Cooperation In R&D With Spillovers And Delegation Of Sales ∗

Cooperation in several phases of the innovation process is viewed by antitrust authorities with suspicion. They face the dilemma between providing the right incentives for the appro-priability of returns to R&D and the risks of diminishing product market competition. The current legislation in the European Union and the United States gives special treatment to cooperation in R&D and the joint exploitation of results (extended cooperation).

We study several collusive regimes for a class of examples in which vertical relations are explicitly introduced. Regarding antitrust policy implications we fmd that: a) there is an ana-lytical justification to a ‘rule of reason’ treatment for extended cooperation in research joint ventures and, b) individual exemptions, though restrictive of competition, might be welfare improving.     

What tenure security? The case for a tripartite view

In the face of advancing urban informality in the developing world there appears to be increasing consensus that tenure security is an important engine driving settlement development. This has, however, not led to a consensus about what tenure security exactly entails. In both theory and policy, the idea of tenure security for low-income settlement dwellers is encountered in three distinct forms: tenure security as perceived by dwellers, tenure security as a legal construct and de facto tenure security. The main argument of this paper is that much controversy that surrounds the debate arises precisely as a consequence of the indiscriminate use of these different kinds of tenure security. To address this problem, a tripartite conceptualization of tenure security that incorporates its three constituent components (perception, de jure, de facto) and clarifies their interrelations is presented.     

Narratives of irony and failure in ethnographic work

Organizational ethnography is one of the most valued approaches to qualitative studies of organizations. Much attention has been given to the development of the research process, of which the researcher's identity is an integral part. However, we believe that the analysis of research failures has been much less developed in the discourse of ethnographic methods for the study of organizations. Therefore, we have explored some of the “slips” in ethnographic work, as described in accounts of fellow organizational anthropologists. As the study is qualitative, we have adopted a narrative research method. We have divided the “slips” (i.e., errors) into four categories important for the ethnographer's identity: (a) one's role; (b) one's project, (c) one's relation to “the Other”; and (d) the social context of the slip. Copyright © 2010 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Compensation of owner managers in Canadian family‐owned businesses: expropriation of minority shareholders

The aim of this paper is to test the hypothesis of owner managers expropriating minority shareholders by receiving excessive compensation. Using a sample of Canadian family firms, we found that when there is divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights, owner CEOs receive higher compensation than non‐owners. The higher the divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights, the higher the excess compensation. Further analysis shows that only poorly governed firms are affected by the expropriation problem. Copyright © 2010 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Analysis and design of focused demand chains

The paper describes the evolution of focused demand chains over an extended period of time as a major UK lighting manufacturer has sought to remain an international player in a fast changing business environment. Analysis and design procedures make use of the concepts of Wickham Skinner and Marshall Fisher to answer the strategic questions “what facilities are required and how should they be laid out to enable the necessary focused demand chains?” and to answer the tactical question “which focused demand chain is appropriate for this product?” The case study then details how the company has been transformed from operating within a traditional supply chain to driving change via the engineering of four focused demand chains. The paper concludes with a comparison of operations enablers, customer choice, and business performance metrics covering the transition period culminating in the current focused demand chain scenario. By matching products to the appropriate value stream there is a consequential reduction in product development time of 75%; manufacturing costs reduction of up to 27%; and up to 95% reduction in delivery lead times.     

论政府间转移支付的分类

进一步完善我国政府间转移支付体系是当前和今后面临的一个重大课题.我们认为,政府间转移支付按照目标和功能的不同,可分为以下4类:以均等化为目标的转移支付、解决辖区间外溢性问题的转移支付、中央委托地方事务引致的转移支付、以增强国家政治控制力为目标的转移支付.     

Firm reputation with hidden information

Summary. An adverse selection model of firm reputation is developed in which short-lived clients purchase services from firms operated by overlapping generations of agents. A firm's only asset is its name, or reputation, and trade of names is not observed by clients. As a result, names are traded in all equilibria regardless of the economy's horizon The general equilibrium analysis links the value of a name to the market for services. This causes a non-monotonicity that precludes higher types from sorting themselves through the market for names, and leads to “sensible” dynamics: reputations, and name prices, increase after success and decrease after failure. Received: July 31, 2001; revised version: December 20, 2001 RID="*" ID="*" I thank Jon Levin, Eric Maskin and Drew Fudenberg for valuable discussions, and Heski Bar-Isaac for comments on an earlier draft. Financial support from the National Science Foundation (NSF grants SBR-9818981 and SES-0079876) is gratefully acknowledged. This paper replaces an older (and incomplete) working paper titled “Reputation with Hidden Information”.     

Credit market imperfections, income distribution, and capital accumulation

Summary. This paper builds a model in which the distribution of income matters for capital formation, and uses it to analyze the effects of a simple policy intended to create a more equal distribution of income on the severity of certain credit market imperfections and, through this channel, capital accumulation. A neoclassical growth model is developed in which some capital investment must be externally financed, and external finance is subject to a standard costly state verification (CSV) problem. In particular, some fraction of the population is capitalists, who have access to risky but high return capital production technologies. Successful capitalists leave bequests to their offspring, thereby permitting them to internally finance some fraction of their own investment projects. However some external finance is also required. This is provided by workers who save out of labor income. As is well known, the greater the capability of capitalists to provide internal finance, the less severe is the CSV problem. Thus bequests mitigate credit market frictions and, in that sense, promote financial market efficiency and capital accumulation. However, they also perpetrate income inequality. The structure is used to show that a policy that taxes the bequests of capitalists, and transfers the proceeds to workers, necessarily reduces the steady state capital stock. Indeed, when this effect is sufficiently strong, these redistributive tax/transfer schemes can reduce the total (wage plus transfer) incomes of workers, as well as their welfare. Thus some simple policies intended to redistribute income can be highly counterproductive.Received: June 3, 1996; revised version: February 4, 1997This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date.     

Quasitransitive social preference: why some very large coalitions have very little power

Summary. If only the strict part of social preference is required to be transitive then Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives implies that there is a coalition containing all but one individual that cannot force x to be socially ranked above y for at least half of the pairs of alternatives (x,y). Received: August 29, 1996; revised version: March 24, 1997