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61.
经济刺激政策的退出问题已引起世界各国决策者的重视。本文从经济刺激政策带来的财政负担、是否应退出的判断标准等进行了研究,并提出中国经济刺激政策不适合迅速发出退出信号,当前工作重点应是转变经济发展方式、调整经济结构、提高经济增长效率、保证经济增长的可持续性。 相似文献
62.
曹伟 《云南财贸学院学报》2008,24(2):79-84
从近期来看,以"逆差 顺差"为特点的美国国际收支结构是可以持续的,从中长期来看,以亚洲国家为外围主体为美国经常项目赤字融资这一复活的布雷顿森林体系难以长久存在。面对日益庞大的经常项目赤字,美国试图通过货币重估来转移其经常项目调整负担。美国试图通过东亚经济体货币联合升值来调整外部经济失衡,有其理论上的可行性,但实践起来有困难。美国经常项目失衡问题应该从美国自身着手加以解决,其他国家特别是东亚经济体要采取有效的宏观经济政策加以配合。 相似文献
63.
受由新冠疫情引发的经济衰退影响,美国启动了以增发国债和超级量化宽松为基础的数轮纾困政策,以央行购买国债推动经济复苏的财政赤字货币化政策自2008年后再一次引起了全球的注意.本文以美国为刺激经济复苏施行的财政政策和货币政策为出发点,从经济基础、理论基础、制度演变、财政赤字和国债规模变化等角度分析了财政赤字货币化的形成原因... 相似文献
64.
美国经常账户逆差是结构性逆差,不应诉求美元贬值或迫使其他国家货币升值等数量性调控手段而加以改善,而应善用因美国经常账户逆差而输出的回流资本,一方面购买国内因产业结构升级而无法生产或少生产的国外廉价商品满足国内消费者必需品或中低端奢侈品的消费需求,提高国民福利;另一方面与国内因补偿性逆差或资源性逆差而释放出来的劳动力以及国内高端技术有效结合,提高国内生产率,增加国内GDP或扩大财富,稳定美元的储备地位,并利用增加的GDP、财富和美元的储备地位,使得NIIP/财富或△NIIP/GDP的比率保持在一个可容忍的稳定水平,加强外国投资者对美国的信心;同时将部分过剩的资本输至国外,与国外廉价的劳动力或优势资源相结合,获取高额的资本回报率,保持收入账户的盈余,降低利息偿付的压力。这样,净外债的增加加速了美国的经济和财富增长,进而强化了美元的储备地位,而经济的增长和储备地位的巩固又吸引外资流入,实现了良性的经济循环。因此只要美国仍能保持这一增长模式,且存在无限的生命周期,美国就能做到无穷的蓬齐博弈,美国经常账户逆差的可持续性就不会受到质疑。 相似文献
65.
贸易统计差异与中美贸易平衡问题 总被引：35，自引：0，他引：35
本文研究发现(1)中美进出口计价方式不同和运输时滞导致双边贸易统计数据存在差异是自然的。(2)参照剔除香港转口毛利后中美贸易新估计值,1995—2003年美国对华出口低估年均在24%以上,从华进口高估年均在35%以上,而中国对美出口低估年均在20%以上,从美进口相对没变。(3)考虑服务贸易后,美中商品与服务贸易逆差估计值与中国对美贸易顺差新估计值已相当接近。上述结果得到IMF数据的证实。(4)外商在华直接投资增加会造成中国对美出口增加、对美贸易顺差增加。依据中美两国月度数据计量的结论是相一致的。这一结果证实中美贸易平衡问题已超越中美两国贸易范围而成为外商在华直接投资所引致的贸易逆差转移问题。剔除外资企业进出口贡献及贸易统计差异后,中国对美贸易估计值已非常趋近于美国对华贸易估计值。 相似文献
66.
