Does accounting conservatism pay?

We investigate whether or not there is a link between conservative accounting practices and the sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance. Using several accrual‐based measures of accounting conservatism as well as alternative measures of accounting performance, we estimate an econometric model of CEO compensation that incorporates the interaction of accounting conservatism and accounting performance. Consistent with optimal contracting theory, we find that the sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance is higher for firms that report conservative accounting earnings. These results support the hypothesis that accounting conservatism, by limiting earnings management opportunities and improving the reliability of accounting performance measures, allows firms to formulate contracts that tie executive compensation more closely to accounting performance.     

国内外股票期权激励机制比较研究

通过介绍美国和日本的股票期权激励机制,并与我国的股票激励机制进行比较分析,提出了关于我国股票期权在公司治理、市场建设和法律法规方面的建议。     

Top management team turnover as an adaptation mechanism: The role of the environment

Based on an organizational adaptation framework, this study examines the influence of three environmental dimensions–munificence, stability, and complexity–on top management team turnover. In addition to investigating the direct influence of these environmental dimensions, indirect effects through firm performance and strategic change are also examined; the indirect effect of environmental complexity through demographic heterogeneity is also studied. Path analysis indicates that the direct effects of the three environmental dimensions predominate. Indirect effects were nonsignificant except for the effect of instability and munificence through strategic change. By expanding the team turnover context to include environmental and strategic dimensions, in addition to previously examined performance and heterogeneity factors, this study enhances our understanding of managerial turnover as a form of organizational adaptation.     

美国税权划分制度评析与借鉴

美国的联邦、州和地方三级政府各自拥有属于本级的税权,并在同级政府层面上表现为税收立法权、执法权和司法权三者之间的划分与制衡。本文通过分析美国税权划分的主要特点,对我国税权划分改革提出了若干建议:确定税权划分的法定主义原则、税收立法权划分的指导思想、赋予地方适度税权的具体设想、明确划分中央与地方税收执法权限、建立解决地区间税权争议的协调机制、通过一些制度设计完善税收司法权的行使。     

Executive compensation: a calibration approach

Summary. We use a version of the Grossman and Hart principal-agent model with 10 actions and 10 states to produce quantitative predictions for executive compensation. Performance incentives derived from the model are compared with the performance incentives of 350 firms chosen from a survey by Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy. The results suggest both that the model does a reasonable job of explaining the data and that actual incentives are close to the optimal incentives predicted by theory. Received: August 12, 1997; revised version: October 27, 1997     

The timeliness of performance information in determining executive compensation

We study whether boards of directors concentrate on performance near compensation decision times rather than providing consistent incentives for chief executive officers (CEO) throughout the fiscal year. We show empirically that managers can profit by moving sales revenue among fiscal quarters. Though this may suggest that boards use short-term trends when determining rewards, we find evidence consistent with boards tying pay to recent sales growth so as to use the best information about future performance. We also find that the timing of profits throughout the year does not affect CEO pay, which may suggest that smoothing firm income is important to CEOs.     

Dynamic incentives and retirement

This paper examines multi-period compensation contracts when retirement is anticipated. Short-term contracts in long-term employment relationships are equivalent to a long-term renegotiation-proof contract. The dynamic of incentive rates is determined by (i) how and in which periods managerial effort affects the contractible performance measures; and by (ii) the time-series correlation of error terms in performance reports. The model explains why long-term investments can decrease while incentive rates increase as managers approach retirement. Earnings persistence is negatively associated to earnings-based incentive rates but, towards retirement, high earnings persistence implies increasing earnings-based incentive rates.     

What determines early exercise of employee stock options in Australia?

Employee stock options (ESOs) are a popular way of remunerating employees. We analyse factors at the firm and option level affecting the employee's decision to exercise ESOs before they mature. Exercises over the period 1998–2004 are analysed and the key factor influencing early exercise is found to be dividends. Exercises frequently occur well before maturity, but in most cases little time value is sacrificed. Our findings have implications for the ‘fair’ valuation of ESOs in companies’ financial statements, as required by the relevant Australian accounting standard, AASB 2.     

An investigation of the short‐ and long‐run relations between executive cash bonus payments and firm financial performance: a pitch

This letter is a discussion of the application of the pitch template developed by Faff (2015) to a financial accounting research topic. The pitch template focuses ideas into key areas, giving clear and concise direction in planning and structuring the research idea. In this instance, the template is used in a nonlinear manner to develop a research proposal to investigate the relation between cash bonus payments and firm financial performance.     

Can economic bonus programs jeopardize service relationships?

Research findings on the impact of economic bonus programs on service relationships are contradictory. While some studies find positive effects of economic bonus programs on customer’s relational behavior, other studies demonstrate negative effects. Building on self-determination theory, Dholakia (J Market Res 43(2):109–120, 2006) points at a possible explanation for these conflicting results, arguing that economic marketing programs have negative effects on self-determined customers when the program is perceived as controlling by them. By testing the effect of four different kinds of economic bonus programs on loyalty in an experimental setting using a nationwide representative sample of 768 participants, this research is the first that provides empirical evidence that economic bonus programs can indeed endanger service relationships by reducing customer’s self-determination. Implications of our findings for the abundance of economic bonus programs offered to service customers these days are highlighted.