企业制度变革中的博弈与均衡——一个关于国有企业民营化的实证研究

企业制度运行以利益相关者之间的共有理念为心理依托；这种共有理念体现在人们博弈均衡之中，是人们行为选择的默认前提，其形成和发展具有不以个人意志为转移的客观规律；企业制度变革的任务，是通过企业利益相关者之间的博弈和信任，在适应和调整共有理念的基础上，塑造合理的企业控制权主体。     

一种非市场因素导致的铁矿石价格上涨——基于博弈的分析

通过一个可重复博弈模型,揭示了中国在国际铁矿石贸易中面临由非市场因素造成的价格上涨问题,认为,造成这种现象的根本原因是中国在铁矿石贸易中的市场地位并没有随着进口量的提高而提高,并从资源安全角度提出了应对策略。     

布雷顿森林体系Ⅱ：博弈均衡与中国的困境

如果把人民币汇率问题纳入“新布雷顿森林体系”的分析框架,通过分析“新布雷顿森林体系”的运行机制和其中的各方博弈,所能够得出的短期均衡结果是,美国继续进口亚洲商品,亚洲国家对美融资以保持美国国内旺盛的消费需求。但从长期来看,新布雷顿森林体系由于自身存在的制度性缺陷,最终会导致亚洲国家组建的对美融资“卡特尔”走向分裂。中国在这个卡塔尔与其破裂的预期中,面临三重困境需要突破。     

Co-ordination of land exploitation,exploitable farmland reserves and national planning in China

Land exploitation, as an important strategy to mitigate farmland loss and stabilize grain production, has been adopted to compensate farmland loss due to rapid urbanization in China. Bounded by the limited capacity and obvious spatial variations of national farmland reserves, it is essential to arrange land exploitation activities timely and reasonably. In this study, we propose an indicator for the status of regional land exploitation, the Exploitation Degree, to facilitate an overview of land exploitation programs in China at both provincial and prefectural levels based on project data from 2006 to 2012. To further our understanding of the regional features of land exploitation activities, we employ the Lasso model to identify and quantitatively assess influencing factors on land exploitation. Our study shows that: (1) contemporary land exploitation practices in China are significantly inconsistent across exploitable farmland reserves. Some areas are greatly over-exploited and such irrational land exploitation has been persistent; (2) related national land plans designed to guide land exploitation efforts centered on resource-rich regions and critical areas do not function as intended. Therefore, we suggest that China⿿s land exploitation policy shall be improved by reconsidering the orientation of land exploitation policy, coordinating land exploitation activities with productivity improvements and eco-system protection, and enhancing the power and scope of the plans in controlling and guiding land resource management.     

Collaboration strategy decision-making using the Miles and Snow typology

Engaging in collaboration may be the best way for a firm to enhance its competitive advantages, since this can offer faster access to both resources and capabilities. This study aims to develop a framework for making collaboration partner choice decisions. The authors design a strategic game model of collaboration using Miles and Snow typology. An empirical data set collected from the S&P COMPUSTAT database is adopted to verify the model, and several managerial implications are derived. This model helps a company choose a competitor as a collaborative partner and helps in the selection of a collaboration strategy.     

Effects of complexity on the success of temporary organizations: Relationship quality and transparency as substitutes for formal coordination mechanisms

The organizational literature has considered complexity as an important factor influencing organizations. More recently, the degree of dissemination of temporary organizations (TOs) increased and today TOs can be found in almost every industry. This corresponds to an augmenting treatment in the literature where TOs are often described as appropriate means to cope with complexity. Yet, few empirical studies to date have analyzed the effects of complexity on the success of TOs. This paper considers three prevalent types of complexity (structural, task, temporal) and integrates two factors (relationship quality, transparency) which are hypothesized to mediate the influence of complexity on the efficiency and effectiveness of TOs. We test the hypothesis using a sample of knowledge-intensive consulting projects. The results show that TOs possess a high degree of “complexity resistance” and are therefore particularly suited for solving unique and complex problems. Of the three types of complexity considered, only structural complexity significantly influences efficiency and effectiveness of TOs. Relationship quality and transparency act as mediators on this effect and can be used to mitigate negative effects of complexity.     

Price and quality decisions in a vertically-differentiated supply chain with an “Online-to-Store” channel

Because of the prevalence of “Online-to-Store (OS)” channel, customers can purchase differentiated products online and pick up in-store. We develop a Stackelberg game-theoretic model to study the impact of an OS channel on quality levels, demands, prices, and profits of a manufacturer and a retailer in a supply chain. We assume that the retailer acts as a Stackelberg leader, and the manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg follower. The manufacturer produces and sells two products with vertically-differentiated quality levels to the retailer who in turn sells the products to customers through a Store channel, an Online channel, or an OS channel. The retailer incurs a handing cost if the OS channel is available, and consumers bear a shipping cost and a transaction cost when the products are purchased from the Online and Store channels, respectively. We find that the manufacturer should reduce both products’ quality levels and wholesale prices, whereas the retailer can increase the selling prices for a relatively small shipping cost and a not too small handling cost. When the products are available both online and in-store, however, the quality levels, wholesale prices and selling prices might increase for a small shipping cost and a not too small handling cost. Compared to the case in which both products are available online only with the OS channel, adding the Store channel is always beneficial for both parties. The intuition behind these results hinges on the trade-off between the handling cost and the increased market demand for the retailer. Moreover, the quality levels, the wholesale prices of both products, and the selling price of the low-quality product would decrease, while the selling price of the high-quality product increases for a sufficiently low transaction cost and a not too small shipping cost.     

A game theoretic approach for analyzing the competition between national and store brands by considering store loyalty

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Strong Nash equilibrium in games with common and complementary local utilities

A rather general class of strategic games is described where the coalitional improvements are acyclic and hence strong Nash equilibria exist: The players derive their utilities from the use of certain facilities; all players using a facility extract the same amount of local utility therefrom, which amount depends both on the set of users and on their actions, and is decreasing in the set of users; the ultimate utility of each player is the minimum of the local utilities at all relevant facilities. Two important subclasses are “games with structured utilities,” basic properties of which were discovered in 1970s and 1980s, and “bottleneck congestion games,” which attracted researchers’ attention quite recently. The former games are representative in the sense that every game from the whole class is isomorphic to one of them. The necessity of the minimum aggregation for the existence of strong Nash equilibria, actually, just Pareto optimal Nash equilibria, in all games of this type is established.     

建设工程业主与承包商招标后合同价格谈判的博弈分析

本文目的在于对业主和承包商在招投标后的合同谈判机理进行研究。对于经过招标的合同谈判，招标活动分两种情况，第一种情况为公开招标，第二种情况为邀请招标。对公开招标，本文指出了垄断性围标对于业主的风险，并且将存在寡头及多头竞争的公开招标并入邀请招标进行研究。在邀请招标情况下，假设业主根据各方报价和技术标得分，选定某一家单位作为合同谈判对象。对在各种信息对称、不对称情况下，对于双方的序贯博弈过程进行分析。