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141.
Tariffs, licensing and market structure 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that exclusive owners of an advanced technology are always better off when producing as a monopolist than when competing against another firm. Competition against a less-efficient firm weakens the power that a host country can exert on the incumbent in the form of its tariff policy. We show that this gives a motive for a monopolist to license its technology to another foreign firm. A host country gains more from increased competition if it can induce the foreign incumbent to transfer technology to the host country firm. We show that the host country can do so by tariff commitment. We also discuss the implications of bargaining under licensing and Bertrand competition in the product market. Hence, this paper qualifies and extends the recent work of Kabiraj and Marjit [Protecting consumers through protection: The role of tariff-induced technology transfer. European Economic Review 47, 113-124]. 相似文献
142.
In this paper, we analyze the pattern of employment adjustment using a rich panel of Norwegian plants. The data suggest that the frequency of episodes of zero net employment changes is inversely related to plant size. We develop and estimate a simple “q” model of labor demand, allowing for the presence of fixed, linear and quadratic components of adjustment costs. The econometric evidence supports the existence of purely fixed components, unrelated to plant size. As a result, the range of inaction is wider for smaller plants. The quadratic component of costs is also always important. In most specifications fixed costs are higher for employment contractions. The quadratic component is higher during employment contractions compared to expansions for small plants, while this is not true for larger plants. 相似文献
143.
Economic policy is modelled as the outcome of a (political) game between two interest groups. The possible ex-post (realized) outcomes in the game correspond to the proposed policies. In the literature policy proposals are exogenous. We extend such games by allowing the endogenous determination of the proposed policies. In a first stage the groups decide which policy to lobby for and then, in a second stage, engage in a contest over the proposed policies. Our main result is that competition over endogenously determined policies induces strategic restraint that reduces polarization and, in turn, wasteful lobbying activities. 相似文献
144.
Dutta et al. (Econometrica 69 (2001) 1013) (Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton—DJLeB) initiate the study of manipulation of voting procedures by a candidate who withdraws from the election. A voting procedure is candidate stable if this is never possible. We extend the DJLeB framework by allowing: (a) the outcome of the procedure to be a set of candidates; (b) some or all of the voters to have weak preference orderings of the candidates. When there are at least three candidates, any strongly candidate stable voting selection satisfying a weak unanimity condition is characterized by a serial dictatorship. This result generalizes Theorem 4 of DJLeB. 相似文献
145.
Jonathan L. Burke 《Economic Theory》1995,5(2):247-261
Summary In overlapping-generations models of fiat money, the existence of a Pareto-optimal equilibrium — which defines an optimal quantity of money — is more general than well-known counter-examples suggest. Those examples, having no optimal equilibrium just because there are small variations in households' tastes and endowments across generations, are not typical. On the contrary: For an open-dense, full-measure subset of smooth stationary economies and an open-dense subset of continuous stationary economies, introducing small variations in tastes and endowments across generations preserves the existence of an optimal equilibrium. Put simply, optimal equilibria generically exist for nearly-stationary economies.I thank Scott Freeman, Katsuhiko Kawai, and two referees for proofreading this text; all lead to clarifications. 相似文献
146.
Redistribution as a selection device 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Hans Peter Grüner 《Journal of Economic Theory》2003,108(2):194-216
This paper studies the role of the wealth distribution for the market selection of entrepreneurs when agents differ in talent. It argues that the redistribution of initial endowments can increase an economy's surplus because more talented individuals get credit for their risky investment projects. Moreover, the redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a Pareto-improvement although all agents are non-satiable. An agent's entrepreneurial ability is his private information and there is moral hazard in production. I find conditions such that unproductive rich entrepreneurs crowd out productive poor ones on the capital market. Then redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a new equilibrium where market participants are better informed about the entrepreneurs’ ability. The new equilibrium is characterized by (i) the selection of better entrepreneurs, (ii) a higher riskless rate of return on capital, (iii) lower repayments of successful entrepreneurs to their creditors and (iv) the fact that all agents are better off. 相似文献
147.
148.
149.
Tayfun Sönmez 《Review of Economic Design》1994,1(1):365-380
We search forstrategy-proof solutions in the context of (many-to-one) matching problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962). In this model, whenever the firms can
hire as many workers as they want (the capacities are unlimited) the stable set is a singleton. There exists aPareto efficient, individually rational, andstrategy-proof matching rule if and only if the capacities are unlimited. Furthermore, whenever the capacities unlimited, the matching rule
which selects the unique stable matching is the only matching rule that isPareto efficient, individually rational, andstrategy-proof. 相似文献
150.
This paper considers a linear triangular simultaneous equations model with conditional quantile restrictions. The paper adjusts for endogeneity by adopting a control function approach and presents a simple two-step estimator that exploits the partially linear structure of the model. The first step consists of estimation of the residuals of the reduced-form equation for the endogenous explanatory variable. The second step is series estimation of the primary equation with the reduced-form residual included nonparametrically as an additional explanatory variable. This paper imposes no functional form restrictions on the stochastic relationship between the reduced-form residual and the disturbance term in the primary equation conditional on observable explanatory variables. The paper presents regularity conditions for consistency and asymptotic normality of the two-step estimator. In addition, the paper provides some discussions on related estimation methods in the literature. 相似文献