Carbon tax simulations using a household demand model

The main objective of this paper is to analyse consumer response and welfare effects due to changes in energy or environmental policy. To achieve this objective we formulate and estimate an econometric model for non-durable consumer demand in Sweden that utilises micro- and macro-data. In the simulations, we consider two revenue neutral scenarios that both imply a doubling of the CO₂ tax; one that returns the revenues in the form of a lower VAT and one that subsidise public transport. One conclusion from the simulations is that the CO₂ tax has regional distribution effects, in the sense that household living in sparsely populated areas carry a larger share of the tax burden.     

Aid, policy and growth in post-conflict societies

Countries emerging from civil war attract both aid and policy advice. This paper provides the first systematic empirical analysis of aid and policy reform in the post-conflict growth process. It is based on a comprehensive data set of large civil wars, and covers 17 societies that were in their first decade of post-conflict economic recovery. We first investigate whether the absorptive capacity for aid is systematically different in post-conflict countries. We find that during the first 3 post-conflict years absorptive capacity is no greater than normal, but that in the rest of the first decade it is approximately double its normal level. Thus, ideally, aid should phase in during the decade. Historically, aid has not, on average, been higher in post-conflict societies, and indeed it has tended to taper out over the course of the decade. We then investigate whether the contribution of policy to growth is systematically different in post-conflict countries, and in particular, whether particular components of policy are differentially important. For this we use the World Bank policy rating database. We find that growth is more sensitive to policy in post-conflict societies. Comparing the efficacy of different policies, we find that social policies are differentially important relative to macroeconomic policies. However, historically, this does not appear to have been how policy reform has been prioritized in post-conflict societies.     

Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement

We show how to decentralize constrained efficient allocations that arise from enforcement constraints between sovereign nations. In a pure exchange economy these allocations can be decentralized with private agents acting competitively and taking as given government default decisions on foreign debt. In an economy with capital these allocations can be decentralized if the government can tax capital income as well as default on foreign debt. The tax on capital income is needed to make private agents internalize a subtle externality. The decisions of the government can arise as an equilibrium of a dynamic game between governments.     

Forecasting Emerging Market Exchange Rates from Foreign Equity Options

The use of derivatives to infer future exchange rates has long been a subject of interest in the international finance literature. With the recent currency crises in Mexico, Southeast Asia, and Brazil, work on exchange rate expectations in emerging markets is of particular interest. For some emerging markets, foreign equity options are the only liquid exchange‐traded derivatives with currency information embedded in their prices. Given that emerging markets sometimes undergo currency realignment with discrete jumps in their exchange rate, estimation of risk‐neutral probability density functions from foreign equity option data provides valuable evidence concerning market expectations. To illustrate the use of foreign equity options in estimating market beliefs, we consider Telmex options around the 1994 peso devaluation and find evidence that markets anticipated the change in the Mexican government's foreign exchange policy.     

Golden cages for showy birds: Optimal switching costs in labor contracts

Under what circumstances do workers sign contracts with high quitting penalties? Our answer points to market transparency. When the worker's performance is privately observed by the incumbent firm, alternative employers face an adverse selection problem. As a result, efficient separations can only take place through involuntary layoffs and there is no role for quitting fees. In contrast, when performance is public, quitting fees are useful devices to appropriate the surplus from workers’ reallocation. Separations are amicable and take the form of quitting after downwardly renegotiating the fees. Qualitative features of contracts are independent of the distribution of ex-post bargaining power. The impact of switching costs on total welfare and its distribution depends on the degree of market transparency and the ex-ante distribution of market power.     

Forms of Foreign Investment Liberalization and Risk in Emerging Stock Markets

I examine the effect of different forms of foreign investment liberalization on risk in emerging equity markets, including international cross-listings and closed-end country funds, and in the domestic equity market as foreign investment restrictions are eliminated. I find that in Latin American markets volatility declines significantly with different forms of foreign investment liberalization, and in Asian markets volatility does not increase significantly. Volatility is driven by domestic factors in South America, but the transmission of volatility from the United States to Mexico increases after liberalization. The market risk exposure increases in Argentina after liberalization, in Chile with an index of American Depositary Receipts, and in Thailand with greater foreign ownership, reducing the diversification benefits of these markets.     

Further Evidence on PPP Adjustment Speeds: the Case of Effective Real Exchange Rates and the EMS*

Two different approaches intend to resolve the ‘puzzling’ slow convergence to purchasing power parity (PPP) reported in the literature [see Rogoff (1996) , Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 34.] On the one hand, there are models that consider a non‐linear adjustment of real exchange rate to PPP induced by transaction costs. Such costs imply the presence of a certain transaction band where adjustment is too costly to be undertaken. On the other hand, there are models that relax the ‘classical’ PPP assumption of constant equilibrium real exchange rates. A prominent theory put together by Balassa (1964, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 72) and Samuelson (1964 Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 46) , the BS effect, suggests that a non‐constant real exchange rate equilibrium is induced by different productivity growth rates between countries. This paper reconciles those two approaches by considering an exponential smooth transition‐in‐deviation non‐linear adjustment mechanism towards non‐constant equilibrium real exchange rates within the EMS (European Monetary System) and effective rates. The equilibrium is proxied, in a theoretically appealing manner, using deterministic trends and the relative price of non‐tradables to proxy for BS effects. The empirical results provide further support for the hypothesis that real exchange rates are well described by symmetric, nonlinear processes. Furthermore, the half‐life of shocks in such models is found to be dramatically shorter than that obtained in linear models.     

Demographic and Economic Pressure on Emigration out of Africa*

Two of the main forces driving European emigration in the late nineteenth century were real wage gaps between sending and receiving regions and demographic booms in the low‐wage sending regions. Our new estimates of net migration for the countries of sub‐Saharan Africa show that exactly the same forces driving African across‐border migration are at work today. The results suggest that rapid growth in the cohort of potential young emigrants, population pressure on the resource base, and slow economic growth are likely to intensify the pressure for migration out of Africa and into high‐wage OECD countries over the next two decades.     

Endogenous timing in trade policy games: Should governments use countervailing duties?

Endogenous Timing in Trade Policy Games: Should Governments Use Countervailing Duties? - Trade policy under oligopoly is analysed in two multistage games with endogenous timing of trade policy. At the beginning of the games, the domestic and foreign governments choose whether to set trade policy at stage one or two. It is shown that in the subgame perfect equilibrium of both games, the domestic government will set its tariff (and production subsidy) at stage one and the foreign government its export subsidy at stage two. The domestic country commits not to use a countervailing duty in both games, and both countries are better off than when they set trade policy simultaneously.     

Intertemporal Equity and Hartwick's Rule in an Exhaustible Resource Model*

In a standard exhaustible resource model, it is known that if, along a competitive path, investment in the augmentable capital good equals the rents on the exhaustible resource (known as Hartwick's rule), then the path is equitable in the sense that the consumption level is constant over time. In this paper, we show the converse of this result: if a competitive path is equitable, then it must satisfy Hartwick's rule.