subjects’ ability to avoid slipping into coordination failure, and (3) History-dependence, defined as dependence of current effort levels on past incentives, is strengthened by the use of full feedback. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C92, D23, J31, L23, M52     

Behavior in one-shot traveler’s dilemma games: model and experiments with advice

We report results of one-shot traveler’s dilemma game experiments to test the predictions of a model of introspection. The model describes a noisy out-of-equilibrium process by which players reach a decision of what to do in one-shot games. To test the robustness of the model and to compare it to other models of introspection without noise, we introduce non-binding advice. Advice has the effect of coordinating all players’ beliefs onto a common strategy. Experimentally, advice is implemented by asking subjects who participated in a repeated traveler’s dilemma game to recommend an action to subjects playing one-shot games with identical parameters. In contrast to observations, models based on best-response dynamics would predict lower claims than the advised. We show that our model’s predictions with and without advice are consistent with the data.      

旅行社价格战的博弈分析

旅行社是旅游产品设计、组织和销售的渠道商以及消费者之间的桥梁.旅行社对旅游业具有重要影响，旅行社之间的价格竞争日益严重，盈利率低。随着我国加入世贸组织，越来越多的外国旅行社进入我国、针对我国旅行社如何走出困境，本文从博弈角度分析旅行社的价格竞争及其对策。     

A theory of reciprocity

People are reciprocal if they reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. In this paper we present a formal theory of reciprocity. It takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by its underlying intention. The theory is in line with the relevant stylized facts of a wide range of experimental games, such as the ultimatum game, the gift-exchange game, a reduced best-shot game, the dictator game, the prisoner's dilemma, and public goods games. Furthermore, it predicts that identical consequences trigger different reciprocal responses in different environments. Finally, the theory explains why outcomes tend to be fair in bilateral interactions whereas extremely unfair distributions may arise in competitive markets.     

内部控制是利益的平衡机制——法的价值与人本思想的衔接

内部控制是企业或其他主体为规范其内部各环节各利益主体的行为,为协调其活动的有序有效运行而建立的内部机制。法是国家为规范社会构成要素特别是行为者的行为,协调相互关系,保障各利益主体的特定利益机制。如果把企业看成一个国家,或反过来把国家抽象为一个企业,我们发现内部控制方法与法有着惊人的相似之处——利益平衡。     

审计独立性的博弈分析

注册会计师的独立性是一种抽象的精神状态,它是通过注册会计师在特定制度安排下的利益选择表现出来的,本文着眼于此,通过建立特定制度下注册会计师行为的博弈模型,从审计收费、注册会计师承担的责任、注册会计师不独立获得的额外好处、管理当局对注册会计师的处罚等方面分析注册会计师的独立性。     

投保人与保险人博弈关系分析

博弈论是研究信息不对称问题的一种有效方法 ,其广泛应用于军事、政治、经济等领域。保险业作为信息不对称最为集中的行业 ,投保人与保险人之间的信息不对称现象尤为突出 ,道德风险也极易发生。如何用博弈理论与方法分析这些信息不对称问题 ,并据此提出切实可行的解决方法 ,已成为保险界日益关注的问题。