Pricing external barrier options in a regime-switching model

External barrier options are two-asset options where the payoff is defined on one asset and the barrier is defined on another asset. In this paper, we derive the Laplace transforms of the prices and deltas for the external single and double barrier options where the underlying asset prices follow a regime-switching model with finite regimes. The derivation is made possible because we can obtain the joint Laplace transform of the first passage time of one asset value and the value of the other asset. Numerical inversion of the Laplace transforms is used to calculate the prices of external barrier options.     

Capital structure in the Chilean corporate sector: Revisiting the stylized facts

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the traditional drivers of the capital structure, in addition to others particularities of the Chilean corporate sector. Using panel data methodology, this study examines the potential drivers of the capital structure in a sample of 157 Chilean firms. To do that, this study also includes variables not commonly used in the literature (e.g. ownership concentration, business groups affiliation, and dividends), as distinctive elements of the Chilean corporate sector. Our results show a positive effect of firm size and ownership concentration on firms leverage; as well as a negative effect of the pay-out policy, growth opportunities, non-debt tax shields, and profitability on the leverage. Some expected relationships in the Anglo-Saxon context are also curiously observed in Chile. Nevertheless, there are some relations that are not in line with the current literature such as the negative relationship between asset tangibility and leverage. Finally, firms’ affiliation to economic groups allows them to take advantage of internal capital markets, increasing leverage. This suggests that some of the insights from the current theoretical bodies are not portable across countries, and consequently, much remains to be done in order to understand the impact of different institutional features on capital structure choices.Emerging markets provide a challenge to existing models that need to be reformulated to accommodate the characteristics of these markets. This study contributes in this direction by taking into consideration the particularities of an emerging Latin American Economy.     

The effect of independent directors’ characteristics on firm performance: Tenure and multiple directorships

In this paper, we analyze how the tenure and the number of directorships of independent directors may influence the relationship between board independence and firm performance. Our sample is composed of US listed firms for the period 2008–2012. Several robustness checks and sensitivity analyses are performed and we confirm that the board’s independence positively influences the firm’s performance. Nevertheless, this relationship exists only under certain values of directors’ tenure and external directorships. Our findings show that these variables determine the effectiveness of independent directors. Therefore, this paper highlights the need for a more specific approach, based on the personal characteristics of independent directors, in order to study their influence on corporate decisions, strategy and outcomes. Furthermore, our evidence has direct implications for companies in the selection of board members.     

Fiscal forecasting performance in an emerging economy: An empirical assessment of Brazil

This study makes use of Brazilian data to analyze government budget balance forecast errors. Besides the analysis of the quality and efficiency of budget balance forecasts, economic, political, and institutional and governance dimensions are explored. The findings show that the data forecasts have low quality and efficiency. Furthermore, it is observed that the budget forecast error is subject to a backward-looking effect, a bias in the economic growth forecasts, as well as cyclical fluctuations. Finally, electoral cycles represent a source of overestimated forecasts, and strong institutions and governance supported by the public are able to suppress opportunistic motivations in budget forecasts.     

After the wrongdoing: What managers should know about whistleblowing

Most of us are likely at some point to observe wrongdoing in our organizations, and some of us will blow the whistle to someone with the authority to put a stop to the wrongdoing. Or we may be managers, inspectors, or auditors who serve as the official ‘complaint recipient’ when one of our colleagues wants to report wrongdoing in the organization. Whether we blow the whistle or are tasked with cleaning up after someone else does so, we are better off knowing in advance how the whistleblowing process usually plays out. In this article we discuss the pragmatic implications of 30 years of systematic research about whistleblowing: who does it and when, and why they choose to report the wrongdoing internally (within the organization) or externally (to outsiders). To avoid external whistleblowing, which entails all sorts of costs for the organization, we recommend that managers take clear steps: investigate the allegations, make the results of the investigation known to those affected, correct the problem if one is found, and avoid reprisal against whistleblowers. These actions can increase the chance that information about organizational wrongdoing stays inside the organization, where it may be remedied, instead of being made public.     

Sovereign debt composition and time-varying public finance sustainability

We compute time-varying responses of the sovereign debt ratio to primary budget balances for 13 advanced economies between 1980 and 2012, and assess how fiscal sustainability reacts to different characteristics of government debt. We find that the sustainability time-varying coefficient increases and countries become more fiscally sustainable if they contract a higher share of long-term public debt, if more debt is held by the central bank or if it is easily marketable in capital markets.     

Optimal fiscal and monetary policy with occasionally binding zero bound constraints

This paper studies optimal fiscal and monetary policy when the nominal interest rate is subject to the zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint in a stochastic New Keynesian economy. In the baseline model calibrated to match key features of the U.S. economy, it is optimal for the government to increase its spending when at the ZLB in the stochastic environment by about 60 percent more than it would in the deterministic environment. The presence of uncertainty creates a unique time-consistency problem if the steady state is inefficient. Although access to government spending policy increases welfare in the face of a large deflationary shock, it decreases welfare during normal times as the government reduces the nominal interest rate less aggressively before reaching the ZLB.     

Market reforms in the time of imbalance

We study the consequences of product and labor market reforms in a two-country model with endogenous producer entry and labor market frictions. We focus on the role of business cycle conditions and external constraints at the time of reform implementation (or of a credible commitment to it) in shaping the dynamic effects of such policies. Product market reform is modeled as a reduction in entry costs and takes place in a non-traded sector that produces services used as input in manufacturing production. Labor market reform is modeled as a reduction in firing costs and/or unemployment benefits. We find that business cycle conditions at the time of deregulation significantly affect adjustment. A reduction of firing costs entails larger and more persistent adverse short-run effects on employment and output when implemented in a recession. By contrast, a reduction in unemployment benefits boosts employment and output by more in a recession compared to normal times. The impact of product market reforms is less sensitive to business cycle conditions. Credible announcements about future reforms induce sizable short-run dynamics, regardless of whether the announcement takes place in normal times or during an economic downturn. Whether the immediate effect is expansionary or contractionary varies across reforms. Finally, lack of access to international lending in the wake of reform can amplify the costs of adjustment.     

How does long-term finance affect economic volatility?

In an approach analogous to Rajan and Zingales (1998), we examine how the ability to access long-term debt affects firm-level growth volatility. We find that firms in industries with stronger preference to use long-term finance relative to short-term finance experience lower growth volatility in countries with better-developed financial systems, as these firms may benefit from reduced refinancing risk. Institutions that facilitate the availability of credit information and contract enforcement mitigate refinancing risk and therefore growth volatility associated with short-term financing. Increased availability of long-term finance reduces growth volatility in crisis as well as non-crisis periods.