Calibrating an algorithm for estimating transactions from FXFX exchange rate quotes

In this paper we investigate the efficiency of a class of transaction-generating algorithms, originally suggested in Bollerslev and Domowitz (1993). Our comparison utilizes real transaction data recorded over Reuters D2000-2 electronic broking system for 7 h in June 1993 and transaction data generated from FXFX quotations over an identical period. Results suggest that, at this high-frequency data sampling, the performance of these transaction-generating algorithms is poor, with the most likely explanation of this outcome due to the high-frequency characteristics of FXFX spreads and quotation intensity.     

Post Bretton Woods deviations from purchasing power parity in G7 exchange rates—an empirical exploration

Exchange rates have deviated substantially and idiosyncratically from purchasing power parity (PPP) since the breakdown of Bretton Woods. In this paper, a model incorporating both traditional PPP and financial market variables is constructed and tested on the US dollar's six G7 exchange rates during the floating rate era. Empirical tests show that the model's common set of variables—with consistent signs—can explain the divergent behavior of G7 exchange rates during 1973.2–90.2. Idiosyncracies are reflected in different subsets of the model's variables entering significantly into each exchange rate's regression; the existence of stable relationships is demonstrated by the equations' co-integration.     

Trade costs, firms and productivity

This paper examines the response of U.S. manufacturing industries and plants to changes in trade costs using a unique new dataset on industry-level tariff and transportation rates. Our results lend support to recent heterogeneous-firm models of international trade that predict a reallocation of economic activity towards high-productivity firms as trade costs fall. We find that industries experiencing relatively large declines in trade costs exhibit relatively strong productivity growth. We also find that low-productivity plants in industries with falling trade costs are more likely to die; that relatively high-productivity non-exporters are more likely to start exporting in response to falling trade costs; and that existing exporters increase their shipments abroad as trade costs fall. Finally, we provide evidence of productivity growth within firms in response to decreases in industry-level trade costs.     

Target zones in theory and history: Credibility, efficiency, and policy autonomy

An experiment with an exchange-rate band in Austria-Hungary in the early 20th century provides a rare opportunity to discuss critical aspects of the theory of target zones. Providing a new derivation of the target zone model as a set of nested hypotheses, the inference is drawn that policy credibility and market efficiency were paramount in the success of the Austro-Hungarian experience.     

The impact of monetary policy on the exchange rate: evidence from three small open economies

This paper studies the impact effect of monetary policy shocks on the exchange rate in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand during the 1990s. Shocks are identified by the reaction of three month market interest rates to policy announcements that were not themselves endogenous to economic news on the same day. The main result is that a 100 basis point contractionary shock will appreciate the exchange rate by 2-3 percent on impact. The association of interest rate hikes with depreciations that is sometimes observed during periods of exchange market pressure is mainly attributable to reverse causality.     

Monetary policy in emerging markets: Can liability dollarization explain contractionary devaluations?

In emerging markets, external debt is denominated almost entirely in large, developed country currencies such as the U.S. dollar. This liability dollarization offers a channel through which exchange rate variation can lead to business cycle instability. When firms' assets are denominated in domestic currency and liabilities are denominated in foreign currency, an exchange rate depreciation worsens firms' balance sheets, which leads to higher capital costs and contractions in capital spending. To illustrate this, I construct a quantitative, sticky price, small open economy model in which a monetary policy induced devaluation leads to a persistent contraction in output. In this model, fixed exchange rates offer greater stability than an interest rule that targets inflation.     

Determinants of business cycle comovement: a robust analysis

This paper investigates the determinants of business cycle comovement between countries. Our dataset includes over 100 countries, both developed and developing. We search for variables that are “robust” in explaining comovement, using the approach of Leamer (Amer. Econom. Rev. 73 (1983) 31). Variables considered are (i) bilateral trade between countries; (ii) total trade in each country; (iii) sectoral structure; (iv) similarity in export and import baskets; (v) factor endowments; and (vi) gravity variables. We find that bilateral trade is robust. However, two variables that the literature has argued are important for business cycles—industrial structure and currency unions—are found not to be robust.     

Business cycles in emerging economies: the role of interest rates

We find that in a sample of emerging economies business cycles are more volatile than in developed ones, real interest rates are countercyclical and lead the cycle, consumption is more volatile than output and net exports are strongly countercyclical. We present a model of a small open economy, where the real interest rate is decomposed in an international rate and a country risk component. Country risk is affected by fundamental shocks but, through the presence of working capital, also amplifies the effects of those shocks. The model generates business cycles consistent with Argentine data. Eliminating country risk lowers Argentine output volatility by 27% while stabilizing international rates lowers it by less than 3%.     

Politics and economics in weak and strong states

While much research in political economy points out the benefits of “limited government,” political scientists have long emphasized the problems created in many less-developed nations by “weak states,” which lack the power to tax and regulate the economy and to withstand the political and social challenges from non-state actors. I construct a model in which the state apparatus is controlled by a self-interested ruler, who tries to divert resources for his own consumption, but who can also invest in socially productive public goods. Both weak and strong states create distortions. When the state is excessively strong, the ruler imposes such high taxes that economic activity is stifled. When the state is excessively weak, the ruler anticipates that he will not be able to extract rents in the future and underinvests in public goods. I show that the same conclusion applies in the analysis of both the economic power of the state (i.e., its ability to raise taxes) and its political power (i.e., its ability to remain entrenched from the citizens). I also discuss how under certain circumstances a different type of equilibrium, which I refer to as “consensually strong state equilibrium,” can emerge whereby the state is politically weak but is allowed to impose high taxes as long as a sufficient fraction of the proceeds are invested in public goods. The consensually strong state might best correspond to the state in OECD countries where taxes are high despite significant control by the society over the government.     

Corruption, inequality, and fairness

Bigger governments raise the possibilities for corruption; more corruption may in turn raise the support for redistributive policies that intend to correct the inequality and injustice generated by corruption. We formalize these insights in a simple dynamic model. A positive feedback from past to current levels of taxation and corruption arises either when wealth originating in corruption and rent seeking is considered unfair, or when the ability to engage in corruption is unevenly distributed in the population. This feedback introduces persistence in the size of the government and the levels of corruption and inequality. Multiple steady states exist in some cases.