Corporate Governance When Managers Set Their Own Pay

This paper presents a model of the firm in which the manager has discretion over his own compensation, constrained only by the threat of shareholder intervention. The model addresses two main questions. How does shareholder power affect managers' compensation and their incentives to maximise firm value? And what is the optimal level of shareholder power? Expectedly, the model shows that increasing shareholder power leads to lower managerial pay. Greater shareholder power, however, also weakens the manager's incentives to maximise value and may even lead to lower profits for shareholders. There might, thus, be too much, as well as too little, shareholder power. The model characterises the optimal level of shareholder power and yields predictions about the relation between shareholder power, managerial pay, performance and firm characteristics.     

Managerial risk-taking incentives and non-GAAP earnings disclosures

We investigate the association between risk-taking incentives provided by stock-based compensation arrangements and non-GAAP financial disclosures. Controlling for compensation to stock price sensitivity, we find that managers with higher compensation to stock volatility sensitivity (vega) are more likely to be associated with voluntary non-GAAP earnings information disclosures. In addition, higher-vega managers are found to be associated with more frequent and less opportunistic non-GAAP earnings information disclosures. Robust to alternative specifications and estimations, our findings suggest that compensation arrangements can encourage managers to make more, higher-quality voluntary non-GAAP disclosures.     

What Questions Do Board Members in Public Service Organizations Ask about Executive Compensation?

The purpose of this study is to investigate the governance questions that board members in public service organizations ask as they go about fulfilling their responsibilities for the oversight of executive compensation. We investigate the usage and perceived importance by board members of the 24 questions proposed by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants that directors should ask about executive compensation. The study is based on a usable sample of 47 board members from public service organizations who attended a Canadian director training program. Our results suggest that the recommended executive compensation governance questions are not being asked with the same frequency or considered equally important by board members of public service organizations. Furthermore, the correlation between a question’s usage frequency and its perceived importance was not perfect. However, there appears to be a significantly positive relationship among the number of executive compensation governance questions asked and selected elements of a board’s governance structure.     

技术董事、股权激励对企业创新效率的影响

随着知识经济时代的到来，创新在企业经营中的地位越来越高，董事、监事及高管团队对企业创新战略的方向、组织和实施具有重要影响，研究他们对企业创新的影响变得必要和迫切。以2012-2017年沪深两市上市公司为研究对象，运用DEA-Tobit两阶段模型，分析企业技术董事比例和股权激励（分为高管股权激励和核心员工股权激励两个维度）对中国上市公司技术创新效率的影响。结果显示，公司技术董事的比例越大，上市公司技术创新效率越高；对核心员工的股权激励授予比例越高，上市公司技术创新效率越高；然而，高管股权激励授予比例与上市公司技术创新效率并无显著联系。     

Growth through rigidity: An explanation for the rise in CEO pay

The dramatic rise in CEO compensation during the 1990s and early 2000s is a longstanding puzzle. In this paper, we show that much of the rise can be explained by a tendency of firms to grant the same number of options each year. Number-rigidity implies that the grant-date value of option awards will grow with firm equity returns, which were very high on average during the tech boom. Further, other forms of CEO compensation did not adjust to offset the dramatic growth in the value of option pay. Number-rigidity in options can also explain the increased dispersion in pay, the difference in growth between the US and other countries, and the increased correlation between pay and firm-specific equity returns. We present evidence that number-rigidity arose from a lack of sophistication about option valuation that is akin to money illusion. We show that regulatory changes requiring transparent expensing of the grant-date value of options led to a decline in number-rigidity and helps explain why executive pay increased less with equity returns during the housing boom in the mid-2000s.     

Cost behavior and executive bonus compensation

Prior literature provides compelling evidence of an asymmetric relation between executive bonus compensation and earnings performance. In particular, this literature reports that compensation committees assign greater weight to good (positive) earnings performance than poor (negative) earnings performance. Taken together, the prior literature provides strong support for critics who claim that compensation committees blindly protect executives from earnings underperformance. We further examine this issue by investigating whether a firm's cost behavior (i.e., the relation between expenses and sales) provides an explanation for the apparent inefficiency in executive compensation contracts. Our evidence suggests that executives are rewarded more for increases in ROA that arise from normal cost behavior than other increases in ROA consistent with these increases being perceived as more persistent. In contrast, we do not find such a relationship for decreases in ROA which suggests that executives are largely shielded from decreases in ROA that follow normal cost behavior. We examine two factors suggested by the prior literature, expected future sales and the extent of capacity utilization, which may provide an explanation for why executives are shielded from normal cost behavior decreases in ROA. When these additional factors are included in our empirical models, our evidence suggests that the asymmetric relation between changes in CEO bonus compensation and increases and decreases in earnings performance documented in prior literature goes away. That is, our results suggest that compensation committees do not blindly protect executives for earnings underperformance. On the contrary, our evidence suggests that these committees take into account other non-earnings information when deciding how much weight to give to a decrease in earnings and that executive compensation may not be as inefficient as suggested by prior research.     

垄断行业高管薪酬的个税调控探讨

合理的收入分配制度是社会公平正义的最重要体现。针对收益不合理收入的垄断行业高管加强个税调控,是促进形成合理的收入分配制度的当务之需。而具体可通过选定合适的税基模式,针对垄断行业高管的薪酬加成征收个人所得税,以实现收入分配结果相对公平,同时彰显个人所得税法的实质正义,促进社会的和谐发展。     

Top executive compensation,regional institutions and Chinese OFDI

Integrating agency and institutional theories, this paper examines the impact of top-executive compensation and regional institutions on the outward FDI(OFDI) of a sample of Chinese-listed firms. The results show that top-executive cash pay and equity ownership have a positive association with OFDI. Differing from previous studies focusing on cross-country institutional variances, we take variations in within-country institutions into account and find that regional institutions in terms of product markets, factor markets and legal systems play an important role in OFDI and positively moderate the governance role of managerial equity ownership.     

职业经理人薪酬激励实证研究

根据深圳证券交易所2004年上市公司的职业经理人薪酬数据进行实证研究,分析了职业经理人平均薪酬和董事薪酬、公司绩效、公司规模、国有股占总股本的比例之间的关系,并对职业经理人的持股状况进行了总结.     

国有控股公司高管薪酬激励与中小投资者利益保护

利用2007年我国国有控股公司数据,以中小股东利益保护为因变量,以高管现金薪酬、高管持股比例和在职消费为主要考察对象,并选取公司规模和股权制衡结构作为控制变量,检验在不同激励方式下高管薪酬与中小股东利益的相关性,结论表明:国有控股公司高管薪酬主要集中于现金薪酬和在职消费,对中小股东利益侵害较大,而高管持股则可以保护中小投资者利益.