We offer a critique of the fiscal preconditions for participation in Stage III of EMU and the Excessive Deficit Procedure of the Maastricht Treaty. We show that the high output costs associated with meeting the fiscal preconditions in Stage II and the incompatibility of the reference values for fiscal policy with other convergence criteria make it unlikely that a mechanical interpretation of those conditions will govern admission to Stage III. Knowledge of this fact will deter governments from undertaking major fiscal adjustments in the first place. Hence, the fiscal criteria of the treaty will not function as an efficient filter for distinguishing countries that are and are not prepared to live with the fiscal consequences of EMU.In Stage III, the function of the Excessive Deficit Procedure is to buttress the European Central Bank's protection from demands for a central bank bailout in the event of a debt crisis in a participating state. We show that other aspects of EU fiscal structure, namely the retention by member states of the bulk of their own revenue-raising capacity, should suffice to restrain the demand for a central bank bailout and the pressure on the ECB to supply it. Until political union follows monetary union, leading to the centralization of fiscal functions and revenu-raising capacity in the EU itself, the Excessive Deficit Procedure will be redundant. If there remains any reason to doubt the credibility of the no-bailout rule, then the best way to buttress it is directly, by further insulating the ECB from pressure to extend a bailout.If it is felt that policy in EU member states is biased toward excessive deficits, then the appropriate place to address this problem is at the national level. A limited approach would involve steps to insure that negotiations over the budget occur in the context of a firm general constraint on the overall level of spending. A more far-reaching reform would involve the creation of National Debt Boards to offset the prevailing bias. 相似文献
67.
Peter Schwarz 《Constitutional Political Economy》2006,17(2):87-101
The hypothesis of divided government is applied to the development of deficits in Germany. Since the party system is relatively
stable, divided governments emerge not from coalitional governments, but rather from the bicameral structure of the country.
Different majorities in the two chambers promote deficits, especially in the case of central government deficits. The results
suggest that under different majorities in the two chambers deficits are more than 0.5%-Point higher. Further, it is indicated,
that only ideological polarization, but not unstable majorities per se induces higher deficits.
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68.
次贷危机爆发以来,美国采取了一系列货币和财政政策以拯救深陷泥潭的本国经济。美联储运用非常规政策工具向金融体系注入大量流动性资产,美联邦政府也大幅度提高了财政支出,使得财政赤字愈加恶化。在此背景下,美元资产的安全性成为投资者关注的焦点。本文分别从货币政策效果、财政赤字的可持续性以及投资主体等方面考察了美元资产的安全性,分析了美国宏观经济政策的实际作用,并从投资主体结构探讨了美国联邦政府的经济取向,最后以所涉及资产的市场表现回应美元资产安全问题。笔者认为,与其它货币资产相比,持有美元资产并不会承担额外的币种风险。 相似文献
69.
由于连续两个"失去的10年"和长期的财政赤字政策,日本的主权债务规模不断累积,主权债务负担显著加重,无论用财政赤字/GDP比例还是用债务余额/GDP比例测度,日本的主权债务问题都极其严重。虽然币种结构、期限结构和债权人结构与已经出现主权债务危机的欧洲国家相比都相对合理,但如果不加以治理,在可以预期的未来,日本有可能爆发严重的主权债务危机。 相似文献
70.
《Journal of Comparative Economics》2022,50(2):555-568
The financial crisis from 2007 and, even more so, the Covid-19 pandemic caused large increases in public sector deficits and debts in many countries and prompted concern about fiscal adjustment. This paper examines fiscal adjustment to debt and deficits for a panel of 17 countries over 1870–2016 using the Jordà–Schularick–Taylor Macrohistory Database. This long span panel is informative since it contains many examples of large fiscal shocks similar to those recently experienced. The results from reduced-form models suggest that large deficits or surpluses tend to prompt stabilising feedbacks, mainly through changes in revenue, and there is greater pressure to adjust on countries running a deficit versus those running a surplus. However, the debt–GDP ratio prompts much less stabilising feedback by expenditure or revenue.1 相似文献