DEFINING THE GOVERNMENT'S DEBT AND DEFICIT

Although the budget deficit and the public debt feature prominently in political debate and economic research, there is no agreement about how they should be measured. They can be defined for different sets of public institutions, including the nested sets corresponding to central government, general government, and the public sector, and, for any definition of government, there are many measures of the debt and deficit, including those generated by four kinds of accounts (cash, financial, full accrual, and comprehensive), which can be derived from four nested sets of assets and liabilities. Each debt and deficit measure says something about public finances, but none tells the whole story. Each is also vulnerable to manipulation, and is likely to be manipulated if it is subject to a binding fiscal rule or target. Narrow definitions of government encourage the shifting of spending to entities outside the defined perimeter of government. Narrow definitions of debt and deficit encourage operations involving off‐balance‐sheets assets and liabilities, while broad measures are susceptible to the mismeasurement of on‐balance‐sheet assets and liabilities. Reviewing the literature on these issues, the paper concludes that governments should publish several measures of the debt and deficit in a form that clearly reveals their interrelationships.     

The surplus prior to ruin and the deficit at ruin for a correlated risk process

This paper presents an explicit characterization for the joint probability density function of the surplus immediately prior to ruin and the deficit at ruin for a general risk process, which includes the Sparre-Andersen risk model with phase-type inter-claim times and claim sizes. The model can also accommodate a Markovian arrival process which enables claim sizes to be correlated with the inter-claim times. The marginal density function of the surplus immediately prior to ruin is specifically considered. Several numerical examples are presented to illustrate the application of this result.     

Dealing with a liquidity trap when government debt matters: Optimal time-consistent monetary and fiscal policy

How does the need to preserve government debt sustainability affect the optimal monetary and fiscal policy response to a liquidity trap? To provide an answer, we employ a small stochastic New Keynesian model with a zero bound on nominal interest rates and characterize optimal time-consistent stabilization policies. We focus on two policy tools, the short-term nominal interest rate and debt-financed government spending. The optimal policy response to a liquidity trap critically depends on the prevailing debt burden. While the optimal amount of government spending is decreasing in the level of outstanding government debt, future monetary policy is becoming more accommodative, triggering a change in private sector expectations that helps to dampen the fall in output and inflation at the outset of the liquidity trap.     

FDI竞争具有债务融资“挤出效应”吗？

研究目标：考察地方政府FDI竞争是否具有企业债务融资“挤出效应”。研究方法：选取中国上市公司微观面板数据,并运用多元线性回归方程模型。研究发现：地方政府FDI竞争对其辖区内企业的银行借款总额和长期借款具有“挤出效应”,但这种现象仅在市场化进程较低、中西部地区的企业中存在,且当面临FDI债务融资“挤出效应”时企业一般通过扩大商业信用进行替代;进一步分析还发现,政企关联作为对不完善市场机制的一种替代保护机制能够缓解FDI竞争下长期借款“挤出效应”问题;无论是从银行借款总额还是从借款期限结构来看,地方财政赤字强化了FDI竞争下债务融资的“挤出效应”。研究创新：从企业债务融资微观视角揭示了地方FDI竞争对投资“挤出效应”的作用机理,突破了现有“宏中观层面”研究视角与证据。研究价值：填补了宏中观层面投资“挤出效应”的微观形成机理,并对纠偏地方FDI恶性竞争行为具有重要政策启示。     

Rogoff revisited: The conservative central banker proposition under active fiscal policies

The paper re-examines Rogoff's [Rogoff, K., 1985. The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target. Quarterly Journal of Economics 100, 1169–1189.] influential monetary policy result. It shows that responses of a conservative central banker and the resulting macroeconomic outcomes may be substantially different if interactions with (ambitious) fiscal policy are taken into account.     

INDEPENDENT FISCAL AGENCIES

Abstract.  There has been a considerable literature regarding the incentives of policymakers as a prime reason for persistent fiscal deficits and a variety of fiscal rules have been proposed as a remedy. However, the often inadequate flexibility of rules and the success of policy delegation in the monetary realm have motivated a small but growing number of studies that suggest delegating some aspects of fiscal policy to what will here be called 'independent fiscal agencies'. This paper surveys the related literature with a focus on three aspects: the motivation for the establishment of such agencies; their potential design; and the experience with these types of institutions.     

防控“新冠肺炎”疫情的财税政策研究

突如其来的“新冠肺炎”疫情对我国宏观经济的平稳运行特别是对中小企业的经营以及就业都会产生较大的影响。在这场防控疫情的斗争中,财政税收政策将发挥重要的作用,但无论是减税还是增支都将会加大财政的赤字率。在2020年这个特殊时期,国家可以考虑突破3%的财政赤字率,但从长期来看,未来也不应该搞结构性赤字,因为这将导致巨大的政府债务。为了应对疫情,国家应当在加大宏观政策调节的力度、加大对公共卫生领域的投入、缓解企业经营困难以及实施好就业优先政策方面出台相应的财税政策。     

When do more selfish politicians manipulate less,not more?

We model the political manipulation of deficits in a political budget cycle model. Assuming that a share of voters suffers from debt illusion the incumbent can increase her re-election chances by expanding government spending. However, the optimal manipulation may exceed the amount necessary to maximize re-election chances (over-manipulation) if the deficit is not very costly (low repayment obligation). Then, more selfish politicians (higher ego rents and, therefore, increased re-election motivation) reduce the over-manipulation. Conversely, “excessive” spending may wrongly be interpreted as opportunistic government manipulation. Theoretical results are supported empirically, with very robust evidence in a sample of 87 democracies.     

中美储蓄率差异的原因及影响分析

中美两国是当今世界经济舞台中的两个最为重要的国家。中美经济结构的最大差异是储蓄率,两国的储蓄活动几乎是两个极端。储蓄率的巨大差异对中美经济与贸易影响深远。本文将对中美储蓄率差异的原因及影响进行深入分析。     

A common pool theory of supranational deficit ceilings

The budget deficit bias is modeled as the result of a domestic common pool problem and of an international externality. Deficits can be used to finance both unproductive and productive public spending. An optimally set supranational deficit ceiling is examined and welfare is compared to the unconstrained outcome and to the case of nationally set deficit ceilings. The supranational deficit ceiling is found to be welfare improving relative to similar national arrangements, but does not fully eliminate the deficit bias unless combined with a domestic fiscal institution allowing for precommitment to productive public spending.