Does trade foster contract enforcement?

Contract enforcement is probabilistic, but the probability depends on rules and processes. A stimulus to trade may induce traders to alter rules or processes to improve enforcement. In the model of this paper, such a positive knock-on effect occurs when the elasticity of supply of traders is sufficiently high. Negative knock-on is possible when the elasticity is low. Enforcement strategies in competing markets are complements (substitutes) if the supply of traders is sufficiently elastic (inelastic). The model provides a useful structure of endogenous enforcement that gives promise of explaining patterns of institutional development. Presented to the GEP Conference on ‘New Directions in International Trade Theory’, 8 and 9 June, 2007. An earlier version of this paper under another title was presented to the American Economic Association meetings, January 2004.     

Strategic interaction and dynamics under endogenous time preference

This paper presents a strategic growth model with endogenous time preference. Due to the potential lack of concavity and the differentiability of the value functions associated with each agent’s problem, we employ the theory of monotone comparative statics and supermodular games based on order and monotonicity properties on lattices. In particular, we provide the sufficient conditions of supermodularity for dynamic games with open-loop strategies based on two fundamental elements: the ability to order elements in the strategy space of the agents and the strategic complementarity which implies upward sloping best responses. The supermodular game structure of the model lets us provide the existence and the monotonicity results on the greatest and the least equilibria. We sharpen these results by showing the differentiability of the value function and the uniqueness of the best response correspondences almost everywhere and show that the stationary state Nash equilibria tend to be symmetric. Finally, we numerically analyze to what extent the strategic complementarity inherent in agents’ strategies can alter the convergence results that could have emerged under a single agent optimal growth model. In particular, we show that the initially rich can pull the poor out of the poverty trap even when sustaining a higher level of steady state capital stock for itself.     

When will payoff maximization survive?An indirect evolutionary analysis

Survival of payoff maximization is the usual as if-justification for assuming rational economic agents. An indirect evolutionary analysis allows for stimuli which are not directly related to reproductive success although they affect behavior. One first determines the solution for all possible constellations of stimuli, and then the evolutionarily stable stimuli. Our general analysis confirms the special results of former studies that payoff maximization in case of commonly known stimuli requires either that own success does not depend on other's behavior or that other's behavior is not influenced by own stimuli. When stimuli are private information, one can derive similar necessary conditions.     

广东县域经济发展的约束与突破

广东县域经济总体上相对滞后于浙江、江苏和山东,滞后的重要原因在于县域经济的集聚效应大于扩散效应,外源式经济模式发展到一定阶段后其示范效应小于挤出效应,县域经济内源式发展模式要受到外源式模式的冲击。发展广东县域经济,要突破资金动员瓶颈和产业结构调整乏力的制肘,制度创新是首要选择。     

Volatility dynamics under an endogenous Markov-switching framework: a cross-market approach

This study uses an endogenous Markov-switching framework to examine the interrelatedness of the volatility dynamics of the US and Korean markets. Previous literature assumes that the US market implied volatility index is exogenous to the Korean implied volatility index. Here, we allow for correlations between the US and Korean variables and suggest two types of endogeneity, namely endogeneity in the regressors and in the regime-switching probabilities. The estimation results show that both types of endogeneity are present in the US variables and that the parameter estimates are quite different when endogeneity is considered, indicating a serious endogeneity bias in the parameter estimates. The results of the endogeneity test for the regressors show that the effects of global shocks are often persistent and may last for as long as six periods. Sub-period analyses indicate that the degrees of endogeneity were especially strong during the global financial crisis.     

A theory of natural addiction

Economic theories of rational addiction aim to describe consumer behavior in the presence of habit-forming goods. We provide a biological foundation for this body of work by formally specifying conditions under which it is optimal to form a habit. We demonstrate the empirical validity of our thesis with an in-depth review and synthesis of the biomedical literature concerning the action of opiates in the mammalian brain and their effects on behavior. Our results lend credence to many of the unconventional behavioral assumptions employed by theories of rational addiction, including adjacent complementarity and the importance of cues, attention, and self-control in determining the behavior of addicts. We offer evidence for the special case of the opiates that “harmful” addiction is the manifestation of a mismatch between behavioral algorithms encoded in the human genome and the expanded menu of choices faced by consumers in the modern world.     

一事一议财政奖补制度对农村居民收入影响效应研究——基于中国县域面板数据的实证检验

一事一议财政奖补制度是中国农村税费改革后村级公共产品主要供给制度。该制度以其筹补结合的供给方式,弥补了由于税费减免导致的财政资金短缺加之村民筹资不足带来的村级公共产品供给缺失,有效促进了村级公共产品供给。理论上村级公共产品有效供给能够提高农村居民收入水平,但通过一事一议财政奖补制度提供的村级供给产品需要农民、村集体承担一部分建设费用,且后期管护工作在一定程度上增加了农民的经济负担。那么实施多年的一事一议财政奖补制度是否真正提高了农村居民收入水平?以及这种影响是短暂的还是持久的?其内在作用机制又是怎样的呢?文章首先从理论上分析一事一议财政奖补制度实施对农村居民收入的影响,并探讨\"一事一议财政奖补→常住人口城镇化率→农村居民收入水平\"的作用路径。然后运用中国县域面板数据对理论分析结论进行实证检验。文章在搜集2002年-2015年全国1869个县域经济数据基础上,从各省政府、省农委历年相关工作文件中查找1869个县开展一事一议财政奖补制度起始年份,最终形成26166组县域面板数据。研究发现,一事一议财政奖补制度实施能够对农村居民收入水平产生显著的正向影响,并且影响程度总体上呈现逐年递增趋势,...     

Monetising the Classical Equations: a theory of circulation

The Classical Equations describe output and income in real terms.To use them to analyse aggregate demand, the transactions theydescribe must be ‘monetised’. A sum of money equalto the wage bill of the capital goods sector can be shown tobe necessary and sufficient to carry out all transactions, ina process of circulation which also defines an expression forvelocity. When money has intrinsic value, the quantity approachmay hold in the short run but, in the long run, money will beendogenous. In these conditions, the rate of interest will bedetermined by the supply and demand for reserves, but when moneyis purely nominal, only a minimum rate will be fixed, and therate of interest will have to be pegged. The Appendix developsthe Classical Equations and shows that they define an invariableunit of account.