No arbitrage conditions and liquidity

We extend the fundamental theorem of asset pricing to the case of markets with liquidity risk. Our results generalize, when the probability space is finite, those obtained by Kabanov et al. [Kabanov, Y., Stricker, C., 2001. The Harrison-Pliska arbitrage pricing theorem under transaction costs. Journal of Mathematical Economics 35, 185–196; Kabanov, Y., Rásonyi, M., Stricker, C., 2002. No-arbitrage criteria for financial markets with efficient friction. Finance and Stochastics 6, 371–382; Kabanov, Y., Rásonyi, M., Stricker, C., 2003. On the closedness of sums of convex cones in L⁰$L^0$ and the robust no-arbitrage property. Finance and Stochastics] and by Schachermayer [Schachermayer, W., 2004. The fundamental theorem of asset pricing under poportional transaction costs in finite discrete time. Mathematical Finance 14 (1), 19–48] for markets with proportional transaction costs. More precisely, we restate the notions of consistent and strictly consistent price systems and prove their equivalence to corresponding no arbitrage conditions. We express these results in an analytical form in terms of the subdifferential of the so-called liquidation function. We conclude the paper with a hedging theorem.     

Strategic interaction between futures and spot markets

We study an oligopolistic industry where firms are able to sell in a futures market at infinitely many moments prior to the spot market. A kind of Folk-theorem is established: any outcome between perfect competition and Cournot can be sustained in equilibrium. We then find that the Cournot outcome can be sustained by a renegotiation-proof equilibrium. However, this is not true for the competitive outcome. Furthermore, only the monopolistic outcome is renegotiation-proof if firms can buy and sell in the futures market. These results suggest, contrary to existing literature, that the introduction of futures markets may have an anti-competitive effect.     

Liquidity shocks and equilibrium liquidity premia

We study an equilibrium in which agents face surprise liquidity shocks and invest in liquid and illiquid riskless assets. The random holding horizon from liquidity shocks makes the return of the illiquid security risky. The equilibrium premium for such risk depends on the constraint that agents face when borrowing against future income; it is insignificant without borrowing constraint, but can be very high with borrowing constraint. Illiquidity, therefore, can have large effects on asset returns when agents face liquidity shocks and borrowing constraints. This result can help us understand why some securities have high liquidity premia, despite low turnover frequency.     

An equilibrium analysis of information aggregation and fluctuations in markets with discrete decisions

This paper shows how the interaction between decentralized information gathering and discreteness of investment decisions at the individual level can generate random fluctuations in aggregate investment that involve occasionally large allocation errors. This interaction is illustrated in a model in which private information is costly to acquire and prices reveal information. The unique rational expectations equilibrium outcome of the model is shown to always be noisy and characterized by investment levels which may be high simply because uninformed investors are buying under the impression that the high price is a signal of good investment opportunities.     

Collateral constraints and the amplification mechanism

Kiyotaki and Moore (J. Polit. Economy 105 (1997) 211) have offered a theory for how common shocks to credit-constrained firms are amplified through changes in collateral values and transmitted as fluctuations in output. I clarify and extend their model by showing that their collateral amplification mechanism is not robust to the introduction of markets that allow these firms to hedge against common shocks. A theory of incomplete hedging is proposed in which the supply of hedging available in the economy is constrained by the aggregate value of collateral. I illustrate how the constraint reinstates amplification effects and discuss empirical implications of this new mechanism.     

Non-addictive habits: optimal consumption-portfolio policies

We formulate a model of preferences with non-addictive habits, where consumption is required to be non-negative at all times, but can fall below a “standard of living” index that aggregates past consumption. We study the consumption-portfolio problem taking account of the non-negativity constraint on consumption, and provide a constructive proof for the existence of an optimal policy on a finite time-horizon [0,T]. We show that the consumption constraint binds up to an endogenous stopping time τ∗∈[0,T], after which it remains slack until T. A decomposition of constrained consumption involving an Asian average-strike capped call-option is demonstrated.     

Market Efficiency Reloaded: Why Insider Trades do not Reveal Exploitable Information

Abstract. Several studies have emphasized a slow price adjustment to reported insider trades for Germany. The results presented in this paper, though, show that this is mainly caused by a subset of high arbitrage risk stocks. In fact, the abnormal return difference between the quintiles of stocks with highest and lowest idiosyncratic risk is in the range of 2.99–4.90% over a 20‐day interval. These results are robust even in the context of a joint generalized least squares approach. By developing a simple zero‐investment arbitrage trading strategy mimicking insider trades, it turns out that such a trading strategy, in most cases, generates significant positive returns as long as transaction costs are neglected. However, the outperformance disappears in all risk quintiles, if bid/ask spreads are taken into account. We conclude that the market's under‐reaction to reported insider trades can mainly be explained by the cost of risky arbitrage and is therefore not exploitable.     

Regulator flexibility and the administrative allocation licensing of 3G spectrum

Globally, most nations assign radio spectrum to provide 3G mobile services during the period 1999–2007. While there is consensus among most economists that auctions are the preferred assignment mechanism, the assignment mode is split, more or less, equally (in terms of the number of licences issued) between administrative allocations and auctions. With auction procedures tending to raise more revenue for governments (Cartelier, 2003) the question that naturally arises is: why are administrative allocations so popular a method to assign spectrum? McMillan (1995) conjectures that administrative allocations provide additional ‘flexibility’. Accordingly, this study examines the performance of 3G assignments in terms of an econometric analysis of a unique sample of national 3G spectrum administrative allocations. These outcomes are modelled as depending on spectrum package attributes, and post-award network deployment requirements.     

Signalling,Disclosure And The Implications Of Financial Structure For Uk Corporate R&D ∗

This paper investigates the impact of R&D disclosure and finance variables on the level of R&D expenditures. The question addressed is: what is the impact of changes in disclosure requirements on the relationship between R&D expenditure and the financing of firms? The question is motivated by the possible signalling role that elective disclosure may have had prior to changes in accounting practices to ensure R&D disclosure.     

The Challenge of Obtaining Quality Care: Limited Consumer Sovereignty in Human Services

Abstract

This paper offers a conceptual analysis of the problem of quality in human services: in elementary school, psychiatric care, and the health and social care of children, the elderly, and the intellectually disabled. Geriatric nursing home patients are used as a case. These care recipients cannot enforce their legal right to quality service; their quality-effective demand is low. Formal economic analyses often characterize the weak position of the care recipient as an information asymmetry problem. An additional obstacle, however, is the recipient's inability to safeguard her personal interest due to physical, mental, or social incapacities; that is, “limited consumer sovereignty.” Incapacitated individuals cannot enforce quality even when quality information is available. This creates a fundamental incentive problem in the monitoring of quality. They also depend on services that are complex and non-verifiable, making external monitoring difficult. This paper presents a typology of measures to increase the quality pressure facing providers.